

FOREWORD

I was invited to deliver lectures in the 'Sir Sayajirao Gaekwad Honorary Lecture Series' conducted under the auspices of the Baroda University and I could deliver these lectures—for this I must first of all express my heartfelt gratefulness to the organizers of that lecture-series and particularly to the learned lady Shrimati Hansa Mehta, who was then the vice-chancellor of the Baroda University. Had these gentlemen not invited me to deliver lectures in this honorific series, then an occasion to write out these lectures in the form in which they have been actually written would have hardly arisen during my life-time. The topics discussed in these lectures were of course lying latent in my mind in the form of scattered impressions, but the task of expressing them in a well systematized form demands both concentration and labour. The fact that the Baroda University provided me an occasion to undertake this task constitutes a festival of joy for my life—this is what I feel.

Had I so desired I could write these lectures in the national language Hindi and had they been available in Hindi they would have received a very wide circle of readership. But despite all this I preferred my mother-tongue Gujarati, and one of the chief reasons for that is that I have been a supporter of not only ordinary education but even higher and highest education in different subjects being imparted through the medium of one's mother-tongue. Hence it was obligatory for me to discuss my own subject in my mother-tongue. In the course of fulfilling this obligation I had a realization of the special power inherent in the Gujarati language better than ever before. Certainly, if a devoted student makes an authentic attempt to discuss his own subject in his mothertongue then he can do particular justice to this subject and besides developing the structure of his mother-tongue can make manifest its internal strength. Particularly significant literature thus composed in different provincial languages does ultimately go to enhance the capacity of the national language and introduce rare augmentation in its mass of literature.

If even though expressed in Gujarati these ideas possess something like weight of their own then entering the arena of the national language they will after all shed lustre on it; on the other hand, if they possess no such permanent weight then even though expressed in the national language in the first count itself they will lie rotting in one corner. Since I view matters thus I have in a way subjected myself to the hard test of a touchstone; now to examine my performance is the task of those possessing expertise in the field concerned.

When one is out to write something then the question arises whether the writing should follow a popular style or a scholarly style. The ever growing expansion of education, the ever growing number of readers, and the ever growing propagation of literature—all these factors incline one to write following a popular style. However, I have adopted the opposite course. For this one reason of course was that the series under whose auspices I was to deliver lectures does not belong to an ordinary category. But another reason that was also before me was that if one is to form a correct idea as to the different question pertaining to philosophy and as to the particular traditions arisen in connection with them, then the aim cannot be achieved in case one remains confined to the very upper-surface of consideration. Thus if one makes no attempt to penetrate into their depth the philosophical topics would ultimately look like something lacking sophistication and sheer humdrum. On the other hand, if one on one's own makes an attempt to penetrate down into those topics as deep as possible the scope for acquiring a genuine knowledge as regards them will become wider day by day. And when such topics keep assuming depth a language and a terminology appropriate to them gradually become ever more well-established and are also established anew. Such an accumulated material in due course proves to be of much value while undertaking a popular exposition of the subject concerned.

The subtle and subtler discussion pertaining to so many subjects that have place in the scriptural languages like Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit—it is on account of them that the literature composed in these languages has been able to attain eminence and last long. Certainly, those writing on different subjects in the western languages like English etc. do not write everything whatsoever merely with a view to keeping it within popular reach. Had they too adopted this course alone the eminence that is today attributed to the western languages and to the literature composed in them would have not been available to them. As a result of this and similar considerations I have discarded in the present lecture-series the easy pathway of writing in a popular style.

However, I am myself of the view that popular literature too ought to be composed. The value of such a literature is not at all little; nay, as a result of such a literature being composed and propagated its readership gradually increases and from within its ranks there arises a class—albeit small—of such persons eager for knowledge as can comprehend even literature composed in a scholarly style. If the topics discussed in these lectures are presented in an able fashion and they leave no room—or as little room as possible—for misunderstanding, then on the basis thereof some competent person can also give them another form by writing in a popular style.

In colleges and universities the different branches of Indian philosophy are studied and taught, and maybe the process will gather momentum with the passage of time. These students and teachers of philosophy make use of books pertaining to different topics mostly written in English while in case possible they also take help of high-grade texts composed in the ancient languages like Sanskrit, Prakrit etc. The students and teachers of course make use of this mass of literature, but I have often felt that if a little or more amount of literature dealing with this subject or that is available to them in their mother-tongue or in the national language they manage to gain a particularly clear understanding of the subject while as a result of this gaining a better understanding of it their taste for it increases. Very often, not only students but even teachers enquire as to what particular book in Gujarati or Hindi offers an all-comprehensive and comparative account of this or that topic pertaining to philosophy. This enquiry and demand of theirs was there before me. Hence with a view to satisfying this demand in howsoever little a measure and thus helping them somewhat in their study, I have here in these lectures arranged in a garland form and in my own fashion the flowers of ideas that have blossomed within the fold of Indian traditions around three chief topics pertaining to philosophy, viz. the world, soul and God. The evaluation of their utility can of course be made by students alone.

The concluding remarks given under the title 'Life and Philosophy' and occurring after the fifth lecture—if the readers first go through them and then study these lectures they would be able to form some idea of the order of treating topics here adopted as also of the viewpoint I had in mind while arranging these topics, and hence would find it somewhat easy to follow the subject-matter under treatment. All the five lectures are written with Indian philosophy in view. In the case of each lecture a reference to the chief subject treated has been made at the very outset while the major and minor topics related to this subject that have been taken up are placed under a subtitle located appropriately. At the end of the lectures there has been given a word-index where pagewise reference has been made for technical terms, persons, texts, authors etc. The texts which I have utilized in the form of support and those which are mentioned within the body of a footnote—they too are included in the word-index.

I was at Ahmedabad while at the time of writing out these lectures I went to Kashi. There I stayed for about three months but these lectures were composed well within one-month-and-a-half or two. The rapidity in writing that was due to my stay at Kashi and the specially favourable condition that prevailed at the time of writing – for all this the

credit goes to the highly learned and energetic Pundit Shri Dilsukh Malvania. Had I not gone there and even after having gone there had I not received his conscious co-operation this work of mine must have been delayed and in some respects remained somewhat loose and incomplete. He is of course a student of mine but even more than that he is a good-hearted friend to me. Hence without expressing in relation to him a word of obligation I simply remember him here.

Even after a rough draft of the text has been prepared work has to be done on it in so many ways. I am myself one dependent on another's eyes but I go on getting friends possessed of eyes. After my return back to Ahmedabad so many friends have rendered me help – and with good will – in giving a final form to that rough draft, but I do not wish to detain the reader by mentioning them by name; however, I also cannot do without mentioning by name three of these friends. Shriyuta Rasiklal C. Parikh, who is director of the B. J. Institute working under Gujarat Vidyasabha and is a thoroughgoing scholar versed in so many subjects, is to me a friend of long standing and companion of long standing. It has since ever been my idea that whenever I write or think about a serious topic I present the result before public only after having received his seal of approval. So I got read to him all these five lectures of mine. He gave his approval and at places also suggested improvements. In my mind I place high value on this act of his. Dr. Indukala H. Jhaveri, who has been a student of mine, has not only taken hard pains in preparing the final manuscript of these lectures but the complicated and tiring work of preparing the index is also her doing.

My young friend Dr. Bhogilal Sandesara, who is director of the Oriental Institute and head of the Gujarati Department at the Baroda University, was since the very beginning insistent that I should accept the invitation for these lectures. And I did accept it. When I went to Baroda to deliver these lectures, then too I stayed at his place. Though he himself was then in America his wife Shrimati Chandrakanta proved to be his true representative. Thus right from accepting the invitation for these lectures upto delivering them and getting them prepared in book form—in this long, long process the Sandesara family has been associated in so intimate a fashion that this foreword cannot be ended without recalling that association

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Sukhlal

LECTURE ONE

PHILOSOPHY OR THE SCIENCE OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES ITS ORIGIN AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER

(World, Soul, God)

My subject-matter is philosophy and that too Indian. Whatever philosophical speculation has taken place in India, has been preserved in various forms upto this day, has undergone development and has spread even outside India—of that the history is almost as much—maybe even more—interesting and inspiring as it is long. Here is not the place to discuss the matter in details and moreover I too have my limitation. Hence I want to concentrate my attention exclusively on certain such questions and issues pertaining to this theme as bear a particular importance.

There is neither a beginning nor an end to the length, breadth and depth of the universe and since it possesses no beginning or an end one also cannot say that here lies its middle point.¹ Thus not only the universe taken as a whole but so also a thing considered to be smallest therein or each single event occurring therein is something mysterious and incomprehensible in its total nature. This mysteriousness is so limitless and endless that in spite of so many attempts being made by mankind for so many ages this mysteriousness and incomprehensibility are in a way² not even yet got rid of fully and in a real manner—nor is there any hope that they will be ever got rid of fully. But on the other hand, man's intellect and his curiosity are two such things that they do not allow one rest unless endeavour is made to fathom the depth of the nature of things considered to be mysterious and incomprehensible. A mere bodily life, physical life or life devoted to a propagation of the progeny is such that however much might be its enrichment it fails to satisfy man's urge for life. The roots of man's urge for life are indeed deep, to wit, these roots are of the form of a knowledge of the unknown and a knowledge of that too in manner free

- 1 Naivāgram nāvaram yasya tasya madhyam kuto bhavet. —Mādhyamikakārikā 11.2
Ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne'pi tat tathā. —Māṇḍūkyakārikā 2.6
Jassa natthi purā pacchā majjhe tassa kuo siyā? —Ācārāṅgasūtra I.4.4.3.
- 2 Yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha. —Taittirīyopaniṣad 2.4
Savve sarā niyaṭṭanti. Takkā jattha na vijjā. Maī tattha na gāhiyā. —Ācārāṅgasūtra I.5.6.3.
Iyam viṣṭir yata ābabhūva yadi vā dadhe yadi vā na vā.
Yo asyādhyakṣaḥ parame vyoman tso aṅga veda yadi vā na veda.
—Rgveda, Nāsadiyasūkta 10.129.7

from doubt and error. Not only that, what is done is that the thing known is preserved in memory, is examined over and over again and new questions arising in connection with it are investigated in sequel. Such roots of the urge for life are what have made man to think of himself in the spirit of 'the wise man must aspire after learning and wealth as if he were to suffer no old age, no death'. It is owing to this spirit that man has made endeavours to turn into something comprehensible what was hitherto incomprehensible. A decorative chain of such endeavours is indeed what constitutes a science (=scientific discipline).

The Meaning of the word 'Tattva' (occurring in the word 'tattvavidyā' meaning philosophy or the science of the first principles)

A dictionary-author briefly mentioning the meanings of the word 'tattva' says 'tattvam brahmaṇi yāthārthye' – that is the word 'tattva' means brahman on the one hand and the real nature of a thing on the other. Of course, at numerous places and in different contexts the word 'tattva'³ is found employed in so many different senses, but the two meanings in question well manage to comprehend the shades characterizing those senses as well. Here if the word 'brahman' is taken to mean originating cause and by the real nature of a thing is understood the true situation – that is, situation lying in conformity with the originating cause – of any thing or event whatsoever, then it becomes easy to grasp the idea lying behind these remaining different senses as well.

- 3 Aparapratyayaṃ śāntaṃ prapañcāir aprapañcitam /
Nirvikalpam anānārtam etat tattvasya lakṣaṇam //
Evaṃ tāvad āryāṇāṃ jātijarāmaraṇasaṃsārāparikṣayāya kṛtakāryāṇāṃ tattvalakṣaṇam,
Laukikaṃ tu tattvalakṣaṇam adhikṛtyocyate—
Pratītya yad yad bhavati na hi tāvat tad eva tat /
Na cānyad api tat tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvatam //

—Mādhymikakārikā 18.9,10

Kim punas tattvam ? Sataś ca sadbhāvo'sataś cāsadbhāvaḥ. Sat sad iti gṛhyamānaṃ yathābhūtam aviparītaṃ tattvam bhavati. Asac cāsad iti gṛhyamānaṃ yathābhūtam aviparītaṃ tattvam bhavati.

—Nyāyabhāṣya 1.1.1

Kim punas tattvam ?..Tattvam padārthānāṃ yathāvasthitātmapratyayotpattinimittam. Yo yathāvasthitaḥ padārthaḥ sa tathābhūtapratyayotpattinimittam bhavati yat tat tattvam.

—Nyāyavārtika 1.1.1

Dravyasya hi tattvam avikriyā, parānapekṣatvāt. Vikriyā na tattvam, parāpekṣatvāt.

—Taittirīyopaniṣad, Śāṅkarabhāṣya. p. 381

Prakṛtyapekṣatvāt pratyayasya bhāvasāmānyasaṃpratyayaḥ tattvavacanāt //5//
Tad ity eṣa prakṛtiḥ sāmānyābhidhāyini, sarvanāmatvāt. Pratyayaś ca bhāve utpadyate. Kasya bhāve ? Tad ity anena yo'rtha ucyate. Kaś cāsau ? Sarvo'rthaḥ. Atas tadapekṣatvād bhāvasya bhāvasāmānyam ucyate tattvasābdena. Yo'rtho yathāvasthitaḥ tathā tasya bhavanam ity arthaḥ.

—Tattvārtharājavārtika 1.2.5

The two species of the meaning pertaining to the word 'tattva'—viz. 'originating cause' and 'real nature' (one ontological, the other epistemological)—are indicative of the inclination specific to the human desire to know. From the very start has been this desire-to-know directed towards getting at the originating cause of the world-events. The history of the evolution of man's intellect – a history to be read out from man's deeds at large – is indicated by the one single word 'tattvavidyā.' Of this evolution the first stage is to somehow confront, eliminate or reduce ignorance or nescience. The second stage is to acquire but knowledge as a result of eliminating ignorance — in addition also to make sure that the knowledge is free from error and doubt. The third stage is not to rest content with a mere superficial appearance but to search for the underlying cause and to lead this search upto the ultimate cause.

Persistence-in-truth

In *Praśnopaniṣad* the sixth questioner is Sukeśā Bhāradvāja. While making enquiry from his preceptor Pippalāda he says one thing that is indicative of the longing characteristic of a knowledge-seeker's heart. Thus Sukeśā says to the preceptor : "Once upon a time a prince named Hiraṇyanābha came to me and asked me whether I knew the person-with-sixteen-elements (=ṣoḍaśakala puruṣa). I answered him in the negative saying that in case I knew the person in question there was no reason why I should not admit the fact—the reason indeed being that one who tells lies dries out from the very root as a tree does and perishes."⁴

This answer, given by Sukeśā to the prince fully exhibits an admission of ignorance and a longing for truth. And very famous is the story of Satyakāma Jābāla. His mother had no information as to the identity of his father and yet the young man mentioned to his preceptor this blunt truth as it stood—on which the learned truth-loving preceptor conferred on the young man the designation 'Satyakāma (=aspirant after truth)' and this exemplified for ever the truth that true Brahminhood consists in persistence-in-truth.⁵ This fact indicates as to how high a position was

4 Atha hainaṃ Sukeśā Bhāradvājaḥ papraccha, Bhagavan ! Hiraṇyanābhaḥ Kausalyo rājaputro mām upetyaitaṃ praśnam aprcchata. Ṣoḍaśakalaṃ puruṣaṃ Bhāradvāja vettha ? Tam ahaṃ kumāraṃ abruvaṃ nāhaṃ imaṃ veda. Yady ahaṃ imaṃ avidiṣaṃ kathaṃ te nāvakṣyam iti. Samūlo vā eṣa pariśuṣyati yo'nṛtaṃ abhivadati. Tas-mān nārhaṃy anṛtaṃ vaktum. Sa tūṣṇīṃ ratham āruhya pravavrāja. Taṃ tvāṃ pra-cchāmi kvāsu puruṣa iti.
—*Praśnopaniṣad*, Sixth Question

5 Taṃ hovāca kiṃgotro nu somyāsīti. Sa hovāca nāhaṃ etad veda bho yadgotro'haṃ asmi. Aprcchaṃ mātaram. Sā mā pratyabravīt, bahv ahaṃ carantī paricārīṇī yauv-ane tvāṃ alabhe. Sā'haṃ etan na veda yadgotras tvam asi Jābālā tu nāmāhaṃ asmi, Satyakāmo nāma tvam asīti. So 'haṃ Satyakāmo Jābālo'smi bho iti //4// Taṃ hovāca naitad abrahmaṇo viyaktuṃ arhaṭi. Samidhaṃ somyāharopā tvā neṣye na satyād agā iti.,
—*Chāndogyaopaniṣad* 4.4.4.

occupied by truth in the preceptor-disciple relationship. In Upaniṣads there occur so many anecdotes indicative of such a persistence-in-truth.

In this connection one cannot help recall that immortal hymn of Īśāvāsyā :

*Hiraṇmayena pātreṇa satyasyāpihitam mukham |
Tat tvam pūṣann apūṣṇu satyadharmāya dṛṣṭaye ||*

Here the sage prays to the god Pūṣan that the latter removes away that tempting coverage on account of which truth is concealed and thus makes possible the attainment of vision which realizes truth.

Why did Siddhārtha Gautama undertake spiritual quest for full six years ? The answer is just one—viz. ‘with a view to knowing truth’. When Siddhārtha goes for the first time to meet his those former five colleagues who had earlier taken leave of him at the deer-cave forest and the latter are not ready even to listen to him he won them over through just one word. And this one word was to the following effect : “O monks ! Had I ever spoken a falsehood in your presence ?” Those monks were won over just through this single word. What strength characterized this word ? It was one strength and that was the search-for-truth and persistence-in-truth.⁶ We are not unacquainted with the name of Mahāvīra. That son-of-a-kṣatriya undertook a severe spiritual quest for full twelve years. Had he the wish he could have begun the task of preaching from the very first day after his home-renunciation. But he did not do that. Really, these spiritual seekers had their very blood and their very breathing thoroughly permeated with just one truth—viz. that the preaching of fundamental verities cannot be undertaken so long as through one’s endeavour one has not completed one’s investigation of truth and has not gained a full self-confidence. Such an irrepressible and deeply-felt longing for the knowledge of truth has not been confined exclusively to the spiritual investigators. For such a longing is found pervaded in all the branches of learning whatsoever. Thus in case someone is a devoted student of the science of grammar, then he would endeavour to grasp the principles of this science to the utmost possible limit. The same is true of the remaining sciences like astronomy, medicine, economics, etc. etc.

The Meaning of the Word ‘Darśana’ Investigated

The science of fundamental principles chiefly means the science of spiritual realization (=adhyātmavidyā). The questions pertaining to matters

6 *Evam vutte bhagavā pañcavaggiyabhikkhū etad avoca—‘Abhijānātha me no tumhe bhikkhave ito pubbe evarūpaṃ bhāvitam etaṃ ti. No he ’tam bhante ti araham tathāgato sammāsambuddho.*
—Mahāvagga 1.1.7.

physical (=adhibhūta) and psychological (=adhidaiva) are of course included here but in the ultimate count a treatment of them culminates in the science of spiritual realization. Thus since all the remaining investigations are directed towards spiritual realization they are but a part and parcel of the science of spiritual realization.

The science called 'tattvavidyā', 'adhyātmavidyā' or 'paravidyā (=high learning)' is also called 'darsana'. In Indian languages the words like 'darsana', 'darsanika sahitya', 'darsanika vidvān' are current and they all directly have to do with the science of spiritual realization. But here the question is that the current and etymological meaning of the word 'darsana' is visual cognition—the word in fact being derived from the verbal root 'dṛś' standing for visual cognition—and so what understanding was responsible for it to be employed in the sense of supersensuous spiritual cognition. The question is also indirectly answered by a number of utterances occurring in Upaniṣads.

While referring to the relative strength or superiority of the various external sense-organs there has been said in Upaniṣads 'cakṣur vai satyam (=the eye verily is truth)' (Bṛhadāraṇyaka 5.14.4.), 'cakṣur vai pratiṣṭhā (=the eye verily is the root-principle)' (Bṛhadāraṇyaka 6.1.3). When some matter is under dispute a witness is needed in order to decide the issue; now in case here there are available two witnesses, of whom one has simply heard of the event concerned while the other has also seen it, then the latter turns out to be a more reliable authority and what he says is deemed to be true. Thus it is that the visual sense-organ is considered to be more authoritative than the auditory sense-organ. So eye is the only sense-organ which makes possible a distinguishing between places even and uneven, high and low, thus preventing men and creatures in general from fall and lending them steadiness or rootedness.⁷ Thus in comparison to the

7 Cakṣur vai satyam, cakṣur hi vai satyam. Tasmād yad idāṇīm dvau vivadamānāv eyātām aham adarśam aśrauṣam iti. Ya evaṃ brūyād aham adarśam iti tasmā eva śraddadhyāma tad vai tat satyam.....

Kiṃ punas tattvam ity ucyate—cakṣur vai satyam. Kathaṃ cakṣuḥ satyam ity āha—prasiddham etac cakṣur hi vai satyam. Kathaṃ prasiddhatety āha—tasmāt—yad yadidāṇīm eva dvau vivadamānau viruddham vadamānāv eyātām āgaccheyātām aham adarśam dṛṣṭvānasmīti. Anya āha aham aśrauṣam tvayā dṛṣṭam na tathā tad vastv iti. Tasya ya evaṃ brūyād aham adarśam iti tasmā eva śraddadhyāma. Na punar yo brūyād aham aśrauṣam iti. Śrotur mṛṣā api śravaṇaṃ sambhavati. Na tu cakṣuḥ mṛṣā darsanam. Tasmān nāśrauṣam ity uktavate śraddadhyāma. Tasmāt satyapratititthetutvāt satyam cakṣuḥ. —Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, Śāṅkarabhāṣya 5.14.4

Cakṣur vai pratiṣṭhā. Cakṣuṣā hi same ca dūrge ca pratititthati.

Yady evaṃ ucyatām kā'sau pratiṣṭhā. Kathaṃ cakṣuṣāḥ pratititthātvam ity āha—cakṣuṣā same ca dūrge ca dṛṣṭvā pratititthati.

—Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, Śāṅkarabhāṣya 6.1.3

remaining sense-organs eye stands very much closer to truth and evenhandedness — this is what Upaniṣads make known. And that is why a higher status is occupied by visual cognition — known as 'darśana'—in comparison to the remaining sense-born cognitions. Since in practical life vision is of great importance the grammarian's explanation of the word 'sākṣin (=witness)' is sākṣād draṣṭā (=one who sees directly).⁸

Since in practical and gross life darśana (=vision) stands closest to truth it is this very word 'darśana' which was employed in the sense of spiritual cognition. Thus the sages, poets or yogins who have had a direct realization of the supersensuous things like soul, Supreme Soul etc. — that is, who have had an imperturbable and doubt-free realization of these things — are called 'draṣṭṛ (=seer)'. Since the direct realization of things spiritual on their part comprehends truth it is called 'darśana'. Thus the word 'darśana' currently standing for the science of spiritual realization turns out to mean 'that clear, doubt-free and for that very reason unperturbed cognition which pertains to things supersensuous like soul, Supreme Soul etc.' Indeed darśana is the supreme limit of the purity of cognition and its truthfulness; again, darśana is the maturization of the purity of cognition. Thus we have seen as to what is the real — i.e. original — idea signified by the word 'darśana' traditionally current in the sense of 'science of spiritual realization'.

However, certain other issues too are connected therewith, and they too merit consideration. Just like the words 'tattvavidyā' and 'tattvadarśana' certain other words too are employed in an identical sense; for example, the words 'tattvacintana', 'tattvavicāraṇā', 'tattvajijñāsā', 'tattvavijñāna' etc. To one viewing things superficially it might seem that these so many words 'darśana', 'tattvacintana', etc., since they are synonyms, convey the same sense, but on examining things in the light of the scriptural teaching and of experience the truth turns out to be a bit different. It is only when this truth is realized that we can understand as to how much and what type of mental endeavour has to be undertaken with a view to reaching that supreme level of knowledge-purity which is represented by darśana — also as to what are the chief stages to be traversed in the course of this mental endeavour and as to what distinguishes the shades of meaning possessed by the words 'darśana' on the one hand and 'tattvacintana' etc. on the other.

8 'Sākṣād draṣṭā'. Sākṣāto draṣṭety asminn arthe in nāmni syāt. Sākṣī.

—Siddhahemaśabdānuśāsana, Laghuvṛtti 7.1.197

In the sub-section Dyūtaparva of the section Sabhāparva is this very idea beautifully expressed as follows by Vidura while reporting an ancient dialogue in the presence of the assembly :

Samakṣadarśanāt sākṣyam śravāṇāc ceti dhāraṇāt /

Tasmāt satyaṃ bruvan sākṣī dharmārthābhyāṃ na hīyate // 2.61.76

The vision of things supersensuous is not had by everyone and all of a sudden; for there is a progressive order reaching upto that stage. In this connection there are to be met with three chief stages.⁹ First, in relation to the principle whose darśana is being sought after knowledge has to be gathered at the feet of experienced persons or from the collected utterances of such persons. This constitutes the stage of listening (=śravaṇa). Then what is listened and what is understood thereby have to be further meditated and pondered over on the basis of argumentation, logic and reasoning. This constitutes the second stage. Afterwards, with a sense of concentration and with a mind rid of all affliction (=prepossession) one has to make endeavour with a view to entering into the heart of the matter concerned. This constitutes the third stage. Unless these three stages are properly worked out the stage of darśana or direct realization is never worked out and on the other hand when these three stages are worked out there is no delay in realizing darśana. Viewed thus darśana is the pinnacle of truth-cognition while earlier three stages are progressive stepping-stones leading upto it. The words like 'tattvacintana', 'tattvavicāraṇā', 'tattvajijñāsā' and 'tattvamimāṃsā' are indicative of the mental operation preliminary to the realization of darśana and not the darśana-operation itself. However, seers are but few while knowledge-seekers are possibly many. Someone might be occupying the first stage, some other the second, while a third one the third, but since all of them are directed towards darśana this their progressive mental operation is called darśana; and hence it is that often enough the words likes 'tattvacintana', 'tattvavicāraṇā', 'tattvajijñāsā' are found employed as synonyms for 'darśana' not only in popular usage but so also in the scriptural texts.

In the Buddhist tradition the three prajñās are indicative of this very order; they are śrutamayī, cintāmayī and bhāvanāmayī (types of prajñā).

This prolonged discussion has been undertaken with a view to making one, properly understand the differing shades of meaning characterizing the word 'darśana' on the one hand and 'tattvacintana' etc. on the other. In default of such an understanding we too often treat as darśana a mere śravaṇa (=the first stage), manana (=the second stage) or nididhyāsana (=the third stage) and claiming to have attained ultimate truth on the basis of that alone either develop a feeling of smugness or resort to obstinacy when a difference of opinion arises with another person.

⁹ Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsītavyaḥ.

Maitreyī ! ātmano vā are darśanena śravaṇena matyā vijñānēnedam sarvaṃ viditam.

—Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣad 2.4.5

Āgamenānumānena dhyānābhyāsarasena ca /

Tridhā prakalpayan prajñāṃ labhate yogam uttamam //

—Quoted in the bhāṣya on Yogasūtra 1.48

Really speaking, tattvadarśana is yogic cognition which is known to certain traditions under the title 'ṛtambharā prajñā'¹⁰ or 'kevalajñāna-cum-kevaladarśana'. But at the same time, all these traditions also confer the designation 'darśana'¹¹ on such a firm faith in (the efficacy of) darśana as is had even in the absence of darśana itself; faith had in (the efficacy of) that direct darśana which relates to things supersensuous – a faith had in the absence of such a darśana itself—is to be called 'darśana' only in a secondary, practical or indirect sense.

One thing more has to be understood in this connection; whatever philosophical texts there are which undertake a treatment of the science of spiritual realization (=adhyātmavidyā) contain a treatment that belongs to the category śravaṇa (=listening), cintana-cum-manana (=cogitation-cum-pondering) and may be nididhyāsana (=penetration). In accordance with this line of reasoning the word 'darśana' originally stood for visual experience and then through a transfer of epithet for very lucid mental experience independent of eyes. Afterwards, it came to stand for the faith had in this very lucid mental experience and gradually for the argumentation, cogitation etc. which bring about such a mental experience as also for the texts which undertake a treatment of it.

Hence it is that such texts, even if they are directed towards things spiritual, are found to harbour sharp mutual difference and to undertake severe criticism of one another. Thus is accounted for that mutual difference, disputation and criticism which one comes across in scriptural texts even in case there happens to occur no mutual difference as regards the final darśana itself.¹²

Generally speaking, the supposition uptil now was that the initial seeds of philosophical speculation (=tattvacintana) are there in certain hymns of R̥gveda.¹³ Such a supposition impels a researcher to argue as if philosophical speculation took its rise with the seers (=authors) of these hymns themselves; but this supposition is now undergoing modification. Ever since research was undertaken related to Indus-civilization and Dravidian civilization, thought given to the remnants of the religion and mode-

10 Ṛtambharā tatra prajñā. Śrutānumānaprajñābhyām anyaviṣayā viśeṣārthatvāt.

—Yogasūtra 1.48-49

Mohakṣayāt jñānadarśanāvaraṇāntarāyākṣayāc ca kevalam

—Tattvārthasūtra 10.1

Kusalacittasampayuttam vipassanā ñāṇam paññā.

—Visuddhimagga 14.2

11 Tattvārthasāddhānam samyagdarśanam.

—Tattvārthasūtra 1.2

12 For a discussion on the different meanings attached to the word 'darśana' see my essay-collection 'Darshan aur Chintan' pp. 67-78.

13 R̥gveda 1.164; 10. 5, 27, 88, 129 etc.

of-worship specific to Indus-civilization, and certain valid surmises began to be made as regard the practice-cum-thought of the indigenous Indian people that were there prior to the advent and spread of the Vedic Aryans. The researchers are more and more definitely of the view that the currents of practice-cum-thought specific to the pre-Vedic civilization have to some extent gained entrance in the practice-cum-thought of the latter-day people, currents which certainly underwent modification but which neither were extirpated nor could be extirpated. True, the written part of the remnants of the Indus-civilization has not yet been deciphered in a doubt-free form. And the task of determining as to which elements of this ancient Dravidian-cum-Indus civilization have been preserved in the latter-day literature and in what form remains to be accomplished and is also tremendously labour-consuming. Besides, on the basis of an analysis of the Vedic literature Dr. Devadatta Bhandarkar in his book 'Some Aspects of Ancient Indian Culture' has envisaged the possibility of some religion-cum-culture having been prevailed in the eastern parts of the pre-Vedic India — that is noteworthy.

Relation Between the Greek and Indian Philosophical Speculations

Generally it is understood that old are two currents of philosophical speculation — viz. the Greek and the Indian. And since long have the scholars been discussing whether there is or is not a mutual relationship between the two. The question was in fact raised for the first time by the western researchers; and an attempt to answer it too was indicated by them. Later on, the Indian savants too have taken part in the task of answering it. Some German and other scholars, on the basis of a comparative study, came to maintain that the Greek philosophical speculation influenced the Indian, but scholars like Garbe¹⁴ are of the view that the Indian philosophical speculation influenced the Greek. The question has been given right consideration by Max Muller.¹⁵ Thus his confirmed view is that there is no definite evidence for maintaining that either of the two thought-currents in question has influenced the other. He admits that there is a great similarity between the Greek and Indian thought-currents but goes on to add that this similarity is no sufficient ground for proving that either has influenced the other. Too often is an identity of thought naturally generated between human groups belonging to two different geographical regions and two different periods of time. So until a doubt-free evidence is forthcoming it has to be admitted that the Greek and Indian philosophical speculations have run a parallel course without influencing each other.

¹⁴ Philosophy of Ancient India (1897) p. 32 onwards.

¹⁵ The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy (1903) pp. 58-59

After having specially considered all the earlier researches pertaining to the subject Dr. Radhakrishnan¹⁶ has examined the question in details. His own finally established view is that so many spiritual propositions pertaining to an ethically uplifted life that we come across in Greek philosophical speculation are definitely influenced by the Indian philosophical speculation and an ethically perfect life as led in India.

It has to be kept in mind that this question pertaining to mutual influence is raised in respect of the pre-Alexander period. On the other hand, in view of the fact that after Alexander's invasion relations between the Indian and Greek peoples grew ever stronger there is no difficulty whatsoever in maintaining that on so many questions the Greeks have adopted Indian views while on so many others the Indians have adopted Greek views.

In connection with philosophical speculation the scholars have also raised the issue that the Western Philosophical speculation has began as free from religious considerations while the Indian philosophical speculation has always remained related with religious considerations. According to many Western scholars, the cause thereof is that in Europe religion came from Asia while its philosophical speculation is to be traced to the Greek tradition. But in India philosophy being an integral part of darśana such a separation was not needed here. Certainly, it seems that Indian sages have been suitably placing emphasis on faith and intellect which are two mutually inseparable aspects of life.

In India whatever philosophical speculation has managed to survive has done so owing to the support received from the side of a religious sect. If corresponding to a philosophical speculation a religious sect did not come into existence or did not survive it became extinct; such for example was the case with Cārvākas, Ājīvakas etc. On the other hand, if a philosophical speculation has sought support in some religious sect or other it has evolved and spread depending on the relative strength of this religious sect; such for example was the case with Buddhism, Jainism, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, Utra-mīmāṃsā etc.

The Order of Evolution in Philosophical Speculation :

Philosophical speculation is supposed to have three chief topics, viz. world, soul, God. Numerous questions have arisen in connection with these three topics and each questions has been considered even in minutest details. On perusing the hitherto composed Indian philosophical literature—that is, on analysing in its entirety the philosophical speculation that has

16 Eastern Religion and Western Thought, ch. IV.

been undertaken here—we find ourselves face to face with two distinct parts, viz. one comprising speculation based on logical ratiocination and one comprising that based on experience. Generally speaking, the function of intellect is to follow ever new curiosities and to seek to satisfy them. Such a satisfaction is sometimes arrived at with the help of logical ratiocination, sometimes with that of experience. The field of logical ratiocination will invariably be wider than that of experience, but it is only the philosophical speculation based on experience that is bound to be mature and solid. Just as in science a reasoning or hypothesis becomes a scientific theory only when verified through an experiment—a hypothesis without a supporting experiment being but sheer imagination—similarly in philosophical speculation the element finding support in experience proves uncontradicted and finally gains universal admission while that element in philosophical speculation which is based on no experience turns out to be of the nature of sheer imagination. This imagination will stand repudiated as soon as any contrary evidence whatsoever is forthcoming and the element concerned will turn out to be something contradicted. Such is the factual situation. When we take up for consideration any current whatsoever that has appeared in the field of Indian philosophical speculation it will be found to exhibit both these elements but the element based on ratiocination is bound to predominate. Hence it is that in respect of formulations that are based on ratiocination the so many philosophical currents have been disputing with one another and such formulations have also received a special standing within the body of philosophical literature. However, we have only to understand that it will be erroneous to think that in each school whatever and however much is forthcoming in the name of philosophical speculation is something based on experience—that is, something established finally.

Experience too has got grades. Thus in case an experience belonging to one grade but being treated as final is sought to be supported through ratiocination then owing to the fact that this experience, even if partially genuine, is treated as final and established to be so with the help of ratiocination many a time the thinkers lose sight of even the partial genuineness of this experience. In the technical terminology of the Jainas this very idea is expressed through the concepts of *naya* and *nayābhāsa*.¹⁷

17 *Ec puna saṅgahao pādikkamalakkhaṇaṃ duveṇhaṃ pi /
Tambhā micchadditṭhī patteyaṃ do vi mūlanayā //13//
Na ya taio atthi naō na ya sammattaṃ na tesu paḍipunnāṃ /
Jena duve egantā vibhajjamāṇā aṇeganto //14//
Tambhā savve vi nayā micchādītṭhī sapakkhapaḍibaddhā /
Aṇṇonṇaṇissīā uṇa havanti sammattasabbhāvā //21//
Taha nīyavāyāsuvinicchiyā vi aṇṇonṇapakḥhaniravekkhā /
Sammaddaṃsaṇasaddaṃ savve vi nayā na pāventi //23//*

The direction of philosophical speculation is progressive. Thus proceeding from what is gross it moves upto what is subtle, from what is subtle upto what is most subtle—thus ultimately finding rest in what is something incomprehensible. Employing a Jaina terminology it can be said that philosophical speculation begins with *dravya* (=outward appearance) or what is gross and culminates in *bhāva* (=inner essence) or what is the subtlest *paryāya* (=mode) or something incomprehensible. A historical and comparative study of the available Indian philosophical literature testifies this very situation. The statement is corroborated by the very evolution that has been undergone by the consideration of the chief subject-matter of philosophical speculation—viz. the three things world, soul and God. Thus about the constitution of the world there first arises the physical standpoint. Those upholding such a standpoint—be they *Cārvākas*, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, *Sāṅkhya*, Buddhist or Jaina—have been considering the nature of the world by treating it as something physical in some form or other. They certainly, exhibit among themselves a more or less pronounced difference of opinion but they all uphold the same standpoint so far as the fundamental idea is concerned—that is, the idea that the visible universe is made up of some physical substance or other or is of the form of a physical substance. This constitutes what is called the physical (= *ādhibhautika*) standpoint as regards the world. But in course of time there arises another standpoint, viz. the psychical (= *adhivijñāna*, *adhicaitasika*) standpoint. According to this standpoint, the world seen and experienced is not made of any physical substance but is solely of the form of consciousness. To wit, this world is verily an externally appearing form of consciousness that is something internal; this form is not really something different from consciousness and since it yet appears to be something different therefrom it is of the nature of a concealed truth or something imputed. After this standpoint too there comes another one and that is the spiritual (= *adhyātma*, *adhibrahma*) standpoint. According to the latter, the world is ultimately of the form of a sole impartite reality comprising existence, consciousness and bliss, a reality technically called *Brahman*—while on the other hand all grossness or multiplicity experienced therein is something illusory and ultimately unreal.

A similar evolution of thought is encountered in respect of soul. Thus those like the materialist *Cārvākas* denied independent individuality to a soul or consciousness but supposed it to be a mere physical transformation and accounted for the experienced life-practice on the basis of this supposition. But then there arose other philosophers who went beyond this *Cārvāka* supposition and who, attributing an independent individuality to a

Niyayavayanijjasaccā savvaṇayā paraviyālaṇe mohā /

*Te una na diṭṭhasamā vibhayai saccā va alie vā //*28// —*Sammati*, First *Kāṇḍa*

Also to be consulted are the *gāthās* 46–49 of the third *Kāṇḍa* of *Sammati*.

soul or conscious element, treated it as something absolutely different from all physical substance. Even so, in the line of thinking adopted by these philosophers positing an independent conscious element there yet remained some tinge or other of the materialist standpoint. Thus the Jainas and Buddhists attributed to consciousness, under this name or that, an independent individuality, and yet the conscious element posited by them exhibits in a real fashion physical properties like 'size-reduction or size-expansion in imitation of the body concerned' 'quality, multiplicity etc. that are in fact characteristic of things physical'. As for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Sāṅkhyas — among the latter some positing 25 fundamental elements, other 26 — they in this connection of course refrained from the talk of size-reduction and size expansion but some shadow of physicality is definitely exhibited by a soul or the conscious element posited by them. Thus the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas do treat a soul as something ubiquitous and eternal-without-undergoing-change, but they do not attribute to this soul consciousness in the form of an inseparable feature, a feature in virtue of which this soul should always undergo a conscious experience. On their view, a soul in the state of emancipation (=mokṣa) assumes a status akin to that of a physical element like ākāśa (=ether), both being something non-conscious and eternal-without-undergoing-change. True, the Sāṅkhyas treat a soul (=puruṣa) as something conscious by nature, but on their view too souls exhibit multiplicity which is essentially a physical feature. The advocates of the doctrine called 'Vijñānavāda' view soul in the form of a series of conscious states. Thus according to them it is not of the form of a permanent substance, and yet in view of the fact that they posit a multiplicity of consciousness-series they too cannot be said to be free from the idea of attributing to the conscious element an essentially physical features. This might be said to be the second stage traversed by the philosophical speculation pertaining to the nature of soul. The last stage is represented by the doctrine called 'Adhībrahmavāda'. According to it, neither one soul nor many souls are either a transformation of some physical element or individuals somehow or other independent of one another. The view is that so many conscious elements — call them soul, puruṣa, consciousness-series or whatever you like — are but an adventitious form of the one single impartite consciousness, this being the reason why all mutual difference among these conscious elements is sheer imaginary. Really, on this view souls are characterized neither by 'size-reduction or size-expansion in imitation of the body concerned', nor by 'multiplicity that is in fact characteristic of things physical', nor by lack of consciousness (-jādatā). Evolution of thought is thus observed also as regards the nature of the element called soul.

Almost similar is the case as regards the element called God. At some stage God was posited in the form of an independent individual and one bringing about world-creation and world-destruction. It began to be thought that if God be no world-creator and world-preserver then neither would the world be created nor would its ordered functioning become possible. Really speaking, such a concept of God was a physicalist concept inasmuch as God was here described as a thousand-headed one and the like¹⁸ while subsequently the logicians attributed to Him even a body made up of atoms.¹⁹ But gradually the concept of God also began to assume another shape. According to it, even if eternally an independent individual God is considered to be exclusively an object of worship,²⁰ The element God posited in the Yoga-tradition is not originally conceived as a world-creator and world-preserver but a purely ideal object of worship who inspires the spiritual realizers to undertake endeavour on their own – He thus having been rendered devoid of all physicality. This might be called the ideal-positing concept (= *adhi-ādarśavāda*) pertaining to God. However, the philosophers did not rest content merely with that. For taking a further step they proclaimed that just like a soul God too is something adventitious. On this view, the ultimately real original element is single impartite and one comprising existence, consciousness and bliss, but just as the adventitious element nescience (= *avidyā*) causes an apparent multiplicity of souls the adventitious element illusion (= *māyā*) causes an independent existence of God. He having no real independent existence.

Viewing thus one learns that philosophers have definitely made progress by bestowing ever deeper thought on the three concepts world, soul and God.

18 *Sahasraśīrṣā puruṣaḥ sahasrākṣaḥ sahasrapāt /*

Sa bhūmim viśvato vṛtvā'atyatiṣṭhad daśāṅgulaḥ // —R̥gveda 10.90.1

19 *Sākṣād adhiṣṭhātari sādhye paramānvādinām śarīratvaprasaṅga iti—kim idaṃ śarīratvaṃ yat prasajyate ? Yadi sākṣāt prayatnavadadhiṣṭheyatvaṃ tad iṣyate eva.*

—Vṛtti on Nyāyakusumāñjali, Fifth Stabaka, kārikā 2, p. 45 (Chaukhamba, 1912)

20 *Kleśakarmavipākāṣayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ. Tatra niratīṣayam sarvajñabijam.* —Yogasūtra 1. 24-25

For a detailed discussion see 'Origin and Development of the Sāṅkhya System of Thought' by Puliṇbihari Chakravarti, Calcutta, 1952, pp. 28-9, 65-9.

LECTURE TWO

THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT : THE FOUNDATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL COGNITION AND THE LIMITATION OF KNOWLEDGE-CAPACITY

The foundation of philosophical speculation is constituted by a reflection over the relation of cause and effect. Where reflection over the relation of cause and effect has not taken its rise there the rise of philosophical speculation is not at all possible. And reflection over the relation of cause and effect (briefly, causal relation) takes place only within the limitations of space as well as time. Thus as the observation of space-extended universe had by one arguments, expands and becomes more lucid and as the impression left by the time-extended experience had by one becomes ever richer and stronger the reflection over causal relation becomes ever more pervasive; as a consequence, the depth and definitiveness exhibited by this reflection too becomes ever greater. And with the development, expansion, and rectification of the reflection-over-causal-relation the sphere of philosophical speculation too undergoes expansion, development and special rectification. Indeed, it is as a result of such an expansion, development and rectification that ever new topics of investigation gain admission in philosophical speculation; nay, under such conditions the understanding of the very nature of philosophical speculation undergoes a change.

However, when philosophers begin to bestow consideration on that level which lies beyond the limitation of space and time they find that the concept of causal relation is of no avail; and yet such a level too which the philosophers designate by phrases like 'that beyond comprehension', 'that beyond description', 'that beyond analysis' is supposed to be a proper topic for philosophical speculation.

Causal Relation on Different Levels

Well-planned treatises dilating on the definitions of causal relation and raising questions such as 'What is an effect?', 'What is a cause?' 'What types of cause can there be?' were of course composed at a relatively later date,¹ but a discussion on things satisfying the need for such definitions and classifications has taken place - very clearly and too often even in great

1 Kāraṇābhāvāt kāryābhāvaḥ. Na tu kāryābhāvāt kāraṇābhāvaḥ.

—Vaiśeṣikadarśana 1.2. 1-2

A consideration of dependent origination (=pratītyasamutpāda) taken in a direct order and a reverse order occurs in the section Dhammacakkapavattanasutta of Mahāvagga as also in Visuddhimagga (17.9, p. 363).

details—in texts like Vedas, Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads, Āgamas,² Piṭakas. When thought is given to all this then it appears that consideration as to causal relation has been conducted on three levels, viz. this-worldly, other-worldly and unworldly. And on the basis thereof it can be said that the topics which are dealt with in the course of philosophical speculation are related to these very three levels.

The causal relation which on having taken note of the inevitable order of succession characterizing such physical events as are amenable to sense-experience and occur at a place or time more or less remote belongs to the type called 'worldly'; that is to say, in order to comprehend this type of causal relation mind endeavours chiefly on the basis of the capacity inherent in sense-organs. For example, we in practice find that a piece of cloth is an effect and that such a person is its producer while such things are the requisite means of production. An observation of this type generates in men curiosity to know about the cause of world-construction and as a result he posits some divine being or some other subtle material by way of that which causes the ever new events occurring in the world. This is what we call causal relation of the worldly type.

However, when impelled by the impressions left by an observation of this very type of causal relation man resorts to a deeper cognition then so many new questions occur to him. And thus runs his cogitation: "The social religious practices and ethical observances that are followed in life—are they absolutely futile? Is the consequence yielded by them possible of attainment in this life alone or even after an end of this life? Again, the relative strength or weakness of the pleasure or pain experienced in the world of living beings as also the difference exhibited in different cases by the impressions left by these pleasures and pains—are they dependent only on the working of the worldly type of causal relation or is there also operative some other type of causal relation determining them?" These and similar questions occasioned a consideration of the doctrine of rebirth or another world. According to this doctrine, in the same manner as the successive events occurring in this world are dependent on one type of causal relation the inequality observable in the world of living beings, since it is dependent on the impression left by a past life, comes under the operation of another type of causal relation called 'other-worldly'.

2 Asad vā idam agra āsit. —Taittirīyopaniṣad 2.7

Ātmā vā idam eka evāgra āsin nānyat. —Aitareyopaniṣad 1.1

bhidyate hṛdayagranthiś chidyante sarvasaṁśayāḥ /

kṛiyante cāśya karmāṇi tasmin dṛṣṭe parāvare // —Muṇḍakopaniṣad 2.2.8

Sad eva somyedam agra āsit. —Chāndogyaopaniṣad 6.2.1

Prayogapariṇata, mīṣrapariṇata and visrasāpariṇata pudgala.

—Sthānāṅgasūtra, Gujarati translation, Gujarat Vidyapith, p. 532

The sphere of causal relation has extended even beyond that, an extension one might designate 'unworldly'. This type of causal relation does not seek to account for the occurrence of physical events nor is it particularly concerned with that doctrine of rebirth or another world. For in connection with this there takes place an entirely different type of consideration — that is, the consideration as to how and through what means such a situation can possibly be created that the difference between what is this worldly and what is other-worldly loses meaning. The causal relation touching upon this unworldly level is in fact the causal relation concerned with the task of spiritual purification.

Thus the three stages of thought-evolution pertaining to causal relation have turned philosophical speculation too into a performance conducted on three levels. The first level chiefly covers the this-worldly discussion concentrating on matters economic and erotic; the second level chiefly covers discussion on matters economic and erotic as also that on other-worldly matters taken care of by religion directed towards things worldly; lastly, the third chiefly covers discussion on matters spiritual — that is, matters pertaining to emancipation — which are taken care of by religion directed against things worldly. Thus both the doctrine of rebirth and the doctrine of emancipation having found place within the body of philosophical speculation it has assumed a novel shape altogether.

The cases illustrating these stages and levels are found scattered throughout the literature belonging to the period preceding the age of philosophizing.³

3. How the Vedic Aryans were jolly and seekers of this-worldly pleasure has been shown by Winternitz in his 'History of Sanskrit Literature' on the basis of the hymns devoted to Indra, Agni etc. See pp. 68, 80, 86-7.

In Brahmanical texts : (1) The this-worldly stage—'Putrakāmo yajeta', 'Vṛṣṭikāmo yajeta', 'Rājyakāmo yajeta' etc. (2) The other-worldly stage—'Svargakāmo yajeta' and the acts like śrāddha (=feast for manes) etc. that prove beneficial at the time of stay in the Dakṣiṇāyana region. (3) The stage devoted to emancipation—Upaniṣadic utterances 'Brahma vid brahmaiva bhavati' etc.

In Praśnopaniṣad the fifth question enquires about the benefits to be derived from a meditation-till-death over the word 'Om'. While answering it Pippalāda says that a meditation over each of this word's constituent-letters respectively leads to the attainment of the region of men, the intermediate region, and the region of Brahman. Thus in this hymn all the three stages have found mention at one single place.

When the Magadhan king Ajātaśatru enquired from Buddha about the observable benefits to be derived from monkhood then the latter enumerated so many of such benefits; and of these some are this-worldly, some other-worldly.

In the Jaina tradition too it is suggested that chanting a religious hymn and similar acts yield benefits like this-worldly ones, other-worldly ones, etc.

The doctrine of causal relation being a doctrine acceptable to all the systems of thought no philosopher can take exception to it. Thus 'What is the cause of the world of external and internal phenomena?', 'What is the nature of this world?', 'What is rebirth?', 'What is the cause and what the nature of rebirth?', 'What are the means for attaining emancipation?', 'What is the nature of emancipation?'—these and similar questions pertaining to matters practical and spiritual have been sought to be answered by every philosopher whatsoever. Certainly, while answering these questions each philosopher employs the principle of causal relation in an identical fashion, and yet the positions or conclusions arrived at are different in different cases. It will not be improper to make clear as to why that happens.

The Generic and the Specific Accounted For

Knowledge or cognitive operation is of the form of comprehending both what is generic and what is specific. No such cognition is possible where in some form or other both the generic and the specific do not make their appearance. Really, it is owing to such an appearance that whatever living beings there are manage to conduct their life-journey. Even such lower species of living beings as beasts and birds have a generic cognition of the class or group to which they themselves belong, a cognition on the basis of which they receive the needed support or help. They also have specific cognition about their food, place of residence, place of shelter, progeny and they live their life. As for the human type of cognition, its grade is much superior to the type in question. It is not guided merely by the instincts of hunger, fear and sex-urge but its curiosity and the possibility of its development are so immense that however limited in strength it might be it develops eagerness to bring under its grasp all the three phases of time (i. e. past, present, future) and all the lands far and near. It is this mental eagerness which impels the philosopher to seek an explanation for both the forms—viz. the generic and the specific—that are experienced in an act of cognition.

The two forms – viz. the generic and the specific – that are experienced in an act of cognition are there due to a corresponding nature belonging to the concerned object of cognition – this general conclusion is certainly what each and every philosopher arrived at. The philosophers also did proceed to answer one question, viz. 'Of what type ought to be the ultimate cause that has given rise to the manifest multiplicity of effects spread out in space and time, a type which ought to account for the fact that two forms – viz. the generic and the specific – are observable there in this manifest multiplicity?', but in the course of doing so they, because of each having a tradition of his own, a prepossession of his own, an inclination of his own, gave rise to a number of mutually differing idealogical trends. As to how that happened we now consider in brief.

‘What mutual difference characterizes the diverse effects that are observable there and what element of mutual similarity is experienced in respect for them?’—this question was answered in one way by a philosopher like Kapila and in this or that entirely different way by the remaining philosophers. Thus Kapila understands the generic element as the element of similarity and maintains that all effects whatsoever—whether gross or subtle—are mutually separate and different but that they yet exhibit some sort of similarity. And with a view to explaining as to wherefrom and how this similarity arose he posited an element technically called ‘*Prakṛti*’ which is spread over throughout the universe and is also permanent. And to this element he attributed the capacity to assume the form of an effect possessing a limited spatial extent as also the capacity to make appear and eventually to make disappear such transformations as arise in the course of time and in response to a need. Hence it is that even if the originating cause is one and single the (twofold) capacity in question manages to produce multifarious effects possessing their own distinct spatial and temporal features. Within the body of these effects that originating cause remains thoroughly permeated. This originating cause so develops, expands or inflates its constituent-units technically called ‘*guṇas*’—mixed in different proportions in different cases—that even while preserving its pristine form it lends its own stuff to the various particular effects emerging out of itself and yet in the process undergoes no reduction whatsoever. This supposition of Kapila establishes cause in the form of something-eternal-undergoing-change—as a corollary to which the stuff pertaining to the unmanifest originating cause continues to exist in the entire lot of manifest worldly multiplicity. It is this existence that accounts for the element of similarity observable over there in the universe. Thus according to the elucidation offered by Kapila the things spatially and temporally specific are real and so also the similarity observable among these things. This supposition is followed also by certain other philosophers—e. g. Rāmānuja, Vallabha etc. These philosophers too attribute transformation to the ultimate originating-cause as posited by them and on the basis thereof they explain as to how both what is generic and what is specific are real.

On the Jaina view the originating cause of the worldly multiplicity is not any single substance but, as on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, an infinite number of mutually independent real substances; but since on this view too a real is something eternal-undergoing-change it too explains as to how both what is generic and what is specific are real by supposing that the originating-cause continues to exist in the effects concerned—e. g. in the effect technically called ‘*skandha* (=aggregate)’.

On the other hand, philosophers like Śāṅkara offer an altogether different explanation for what is generic and what is specific. Thus according to

them, the generic is not the same thing as the similar inasmuch as no similarity is at all possible in the absence of a real difference; the conclusion is that the generic is the same thing as the single or impartite. On this view it is supposed that at the basis of the world phenomena there exists one single impartite and undifferentiated real element which is possessed of no constituent-units whatsoever and no qualities whatsoever. This real element, since it is impartite and undifferentiated, is something eternal-undergoing-no-change; in it a transformation or a change is not at all possible. This real element alone is what is ultimately real. What particular worldly phenomena spread out in time are apparently observable there carry nothing whatsoever in the form of an underlying substance – these particular phenomena in fact being but a superimposition caused merely by ignorance or nescience. The realness apparent in these phenomena pertains not to themselves but to that basic element which acts as their substratum and is itself something undifferentiated and impartite. Hence it is that the multiplicity of phenomenal effects, even if devoid of a real existence, appears to be real owing to the existence pertaining to what acts as the substratum of this multiplicity. Thus this line of consideration culminates in the view that the particular phenomenal effects are not something real but merely ignorance-born – something of the form of a mere apparent transformation, a view according to which the real or ultimate existence pertains to what acts as the substratum of these effects. This monistic doctrine positing the reality of something eternal-undergoing-no-change is upheld by Śāṅkara alone.

Nor was there unanimity about offering an explanation of what a piece of cognitive operation views as something specific. Thus what a piece of cognitive operation views as something generic was understood either as something exhibiting similarity or as something exhibiting identity and thus respectively came into existence the doctrines positing a real-undergoing-change and one positing a real-undergoing-no-change;⁴ the same thing

4 The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas advocate neither the doctrine which posits real-undergoing-change nor one which posits a real-undergoing-no-change. Thus according to them, so many substances like atoms, ākāśa (=ether), etc. are something real-undergoing-no-change and something absolutely different from one another. And yet they also somehow posit similarity, a position elucidated by them as follows : even elements which are real-undergoing-no-change and which are absolutely different from one another carry in common an impartite element called 'universal (=sāmānya)' and one accounting for the similarity exhibited in individual things different from one another; thus the universal earthness is common to all the earth-atoms, the universal substance-ness to all the substances, the universal real-ness to all the substances, qualities and actions. Such a permanent element accounting for similarity is not posited by the philosophical schools like Jainism etc.

happened in connection with what a cognitive operation views as something specific. Thus a seer like Buddha maintained that the observable multiplicity of phenomenal effects has at its basis in the form of an underlying substratum neither a substance that is something eternal-undergoing-change nor one that is eternal-under-going-no-change. It is only through denying such a basic cause that the Buddhists account for both what is cognized as something generic and what is cognized as something specific. In terms of this accounting the ever new effects gradually emerging in space and in time come into existence owing to the concerned preceding particular effect and then go out of existence. In the midst of these particular effects appearing to form a series there is no element whatsoever representing similarity or identity. Even in the case of such series of particular effects as seem to retain an identical form the effects concerned are in fact absolutely different from one another. Whatever similarity or identity one apprehends in those series is there because the ultimately real nature of the effects concerned is apprehended by one in an incomplete form. To the extent that one is incapable of properly comprehending the nature of these effects – precisely to that extent does similarity or identity appear before one as exhibited by these effects.⁵ In this way was this doctrine a doctrine positing real particular effects. Just as Śāṅkara views as ultimately real some one impartite and undifferentiated element while dismissing as unreal or 'real practically speaking' what appears to be something specific, similarly—and adopting the exactly opposite extreme standpoint—the Buddhists view as ultimately real the particular effects spread out in space and time while dismissing as unreal or 'real practically speaking' whatever similarity or identity is observable there.

There have also been philosophers who explain otherwise the two forms in question—viz. the generic and the specific – which a cognitive operation views. Thus philosophers like Kaṇāda maintain that in the form of the basic cause giving rise to the totality of phenomenal effects there exists neither some one element which is something eternal-undergoing-change nor some one element which is something eternal-undergoing-no-change but an infinite number of substances which are something eternal-undergoing-no-

⁵ See Hetubinduṭīkā p. 86; also

Yathā dhātryabhayādīnaṃ nānārogaṇivartane /
Pratyekaṃ saha vā śaktir nānāve'py upalakṣyate ||723||
Na teṣu vidyate kiñcit sāmānyaṃ tatra śaktimat /
Ciraḥsīprādibhedena rogaśāntyupalambhataḥ ||724||
Evam atyantabhede'pi kecin niyatisaktitaḥ /
Tulyapratyavamarśāder hetutvaṃ yānti nāpare ||726||

—Tattvasaṅgraha

-change. These infinite number of substances – be they atomic or ubiquitous in size – are different from one another because they are absolutely separate from one another. The mutual difference characterizing these basic substances is doubtless real, and yet there exists in these substances a common element called ‘universal (=sāmānya, jāti)’ which is responsible for the similarity which these substances exhibit. Thus treating as absolutely real and independent the two elements generic and specific Kaṇāda offers an explanation of the two forms generic and specific viewed by a cognitive operation. As for the substances of the form of an effect originating from the atoms which are something eternal-undergoing-no-change, they too were treated as something different from the cause concerned and yet something real. The qualities and actions belonging to these substances too were treated by him as something independent and real. And in this multiplicity of phenomenal effects of the form of substances, qualities and actions he treated things particular as real either on the ground that their respective causes are different or on the ground that their respective effects are different at the same time, he posited in these substances etc. also a common element in the form of numerous types of ‘universals’. Thus substances of the form of a basic cause were treated by him in a Śāṅkara-like fashion as something eternal-undergoing-no-change, and yet in order to account for the two forms generic and specific viewed by a cognitive operation he posited two real elements generic and specific.

Thus we saw that it was on the basis of admitting the reality of cause-effect relationship that each philosopher proceeded to account for the phenomenon of a cognitive operation exhibiting two forms generic and specific, and yet on account of a difference of fundamental viewpoint the net conclusion was different in the case of each.

The Doctrine of effect Existing in Its Cause (=Satkāryavāda) and the Doctrine of effect not Existing in Its Cause (=Asatkāryavāda)

Those according to whom a basic cause is something eternal-undergoing-change maintain that in all effect whatsoever there really exist elements of the concerned basic cause, and that is why they are called an advocate of ‘satkāryavāda’. The word ‘satkārya’ means on the one hand that all cause really exists in the effect concerned, on the other that all effect exists – in the form of a capacity – in the cause concerned. The absolute monists like Śāṅkara too are an advocate of satkāryavāda, but in a somewhat different sense—that is, in the sense that the multiplicity of phenomenal effects makes itself apparent in the one underlying substratum that is ultimately real. As for the Buddhists, they treat as real only things particular. Thus according to them there exists no such basic cause as persists in all

the three phases of time; this means that one particular thing originates out of another one. However, since this latter particular thing does not already exist in the former one the doctrine is to be treated as a case of *asatkāryavāda* (=denial of *satkāryavāda*). Philosophers like *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* too are an advocate of *asatkāryavāda*. Thus even if they treat the basic substance as something permanent and also maintain that substances of the form of an effect originate out of this very substances they are to be included among the advocates of *asatkāryavāda* inasmuch as according to them the substances, qualities and actions that are of the form of an effect originate in the form of something absolutely new—this depending on the nature of the concerned causal aggregate.⁶

With the help of a doctrine of causal relation philosophers proceeded on to account for the twofold experience of the form of the generic and the specific, and in this connection depending on their cherished viewpoint they ultimately posited some basic cause of some type; then endeavouring to explain as to how this basic cause stands related to the multiplicity of gross and subtle phenomenal effects visible in the world they finally arrived at

6 The discussion as to *satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda* has occupied a very important place in the philosophical traditions and moreover it has gone on for centuries. *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* (*Sāṅkhyakārikā* 9) has established *satkāryavāda* while refuting *asatkāryavāda*. *Patañjali*, the author of *Yogasūtra*, and so also the authors of *Yogabhāṣya* equally advocate *satkāryavāda*. While considering the *kārikā* in question, *Pulinbharti* in his 'Origin and Development of the Sāṅkhya System of Thought' (p. 196) has discussed the matter in a correct manner and has also elucidated the view maintained in this connection by the author of *Yogabhāṣya*.

But specially important for the students of the problem of causal relation is the discussion undertaken by him in his footnote on p. 200, a discussion based on an article by *Shri Gopinath Kaviraj*. *Kavirajaji* has undertaken a detailed discussion on the problem of causation in his article entitled 'The Problem of Causation' (*Saraswatibhavan Studies*, Volume 4, p. 145, 1925) and has here also given thought to the question faced by an advocate of *satkāryavāda*. 'When an effect simply submerges in the cause concerned and does not vanish altogether, then in case this effect is once more produced by this cause does the same old effect become visible once more or one that is only similar to that old effect?'—this question has been answered by philosophers in two ways. Thus *Bhartṛhari* and the author of *Yogabhāṣya* are of the view that when *prakṛti* brings about a new world-creation this world-creation is only similar to an earlier one and not the same as that earlier one. On the other hand, *Pañcādhikaraṇa* and *Pāñcapādikāvivarāṇa* maintain the view that a new world-creation is the same as an earlier one. Since special consideration has been bestowed on this matter by *Kavirajaji* his original article is worth consideration.

And noteworthy is the prolonged discussion undertaken by *Stcherbatsky* in order to elucidate the Buddhist view on the problem of causation.

the diverse doctrines called 'ārambhavāda', 'pariṇāmapāda', 'pratītyasamutpāda' and 'vivartavāda'.

The Four Doctrines Ārambhavāda etc. Defined?

Ārambhavāda : (1) Positing an infinite number of basic causes independent of one another; (2) Absolute difference between a cause and its effect; (3) Whether permanent or otherwise a cause undergoes no transformation in the course of producing its effects; (4) The origin or short-time duration of such an effects as was altogether novel—that is, something non-existent prior to its origination.

Pariṇāmapāda : (1) Positing either single basic cause or a number of basic causes; (2) Real non-difference between a cause and its effect; (3) Even a permanent cause exists and functions in the form of something that undergoes transformation; (4) The all-time existence of an effect in its cause and that of the totality of effects in the concerned basic cause—that is, a total denial that there ever originates any thing altogether novel.

Pratītyasamutpāda : (1) Absolute difference between a cause and its effect; (2) Absolute denial of a cause that is permanent as also of one that undergoes transformation; (3) Origination of just such an effect as was earlier not-existent.

Vivartavāda : (1) Positing such an ultimate real cause as neither produces an effect nor undergoes transformation; (2) Absolute denial that the gross or subtle apparent world ever originates or is the transformation of a basic cause; (3) The unreal or imaginary existence of the gross world—that is, its appearing there owing to an illusion.

This brief discussion should make it clear as to how even if the doctrine of causal relation is a unanimously accepted doctrine its employment in different ways on the part of those upholding different world-views gives rise to a multiplicity of philosophical trends.

The Capacity for Valid-cognition Considered

All the Indian philosophers subscribe to the doctrine 'manādhīnā meyvavyavasthā' or 'prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇāddhiḥ'; this means that the doctrine in question is here a unanimously accepted doctrine. Certainly, each philosopher establishes his view as to what constitutes an existing-element (=tattva) or an object-of-valid-cognition (=prameya) with the help of a means-of-valid-cognition (=pramāṇa). Thus it is that even while taking recourse to a capacity for valid-cognition the philosophers too often

7 For details see *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, Intro. pp. 6-11 or 'Darshan aur Chintan', pp. 355-61.
8 *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, kārikā 4

also sharply disagree as to their view of what constitutes an existing-element—as a result of which a number of philosophical trends have come into existence. For these the chief reason is that the different means-of-valid-cognition vary as to their working capacity. Thus when one philosopher establishes his view he bases himself on the capacity of a particular means-of-valid-cognition which he treats final; then comes another philosopher who proceeds basing himself on the capacity on a more developed means-of-valid-cognition. Thus if the philosophical schools have given consideration to the gross, the subtle, the subtlest and the incomprehensible forms of what constitutes an object-of-valid-cognition or an existing-element that has happened just owing to the fact that the different means-of-valid-cognition are possessed of increasingly greater degree of working capacity.

Let us now consider as to how the capacity of different means-of-valid-cognition lies at the basis of the views advocated by the different philosophers beginning with the materialist Cārvākas and ending with the spiritualists—particularly those upholding absolute-nondualism.

The materialist Cārvākas treat as final the capacity inherent in a sense-organ. Thus on their views, that entity is real which is amenable to sense-born cognition while as regards entities supposed to be not open to sense-born cognition one can only entertain imaginations. But what criterion can one apply to examine the genuineness or otherwise of such an imagination? Thus chiefly basing themselves on the capacity inherent in a sense-organ they treat sense-born cognition as a means-of-valid-cognition and declare that the sole means-of-valid cognition is sense perception. True, they treat inference too as a means-of-valid-cognition but go on to add that this means has got its own limitation. Thus they aver that inference regarding an object not open to sense-born cognition can attain the status of a means-of-valid-cognition only in case this object is as such capable of being open to sense-born cognition. This means that in the ultimate count the validity of an inference too is based on the capacity of sense-perception. Hence it is that the Cārvākas, even while admitting the validity of inference to a certain extent, are counted as an advocate of the doctrine that sense-perception is the sole means-of-valid-cognition.⁹ It is apparent that the means-of-valid-cognition called sense-perception cannot proceed beyond gross physical objects. That is why the Cārvāka trend is exclusively confined to the gross physical world.

9 Pratyakṣam evaikaṃ pramāṇam iti vacanam tat tāntrikalakṣaṇalakṣitalokasāmyavahāripratyakṣāpekṣayā. Ata eva lakṣaṇalakṣitapratyakṣapūrvakānumānasya 'Anumānam apramāṇam' ityādigraṇthasandarbhena pramāṇyapratipādanam vidhīyate. Na punar gopālādyajñālokavyavahāraracanācaturasya dhūmadarśanamātrāvirbhūtānalapratipattirūpasya—etc. Sanmatitarkatīkā, Volume 1, p. 73; the passage introducing Tattvasaṅgrahakārikā 1482—'Purandaras tv āha' etc.

However, other philosophers consider the matter proceeding still further. Thus they submit that the capacity possessed by an internal-organ (=manas) is greater than that possessed by a sense-organ. For while each and every sense-organ grasps the object that is specific to it the internal-organ takes cognizance of all such objects grasped by a sense-organ. Hence it is not proper to say that the internal-organ can consider over such objects alone as belong to the present time and lie in a nearby place. Just as with the help of external instruments like microscope etc. a sense-organ can see or listen more than what is ordinarily possible for it, similarly depending on an appropriate past impression an internal-organ too can form an idea of things far past and far future. Of course, even in case an internal-organ considers over things which are not present but past or future the basis of the consideration concerned is some rule of invariable concomitance arrived at in connection with things present. With the help of repeated observations and cogitation related thereto an internal-organ can formulate, definitively and without the likelihood of contradiction, a rule of invariable concomitance valid for all the three phases of time. The philosophers positing such special capacity inherent in an internal-organ treat inference too as an independent means-of-valid-cognition — independent in the sense that even in such cases where the corroboration of sense-perception is not available inference can operate and make a true decision possible. Barring Cārvākas, all the philosophers treat inference as an independent means-of-valid-cognition. With the help of this means-of-valid-cognition called inference they established the existence of a subtle physical element lying beyond the gross physical world. In connection with their employment of inference these philosophers chiefly recognized the principle of causal relationship alongside that of similarity. That the cause must be similar to the effect and that if there be an effect there must also be its cause — this is the relation of invariable concomitance on whose basis they establish the existence of a subtle physical element. Of course, even despite equally recognizing the principle of invariable concomitance not all the philosophers treating inference as an independent means-of-valid-cognition arrived at one and the same final conclusion. Thus on the basis of the very same invariable concomitance one philosopher concluded that the gross physical world has for its basic cause some one element while another on that it has for its basic cause a multiplicity of such elements. However, the two are certainly akin insofar as both concluded that there does exist a suprasensuous element—call it unmanifest (=avyakta), call it atom.

The supposition that the means-of-valid-cognition called inference is possessed of a special capacity proceeded beyond even that. Thus to a number of philosophers the question occurred as to whether the world consists of just a physical element—gross or subtle—or there also exists some-

thing beyond that element. It appears that the answer to this question was found out by these philosophers with the help of the means-of-valid-cognition called inference. For when the experience of pleasure, pain, etc. as also numerous other specialities of everyday life failed to receive explanation on the basis of a physical element the philosophers in question posited a non-physical conscious element—that seems probable. Thus with the extension of the capacity of the means-of-valid-cognition called inference there came to be established two elements—a physical one and a conscious one; but along with that a new question also came to the fore.

The question was that even if a subtle physical element or a conscious one be posited with the help of inference whether there obtains no way so as to make possible the perception of such subtle supra-sensuous elements. The question was not easy to answer but a number of extra-ordinary personages did pursue it. In this connection they arrived at the path of mental concentration (=yoga). Thus they realized that when the internal-organ chiefly follows sense-organs—that is, is chiefly oriented outwards—there acquires development of its just one capacity but that when on being oriented inwards it concentrates itself in a special manner another variety of its capacity opens up. On the basis of experience they also saw that when the impressions left behind in an internal-organ are got rid of its capacity blossoms forth in a particularly strong form. Such heroes of experimentation, basing themselves on their yogic experience, made the discovery of a new means-of-valid-cognition. This means-of-valid-cognition is neither sense-perception nor inference-based-on-an-invariable-concomitance; at the same time, it was realized by the philosophers in question that this new means-of-valid-cognition can take cognizance of subtle supra-sensuous entities. Hence they submitted that sense-perception and inference are not the only means-of-valid-cognition but that there also lies beyond them supra-sensuous perception—called *ārṣa jñāna* or *ṛtambharā prajñā*.¹⁰ Such supra-sensuous perception lies at the root of the means-of-valid-cognition called scriptural testimony. Thus perception, inference and scriptural testimony—these three are the basic means-of-valid-cognition; of these three, scriptural testimony in its basic sense can be deemed to be supreme inasmuch as it takes within its purview the respective objects of sense-perception and inference as well.

The basic cause responsible for there being a multiplicity of philosophical trends are just these three means-of-valid-cognition, but in the field of philosophical speculation there have also been posited a larger or a fewer

¹⁰ Yogasūtra, 1.48-9

number of means-of-valid-cognition.¹¹ Some have included scriptural testimony among inference while others have counted as subspecies of inference the means-of-valid-cognition called implication etc. as well. In this connection one further thing has to be noted. Thus originally the yogins understood by scriptural testimony just *ṛtambharā prajñā*, but when their ideas began to be expressed through words those words too were treated as scriptural testimony and when this scriptural testimony of the form of words found entrance in the current of sectarian religious differences so many elements of perception and inference too got included within the fold of scriptural testimony; not only that, too often it too happened that on account of the prestige gained by scriptural texts all sorts of relevant and irrelevant imaginary concoctions too got interpolated in these texts.¹² For the present, however, we have only to see as to what type of capacity of a means-of-valid-cognition lies at the basis of the fundamental philosophical differences observable within the fold of the various philosophical trends. Our above discussion has revealed in brief that such a capacity obtains at three levels; the rest of the discussion pertaining to means-of-valid-cognition is a mere elaboration of the same.

If the tamil text 'Maṇimekhalāi' mentions ten means-of-valid-cognition then Caraka, Mīmāṃsā, Purāṇas etc. mention even nine, eight and six of them.

The Age When Independent Discussion on the Means-of-valid-cognition was Absent and the One When It was Independently Present

Whatever investigation into matters physical and non-physical, non-conscious and conscious is found in Upaniṣads, Āgamas and Piṭakas is certainly based on some means-of-valid-cognition or other, but in

11 Thus there are Cārvākas positing just one means-of-valid-cognition in the form of perception, Buddhists etc. positing two in the form of it and inference, Sāṅkhya etc. positing three in the form of these two and scriptural testimony, Naiyāyikas etc. positing four in the form of these three and analogy, Prabhākara positing five in the form of these four and implication, Kumārila positing six in the form of these five and absence, Caraka positing seven in the form of these six and reasoning (=yukti), other disputants positing eight in the form of these seven and historicity (=aitihya). See *Tattvasaṅgraha* (kārikās 1213-1708) for perception, inference and the remaining means-of-valid-cognition—also *Yuktidīpikā* pp. 36—9.

In *Maṇimekhalāi* there has been said that on the view of Vedavyāsa, Kṛtakoti and Jaimini the number of means-of-valid-cognition is ten. Nature (=svabhāva) and elimination (=pariśeṣa)—these two new means-of-valid-cognition are found mentioned in this connection. See 'Maṇimekhalāi—in its Historical Settings' by Aiyangar, pp. 57 and 189.

12 For this see the text elucidating *Yuktidīpikā* and entitled 'Origin and Development of the Sāṅkhya System of thought', pp. 222ff.

those old texts there was no independent section dealing with the science devoted to the means-of-valid-cognition. An enterprise like this began in the period when philosophical aphoristic-texts were composed and went on making progress with the passage of time—so much so that all the philosophers like Vedicists, Jainas, Buddhists, Cārvākas, etc. were compelled to undertake in their texts such as a specially detailed discussion on the means-of-valid-cognition as was acceptable to them. By doing so they in a way also made it clear that whatever they say or believe is based on these and similar means-of-valid-cognition, a procedure which should disabuse the rival disputant or listener of the illusion that whatever they were saying was based on the ideas related to means-of-valid-cognition entertained by him. Philosophical scholars have entered into an extremely deep discussion as regards means-of-valid-cognition just as they have entered into that as regards what constitutes an object-of valid-cognition. Thus having undertaken a most subtle possible consideration of the questions such as 'What is a means-of-valid-cognition?', 'What goes to produce it?', 'What makes possible a knowledge of it?' they gave rise to an independent science dealing with means-of-valid-cognition (=science of Logic).¹³

In his 'Six Systems of Indian Philosophy' Max Muller while taking up the Nyāya system of philosophy says one thing – viz. that the Indian philosophers discuss about the means-of-valid-cognition before they do about what constitutes an object-of-valid-cognition and that had this method been followed everywhere a good number of misunderstandings would have been avoided.

From the standpoint of periodization the philosophical thought-current is very clearly found divided into two divisions; thus one division continues upto the time of Buddha and Mahāvira, the other upto this day since that time. Of these, the first division includes portions of the old Upaniṣads, the old portions of Mahābhārata, the old portions of Buddhist Piṭakas and those of Jaina Āgamas, the second the entire literature composed upto today ever since the time of the philosophical aphoristic texts. Thus these two divisions of current, even while exhibiting mutual divergence from so many angles, equally reveal invariability and continuity as regards basic questions. The same chief philosophical questions that were considered in the earlier division of thought-current; and yet the two exhibit an enormous mutual difference. Briefly speaking, the difference pertains to the following two points : (1) The characteristic feature of the old division of thought-current is that whatever a philosopher here seeks to establish he delineates through

13 For this see my essay discussing the problem of self-validity versus non-self-validity of cognition, 'Darshan ane Cintan' p. 1032.

a descriptive style – as if the thing said by him has been ascertained by him with the aid of a sagely eye. And in the course of doing so in case he occasionally feels the urge to refute a rival view he usually simply makes a mention of this view adding that it is a false standpoint or not a right standpoint. Alternatively, he even refers to such views as so many preliminary stages leading upto his own doctrine and thus makes a synthesis of even such views in the form of so many different views suited to the capacity of so many different grades of students.¹⁴ (2) Another characteristic circumstance is that the details taken up in the later division of thought-current in connection with a chief problem and the discussion of new issues raised while doing so are absent in the earlier division.

In what manner was philosophical speculation conducted in this land of Aryans since olden days and how much extensive was this speculation – about all this important researches have been made by the Western as well as Indian scholars. On perusing them and on going through the original text-passages mentioned therein any one whatsoever can learn as to how within the body of both the thought-currents in question the chief philosophical problems have been discussed in an identical fashion.

The Characteristic Features of the Later Philosophical Literature

Broadly speaking, the period of philosophical aphoristic texts begins after the days of Buddha and Mahāvīra. The impelling forces behind that novelty which philosophical speculation assumed ever since this period are briefly as follows :

(1) To investigate each problem in an organized fashion and after having first formulated appropriate definitions.

(2) To adopt a particular style of examining problems—viz. one in which a rival view is refuted through undertaking an ever more detailed analysis thereof and one's own view is sought to be established with the aid of logic.

(3) A tendency to undertake an ever wider and ever deeper study of all the possible rival views and therethrough to elucidate and further clarify one's own views whenever a suitable occasion arises.

14 Some examples of a synthesis made keeping in view the different grades of students are Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Prasthānabheda*, Vijñānabhikṣu's 'Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya' pp. 2ff. (Chaukhamba edition) as also the verse from *Mādhyaṃikakārikā*.

Sarvam tathyaṃ na vā tathyaṃ tathyaṃ cātathyaṃ eva ca/
Naivātathyaṃ naiva tathyaṃ etad Buddhānuśāsanam//18.8

and the commentary thereon. Besides, see *Yogaśāstrīyamuccaya*, kārikās 132 ff. and the *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya* aphorism 8 'Tadbhūmikāḥ sarvadarśanasthīyāḥ'.

(4) Taking help of the ever developing style and subtlety of Sanskrit language—in prose, verse and a mixture of both—to formulate one's definitions and to explain them in an unmistakable form.

(5) Through the instrumentality of the art of disputation—an art blossoming on account of a development of the manner of argumentation and inference—to elucidate problems with the aid of discussions—factual as well as surmised—taking place among various rival Parties.

(6) To compose either small and large independent essay incorporating the entire teaching of a particular philosophical system or similarly small and large monographs dealing with this or that particular problem—besides, of course, aphorisms and the commentary-texts called *vṛtti*, *bhāṣya*, *vārtika*, *anūṭika* etc.

(7) To delve somewhat deeper into philosophical problems with the help of the efflorescent definitions and style characteristic of that school of neo-Logic which had taken its rise after the eleventh century A. D.

On account of these and similar forces the character of the discussions taking place in the later philosophical current appears to be so much different that while perusing it one feels as if one is entering into an altogether new circle of ideas pertaining to those same old problems. The later extensive and multifarious philosophical literature has been shaped by each and every philosophical tradition with such an awakened intellect that today no genuine student of it can help harbouring towards it a feeling of utmost respect; not only that, this mass of literature is possessed of so much material for thought that even a researcher working on it for years cannot fail to discover in it things newer and newer. Among the authors of this literature a certain number of extra-ordinary savants belonging to each and every tradition are such that the thinking and writing pursued by them alone can detain the attention of a good number of present-day scholars.

The above generalizations can be properly grasped only in case they are corroborated by the quotation of certain instances.

An instance of organized investigation preceded by the formulation of appropriate definitions are the aphoristic texts of the philosophical systems like that of Kaṇāda, Nyāya, etc. (2) An instance of the examination style are the predominantly examinative texts like Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamikakārikā* and *Nyāyasūtra*. (3) The tendency to clarify the views characteristic of one's own system is found in works like Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārtika* and Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* and the commentary-texts of Vācaspati-miśra. (4) The formulation of definitions and their explanation in an unmistakable form are well visible in the commentary-texts *bhāṣya*, *vārtika*, *ṭīkā*, etc. composed in each and every tradition. (5) As an instance of the art of dispu-

tation can be enumerated works like Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārtika, Kumārila's Ślokavārtika, Prajñākara's Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣya, Vidyānanda's Aṣṭasahasrī. (6) As an instance of texts incorporating the entire teaching of a particular philosophical system can be pointed out works like Akalaṅka's Rājavārtika and Vidyānanda's Ślokavārtika; similarly, an instance of texts dealing with certain chosen particular problems are works like Brahmasiddhi, Ātmasiddhi, Sarvajñasiddhi, Kusumāṅjali. (7) An instance of texts employing the definitions characteristic of the school of neo-Logic are the works like Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi.

The Viewpoints Impelling Speculation

Generally speaking, philosophical problems are divisible into four heads, viz. world, soul, God and emancipation; and all these problems have been investigated from three possible viewpoints, viz. worldly, other-worldly and unworldly. (1) The viewpoint which touches upon merely visible this-world and discusses problems on the basis thereof is the worldly viewpoint; e. g. Cārvāka etc. (2) The viewpoint which undertakes discussion through positing rebirth besides this birth is the other-worldly viewpoint; e. g. all the non-Cārvāka systems of philosophy which posit soul. This other-worldly viewpoint does not discard the worldly one. (3) The viewpoint which undertakes discussion aimed at ultimate emancipation is the unworldly viewpoint. In this viewpoint too there is no discarding of the earlier two viewpoints, but in the course of philosophical speculation such currents too have come into existence as attribute a subsidiary status not only to the worldly viewpoint but even to the other worldly one—so that the unworldly viewpoint alone remains prominent. The idea is that at the time when the other-worldly or unworldly viewpoint is given prominence the ultimate aim gets changed—so that in the course of the present life-current itself the spiritual quest for newer and newer paths makes its appearance and the ways of life too go on getting changed. As an example we can take Gītā itself. Thus here the same religious performances like yajña, penance, meditation, donation, pious muttering, self-study etc. which were earlier undertaken with a desire for fruit in view are recommended to be undertaken with desire for no fruit and thus all religious performances become a part and parcel of the path-of-action.

Various Classifications of the Philosophical Systems

Haribhadra, who was the first person to have summarily narrated the philosophical systems current in his time, recognizes six such systems in his Śaddarśanasamuccaya. These systems include the Vedic as well as non-Vedic ones; among the non-Vedic ones are included Buddhism, Jainism and Cārvāka while among the Vedic ones are included Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika,

Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Mīmāṃsā. However, Mādhavācārya who flourished in the fourteenth century A.D., narrates sixteen philosophical systems in his *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha*; these include almost all the Vedic and non-Vedic systems, but so many traditions—such as Śrīkaṇṭha's Śivādvaita etc.—are not included even here.

The six philosophical systems narrated by Max Muller in his 'Six Systems of Indian Philosophy' are all Vedic.

People have classified philosophical systems according to their respective standpoints,¹⁵ but in all those classifications the noteworthy thing is that some among these systems have proceeded recognizing the authority of Vedas while others, having denied the authority of Vedas, have recognized that of the respective personages supremely venerated by them. Among the philosophical systems recognizing the authority of Vedas are included Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, Uttara-mīmāṃsā, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika while among those recognizing the authority of particular personages are included systems like Buddhism, Jainism, Śaivism, etc.

Among the philosophical systemes Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika exhibit a unique feature that is worthy of note. Thus these systems discuss and establish their respective positions chiefly relying on two means—of-valid-cognition perception and inference. Even if they recognized the authority of some particular scriptural text they do not base themselves on any such text while establishing their own positions or refuting those of their rivals; contrarywise, the followers of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and Vedānta base themselves on Vedic utterances and Upaniṣads, all the Buddhists—those following Sthavirayāna as those following Mahāyāna—base themselves on Buddha's utterances while Jainas base themselves on those of Mahāvira. In view of all this one can say that among the philosophical systems

- 15 How the philosophical systems have been classified in Mahābhārata and Purāṇas—for that the following verses should prove useful :

Sāṅkhyam yogaṃ pāśupatam vedā vai pañcarātrakam/
 Kṛtāntapañcakam hy etat gāyatrī ca śivā tathā// —Agnipurāṇa 219.61
 Evam ekam sāṅkhyayogam vedāranyakam eva ca/
 Parasparāṅgāny etāni pañcarātram ca kathyate// —Śānīparva 336.76
 Sāṅkhyam yogam pañcarātram vedāranyakam eva ca/
 Jñānāny etāni brahmaṛṣe lokeṣu pracaranti ha//
 Kim etāny ekaniṣṭhāni pṛthaniṣṭhāni vā mune//
 Prabruhi vai mayā pṛṣṭaḥ pravṛttim ca yathākramam// —Śāntīparva 337.1-2
 Brāhmam śaivam vaiṣṇavam ca sauram śaktam tathārhatam/
 Śaddarśanāni caktāni svabhāvanīyatāni ca// —Vāyupurāṇa 104.16

Similarly, in 'Sundaragranthāvalī—Sarvāṅgayogapradīpikā', pp. 88-94 there are narrated 96 pākṣaṇḍas (=viewpoints). On p. 30 of 'Padamāvata' edited by Dr. Agrawal note has been taken of the number of philosophical systems.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya are predominantly an advocate of argumentation or inference and even while recognizing the authority of sagely cognition they do not make this cognition the chief instrument of their investigation. On the other hand, when among the remaining philosophers there arises a difference of opinion then each class and sub-class thereof chiefly relies on a scriptural text in order to vindicate its cherished standpoint and on the basis of such a text uses argumentation with a view to reading its own stand into this text. As against this, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya-Yoga traditions, at the time when a difference of opinion arises within the fold of either, seek to endorse their respective stands with the aid of argumentation and thought-power alone and without basing themselves on the scriptural texts unanimously acceptable to them.

LECTURE THREE

WORLD : THE NON-CONSCIOUS ELEMENT

Generally speaking, the term 'world' denotes both the conscious and non-conscious elements, but since in the next lecture we are independently going to speak of the conscious element we are presently taking the term 'world' to stand for the non-conscious element alone.

'What is the nature of the world?', 'What and of what nature are the causes that go to originate this world?', 'What is the order followed by the originating causes while creating the world out of themselves?', 'And whether this creation-process proceeds on automatically or there exist such elements independent of these originating causes as to guide the activity of these causes?' —questions like these must have occurred to man's mind simultaneously or one after another. In order to seek answer to these questions efforts were made in diverse directions. With the help of the various philosophical viewpoints which came to be established as a result of these efforts and which have already been a topic of discussion among scholars we shall try to understand as to what different types of consideration the philosophers have bestowed on the nature of the world.

The Cārvāka Viewpoint as to the Nature of the World

Those seeking to search for the originating cause of the world are found to have displayed two chief tendencies; the first tendency looks for some one element in the form of the originating-cause lying at the root of the world while the other one looks for a multiplicity of such elements in the form of such an originating cause. The first tendency is chiefly visible in the Upaniṣads while the second in the Śramanic traditions like Buddhism, Jainism etc. However, whether one is looking for some one root-cause or for several such ones one must take one's start from the objects amenable to sense-perception. Hence whoever be the philosopher he first of all makes sure as to what and of what type are the objects amenable to sense-perception. Here lies the common foundation of the two tendencies in question. Apparently, keeping in view just that portion of the world which is amenable to sense-perception certain philosophers took the world to be made up of five bhūtas, five dhātus or five skandhas and on the basis of that assumption started offering all further clarification. Earth, water, fire, air and ether (=ākāśa)—these five are called bhūtas. These very entities are called skandhas; and the words 'dhātu' and 'kāya' too are employed in this very sense. Subsequently, the word 'dravya' has been employed to denote the same. The four elements earth etc. being amenable

to sense-perception there is absolutely no difference of opinion about positing them. Similarly, conceived as the substratum of the four elements in question the element ether too is posited unanimously. As denoting these five elements there came to be employed the word 'bhūta'—implying thereby that these elements do exist and are also real. Just as a tree stands fixed on its stem (=skandha) so also does this world-canopy stand fixed on these five bhūtas. Hence it is that these five bhūtas were also called skandhas. The word 'dhātu' too has a similar connotation. Whatever sustains (=dhāraṇa) or nourishes the world is dhātu—understood exactly in the same fashion as the fact that wind, phlegm and cough are called dhātu inasmuch as they sustain or nourish body. The word 'kāya' connotes an organized configuration, and the five elements in question are also called kāya because they constitute so many configurations of this world. And since these very elements exhibit a current or flow (=drava) of the various qualities and actions observable on the standing-board of space and time they are also called 'dravya'. Thus came into existence the assumption that the world is made up of five bhūtas. These five bhūtas are found mentioned in Upaniṣads as also in the old texts of Buddhists, Jains etc.¹

However, as research proceeded further and turned its attention towards a subtle cause lying at the back of the sense-perceptible gross physical world the philosophical sect positing five bhūtas stood isolated. It just stagnated and began to demonstrate that there exists nothing besides the five bhūtas. This view is known by the name 'Bārhaspatya', 'Lokāyata', 'Paurandara' or 'Cārvāka'. In the course of time there arose within it a tradition according to which there exists just four bhūtas—that is, the above five minus ether.

The Philosophical Trends Seeking for a Subtle Cause

The philosophers who did not rest content with a consideration of the sense-perceptible elements alone began to bestow thought on the cause of these elements themselves. They realized that the visible physical elements come into existence and go out of existence. Moreover, whatever thing is of the form of an effect must possess a cause while an effect can in no case be dissimilar to its cause—taking recourse to such a principle of causal relationship and a principle of similarity they began their causal investigation. Among them, those who chiefly had a predilection for the element air posited air in the form of the root-cause and on the basis thereof accounted for the observable world-creation. Similarly, those who venerated the element water, fire or ether posited one of these as the single root-cause and accounted for the world-creation in their respective manners. Thus came into existence various philosophical trends in connection with

¹ See Ajitakesakambal's view in Sāmaññaphalasutta; Sūtrakṛtāṅga 1.1.17 and 'Bhūtāṇi yonih'—Śvetāśvatārōpaniṣad 1.2.

a consideration of the root-cause. Here there was conjoined another philosophical trend as well. Thus somebody thought that if the visible world is of the form of something existent then its cause Sat (=existent) too must be something ever-existent. Thus he identified the root world-cause in the form of sat itself. Someone else put to himself the question : 'Just as the visible entities are "non-existent" and yet come into existence similarly why should it not be the case that the element sat conceived in the form of the root world-cause originated out of Asat (=non existent) ?' This question must have impelled some other thinker to assume that the root world-cause must be Asat or (Nāsti = does-not-exist). Among the Philosophical trends enumerated so far that positing Sat and that positing Asat were absolutely opposed to one another. This opposition obtaining among the thinkers was fundamental. Hence in Taittiriya one sage asked as to how sat can originate out of what is absolutely of the form of asat or nāsti – for certainly, an effect cannot be the opposite of what happens to be its cause. On account of this question a way to synthesize the two extremist viewpoints too occurred to someone. He said that what is of the form of asat or nāsti is not something absolutely non-existent but something that has not yet become manifest bearing a name and a form. That sat originates out of it only means that it becomes thus manifest. All these views are found expressed in Upaniṣads at different places.²

The denial of sat and asat that we find in Nāsadīyasūkta is indeed a denial of the just mentioned two extremist views. But to the author of the hymn the character of the originating cause appears to be that of something unmanifest. That is why even after denying to it a multiplicity of couples with mutually contradictory qualities he indicates the working presence of the originating cause by the word 'ānīdavātam' and puts forth its character in the form of a question – all which is a way of expressing the idea that the originating cause in question is something indescribable.³

- 2 Asad vā idam agra āsīt. Tato vai sad ajāyata.—Taittirīyopaniṣad 2.7
Naiveha kiñcanāgra āsīt. Mr̥tyunaivedam āvrtamāsīt.—Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 1.2.1
Asad evedam agra āsīt. Tat sad āsīt. Tat samabhavat. Tadāṇḍam niravartata.

—Chāndogyaopaniṣad 3.19.1

Taddhaika āhur asad evedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam. Tasmād asataḥ saj jāyata. Kutastu khalu somyaivam syād iti hovāca katham asataḥ saj jāyeta. Sattvam eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam.—Chāndogyaopaniṣad 6.2

- 3 Ko addhā veda ka iha pra vocat kuta ājātā kuta iyam viśṣṭīḥ /
Arvāg devā asya viśarjanenā'thā ko veda yata ābabhūva //6//
Iyam viśṣṭīr yat ābabhūva yadi vā dadhe yadi vā na /
Yo asyā'dhyakṣaḥ parame vyomant so aṅga veda yadi vā na veda //7.

—R̥gveda, Nāsadīyasūkta 10.129

"Who knows it directly? Who would answer the questions : 'Out of what sort of cause has it originated? From where did this creation take place?' The gods

In the first Maṇḍala (=Book) of Ṛgveda⁴ there are mentioned thinkers who describe the same element sat in the various forms fire, water etc. That too is a form of way-to-synthesis. Just as the two extremes sat and asat got synthesized in the form of mānifest and unmanifest respectively so also the different earlier thought-currents giving prominences to air, water, fire, ether etc. got synthesized under the single title 'sat' that was almost indisputably recognized as the originating cause.

The philosophical speculation pursued uptill now decided this much that the originating cause of the world is sat – that is, that it cannot be merely of the form of nāsti or absence. This level of thought remained preserved even in such traditions as posited a multiplicity of originating elements. Thus Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas treat sattā (=existence) as something eternal.⁵ Akṣapāda too rejects the view that posits absence in an absolute fashion.⁶ The Jaina tradition too describes the fundamental element under the title astikāya (=existing-body).⁷

However, the thinkers did not rest satisfied with the mere view that the originating cause is something of the form of sat. The idea naturally occurred to them that the originating cause might well be sat and it might well be something unmanifest but that it must be possessed of a nature that has to be understood and elucidated through thought or intellect. This idea impelled a sage like Kapila to move in one direction, some other sage in some other direction. It appears that from this stage onward there began to flow two currents as regards characterizing the originating cause. Thus those who searched for an originating cause from among the physical elements chiefly relying on intellect or mental self-experience constituted one current while those who considered the nature of an originating cause chiefly relying on sense-experience constituted the other current.

The Sāṅkhya Viewpoint Regarding the Nature and the Cause of the World

The sages did recognize that with the help of sense-organs there takes

themselves came into existence after this creation had taken place. Who can therefore say as to wherefrom all this originated? That out of which this origination took place--did it undertake this creation or did it too not do so? Only its Lord who resides in supreme heavens knows that--or may be He too does not."

4 Ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti. –Ṛgveda 1.164.46

5 Sāmānyādinām trayānām svātmasattvaṃ, buddhilakṣaṇatvaṃ, akāraṇatvaṃ, asāmānyaviśeṣavattvaṃ, nityatvaṃ, arthaśabdābhidheyatvaṃ. –Prāśastapādābhāṣya, Sādharmya-vaidharmya-prakaraṇa.

Lakṣaṇabhedād eṣāṃ dravyaguṇakarmabhyah padārthāntaratvaṃ siddham. Ata eva ca nityatvaṃ. –Ibid., Sāmānyā-prakaraṇa

6 Nyāyasūtra 4.1.14-18

7 Ajīvakāyā dharmādharmākāśapudgalāḥ. Dravyāṇi jīvā ca. Nityāvasthitāny arūpāṇi. Rūpīṇaḥ pudgalāḥ. –Tattvārthasūtra 5.1-4

Sattā savvapayatthā savissarūvā ānamtapajjāyā /
Bhaṅguppadadhuvattā sapaḍivakkhā havadi ekkā //8// –Pañcāstikāya

place an experience of qualities like colour, taste, etc., but giving prominence to the feeling of pleasure, pain and delusion that arises from this experience they, on consideration came to the view that the object of experience, instrument of experience as also the intellect undergoing experience – all these three are of the form of pleasure, pain and delusion. If any of these three were devoid of one of these three felt states then the feeling in question would have been impossible. To the different viewers the same thing appears as causing pleasure, pain or delusion; not only that, even to the same viewer at different times the same thing appears as thus causing pleasure etc. Even where sense-experience is not being undergone then too the intellect does somehow experience the states of pleasure, pain and delusion. From all this it has to be concluded that whether an entity be gross or subtle, external or internal, an object of cognition, an instrument of cognition or an agent of cognition it must be of the form of pleasure, pain and delusion. Thus right from things gross upto the subtle intellect they established mutual similarity and also posited causal relationship among them. However, their task was to proceed beyond the manifest intellect and elucidate the nature of that originating cause which was called sat and supposed to be something unmanifest. So in the form of the cause of the manifest intellect they posited that universally recognized element sat or unmanifest (=avyakta). But the fundamental question was how to define the nature of this element. Hence on the basis of the common element of the form of pleasure-pain-delusion recognized by themselves they determined the nature of that originating cause. Thus they said that if all things whatsoever are commonly possessed of the form of pleasure-pain-delusion, then their originating cause too must be possessed of aspects determinative of the common nature of all things. On the basis of this supposition they posited even such aspects in the originating cause as should elucidate the gross and subtle multifariousness visible there in the universe and should render possible that common nature characterizing all things whatsoever. These aspects are sattva, rajas and tamas. They are called guṇa in the sense that they are mutually un-separable constituents of the originating cause. And even if the respective functions of these guṇas are different from one another they all act in concert becoming chief and subordinate as suits the occasion. Hence it is that on the basis of the mutual intermixtures – proportioned in numerous ways – of these three guṇas the entire further development of the gross as well as subtle creation takes place.

To them certainly occurred the question as to why this ultimate cause too should not have a cause. And this question they answered in the same manner as do all other philosophers – viz. by saying that in the end rest must come somewhere or else. Thus in the eyes of these thinkers

avyakta made up of three guṇas was supposed to be such an ultimate real cause, but here again there arose a number of further questions. Thus they noted that this visible world is limitless and multi-formed and that likewise it is divided among several categories such as gross, grosser, grossest, subtle, subtler, subtlest. Again, just as it is undergoing movement in the course of time it also appears to be static. So the question was as to how all this is to be accounted for by positing just one ultimate cause. And in brief this question was answered as follows. The originating cause pervades all the space. It also lies beyond all past or future limit in time. It is also possessed of a subtle seed of mobility as well as immobility, and even for a moment it cannot help assuming an ever new form. Despite all this the cause in question always keeps in tact its original form. It is also possessed of the capacity to get inflated—that is, a capacity to assume in place of a subtlest form a relatively less subtle form and thus gradually a grossest form; it is on account of this its inherent capacity that the single element in question, without being impelled by anybody else, gives shape to this multi-formed world just as the seed of a banyan tree to a huge tree. It is possessed of such a capacity that sometimes assuming the form of buddhi predominantly made up of sattva it experiences the mental states like pleasure, pain etc., sometimes assuming another state it acts as the instrument of this very experience, while the same cause on account of the predominance of tamas assumes the form of an object of this very experience. In this way those thinkers accounted for the entire world on the basis of positing so many capacities in one and the same originating cause, but they had yet to answer the question as to why if the world possessed of various forms assumes shape out of the same originating cause there takes place no reversal of order in the appearance of these forms—that is, why it does not so happen that a later appearing form appears earlier while an earlier appearing form appears later. This question was answered by them by positing in the originating element a capacity pertaining to time—that is, a capacity for ordered succession. They thus submitted that the transforming capacity inherent in the originating cause is such that the order of succession is never violated—also that when this cause assumes a gross form the duration and size of this form get decreased and when it assumes a subtle or very subtle form the duration and size of this form get increased. Not only that, they went on to add that even while developing and becoming manifest in the shape of a huge infinity of ever new forms the originating element remains yet unexhausted and infinite.

This line of thinking is known by the name of 'Sāṅkhya system of philosophy'. Kapila is considered to be the First Wise-man and the supreme sage belonging to this system. The seeds of this line of thinking are

certainly present in Upaniṣads but it has also been discussed in various forms in Mahābhārata, Caraka, Purāṇas, Śmṛtis and a number of poetical texts. As for Gītā, it is composed on the very basis of it. Of the yogic text composed by Patañjali it is the very bedrock but—it has also served as basis for the old yogic tradition advocated by Hiraṇyagarbha. Generally speaking, the Sāṅkhya line of thinking and a certain number of its principles have taken within their purview a large number of philosophical systems – even while they have undergone modification in the course of—doing so.

The above brief account has kept in view that Sāṅkhya tradition which posits twenty-five elements. And we have already seen that according to it there exists an originating cause called prakṛti – later on also called pradhāna – out of which are transformed the knower and the enjoyer, the instruments of knowing and those of enjoying, the objects of knowing and those of enjoying.

*The Brahmanāda Viewpoint Regarding the
Nature and the Cause of the World*

However, the consideration as to the originating cause did not come to an end just at that stage. Thus to so many persons the idea occurred that even if there exists such an all-pervading and transformative cause made up of three guṇas as remains un-separated in the midst of separate things, is common to a number of particular things and lies unmanifest at the basis of manifest things it is after all devoid of consciousness and bliss and is merely an aggregate of the three non-conscious guṇas sattva, rajas and tamas. If so, how can there arise out of it an altogether different entity which is something conscious and is of the form of a knower and an enjoyer? This question impelled them to posit such an originating elements as is possessed of the three forms existence, consciousness and bliss. Thus while the Sāṅkhya system positing twenty-four elements treated as originating cause prakṛti made up of the three constituent-units sattva, rajas and tamas this new trend instead treated as the originating cause a conscious element made up of the three constituent-units existence, consciousness and bliss. The constituent-unit existence is common to the two positions, but the difference arises when according to the first position sattva guṇa assumes the form of mental experience like knowledge, bliss etc. while there exists no independent consciousness or bliss while according to the later position consciousness and bliss form original constituent units – out of which there appear the transformations like cognition, pleasure, pain, etc. When there came to be posited such an original element of the form of existence, consciousness and bliss the thinkers concerned conceived this element to be a transformative one in the manner of prakṛti and offered explanation to the effect that there originate out of it on the basis

of an inherent capacity, on the one hand the soul which knows and enjoys, on the other hand the non-conscious world which is known and enjoyed. Thus in the place of the originating cause prakṛti there was posited another originating cause. This latter is called the element Brahman and is also found mentioned in the form of Nārāyaṇa etc. This line of thinking is of course present in Mahābhārata, but it is also there in Gītā. In Mahābhārata this line of thinking is evident where there is described the Sāṅkhya tradition positing twenty-six elements. It appears that the line of thinking which came into existence on the basis of positing in the form of an originating element Brahman, Nārāyaṇa or something of the form of existence, consciousness and bliss remained preserved and found development in the tradition of the master Bodhāyana etc. This element Brahman is such that it is the originating place of prakṛti made up of three guṇas on the one hand and that of a soul which knows and enjoys on the other. Thus according to the advocates of Brahmovāda, that transformation of Brahman which is of the form of pradhāna falls under the category 'non-conscious world.' In the course of time this doctrine of a transformative Brahman found enunciation in various traditions with slight mutual differences; such for example, were the doctrines called Sopādhika-Brahmovāda, Viśiṣṭādvaita-Brahmovāda, Śuddhādvaita-Brahmovāda. In all these doctrines the originating element is a single one but on account of being something transformative it well accounts for the entire diversity visible there.

*The Vaiśeṣika View Regarding
the Nature and the Cause of the World*

Here we have offered a brief account of that thought-current which searches for some one single originating element.⁸ Let us now take account of the research that posits a multiplicity of originating elements. Those thinkers who gave prominence to the experience gained by external sense organs chiefly paid attention to the qualities colour, taste, smell, touch, liquidity etc. belonging to the products made up of earth, water, fire and air. They retained belief in the principle of causal relationship as well as that of similarity, but their task was to account for the experience of these qualities colour, taste, etc. as belonging to the gross physical elements and to do so on the basis of what things act as cause to these gross physical elements. Hence they proceeded on to search for a causal series working on the assumption that the causes of the visible gross physical elements ought to possess qualities similar to those possessed by these elements themselves. Thus whatever qualities are experienced in a gross earthy

8 The process of searching for some one single cause for the multiplicity of effects that are there—is evident in Sāṅkhyakārikā. See kārikās 8-16.

object the same ought to belong to its cause as well while it goes without saying that a cause ought to be subtler than the effect concerned. Cogitating thus they ultimately came to the conclusion that the ultimate cause of a product made up of earth must itself be of the form of earth while the ultimate cause of product made up of water, fire and air ought to belong to the same class as the corresponding element itself. Whatever physical elements they posited in the form of this ultimate originating cause were of course considered to be of the form of atoms. This means that subtleness belonging to an atom is of the ultimate grade and it is not further divisible. Thus on the basis of a huge infinity of earthy, watery, fiery and airy atoms belonging to various classes and mutually dissimilar in an absolute fashion they accounted for the world of the form of an effect. However, subtle might be a cause but combining with other subtle causes belonging to the same class it gradually gives rise to more and more gross effects—this was the supposition on the basis of which they established the doctrine of original creation (=ārambhavāda); the idea was that as a result of the combination of two atoms there originates a new substance of the form of diad which, even while different from those two atoms acting as cause, resides pervaded in those atoms. Similarly, three diads go to make up a three-atomed (really, six-atomed) aggregate while four three-atomed aggregates go to make up a four-atomed (really, twentyfour-atomed) aggregate – following which order they accounted for the gross creation of form of mountain, river, sun etc. This doctrine⁹ differed from the doctrine of transformation (=pariṇāmavāda) insofar as according to the latter the gradually manifested effects already exist in the originating cause and even when they become manifest the originating cause already remain pervaded therein. These manifested effects do not come into existence altogether anew, but while they originally existed in the cause in an unmanifest form they become visible when suitable occasioning cause etc. become available to them. On the other hand, in the doctrine of original creation the supposition is that an effect is absolutely different from its cause and that it comes into existence really anew. The idea is that a huge infinity of atoms of various classes, while retaining their original form as such, give rise to numberless effects akin to themselves when an appropriate causal aggregate becomes available to them. In the doctrine of original creation there is an absolute difference between a cause and its effect while in the doctrine of transformation prominence is given to their mutual non-difference. In the doctrine of original creation the cause of an

9 Sad akāraṇavan nityam. Tasya kāryam lingam. Kāraṇābhāvāt kāryābhāvaḥ.

—Vaiśeṣikadarśana 3.3.1–3

See the following statements occurring in Prāśastapāda's account of creation and destruction : 'Tataḥ pravibhaktāḥ paramāṇavo' vaṭiṣṭhante. Evam samutpanneṣu caturṣu mahābhūteṣu."

earthy effect are earthy atoms, those of a watery effect watery atoms, and so on and so forth. However, the huge infinity of earthy atoms, even while akin to one another qua something earthy, are absolutely different from one another individually and retain in themselves all those qualities which are possible in an earthy atom substance. According to the doctrine of original creation, the huge infinity of the four types of atoms—viz. earthy, watery, fiery, and airy—are supposed to be the originating cause of the physical world while at the same time eternal elements like ether, direction, time too have found place in the physical world. This then is the Vaiśeṣika tradition which is one among such ones as posit a multiplicity of elements in the form of an originating cause.

*The Jaina Viewpoint Regarding
The Nature and the Cause of the World*

There is also another such thought-current as considers about the world by positing a multiplicity of elements in the form of its originating cause.¹⁰ This thought-current is known by the name of 'Jaina tradition.' Its submission is that the non-conscious world is of the form of four astikāyas. Here the element ether (=ākāśa) is a single one as is also according to the Vaiśeṣika system. However, as regards the nature of atom the thought-current in question is altogether different from the doctrine of original creation maintained by the Vaiśeṣika system. According to the Jaina tradition, atoms are of course hugely infinite in number, but they exhibit no basic difference like being earthy, being watery etc.; thus depending on the occasioning circumstance any atom whatsoever can assume any form whatsoever. That is to say, the very same atom which once assumed the form of earth can, when the concerned causal aggregate changes assume the form of water, fire or air as well; in other words, there obtains among atom no qualitative difference whatsoever. Another distinguishing point is to the effect that the capacities to exhibit colour, smell, taste and touch are commonly present in each and every atom and that depending on occasioning circumstance they only assume so many forms. Thus it is not the case that some from among the capacities to exhibit colour, smell,

10 The Jaina tradition posits two substances called dharmāstikāya and adharmāstikāya. The function of dharmāstikāya is to be of use in motion, that of adharmāstikāya to be of use in stationing. These two substances are comparable to two constituent-units of pradhāna posited by Sāṅkhya. Thus rajoguṇa, being mobile, ever remains in motion. It keeps in motion the effects produced by prakṛti while the function of tamoguṇa is to control motion. (Sāṅkhyakārikā 13) In this connection the following kārīkās of Īśvarakṛṣṇa are worthy of literal comparison :

Dharmēṇa gamanam ūrdhvaṃ gamanam adahstād bhavaty adharmēṇa /

Jñānena cāpavargo viparyayād iṣyate bandhaḥ //44//

Ajīvakāya dharmādharmākāśapudgalāḥ /1/ Dravyāṇi jīvāś ca /2/

Gaṭisthityupagraho dharmādharmayorupakāraḥ /17/ —Tattvārtha, chapter 5

taste and touch belongs to these atoms and not to those. That is to say, originally all these capacities commonly belong to all the atoms whatsoever but depending on the difference of the available causal aggregate they assume different forms in different cases. Similarly, according to this tradition the aggregate coming into existence as a result of the combination of atoms is not an altogether new substance as it is on the Vaiśeṣika view; for according to it, this aggregate is but of the form of a specific formation or configuration of the concerned group of atoms themselves. Again, the Vaiśeṣika tradition considers the atoms to be something eternal-undergoing no-change while it corroborates this character of their being thus eternal by supposing that the substances, qualities and actions which come into existence are something altogether different from these atoms; on the other hand, the Jaina tradition, not admitting such character of being something eternal-undergoing-no-change follows the Sāṅkhya custom of positing the character of being something eternal-undergoing-change. And it explains the character of being something eternal-undergoing-change by supposing that even while the atoms taken individually are something eternal the aggregates and qualities-cum-action originating in them are somehow different and also somehow non-different from these atoms.¹¹

Just as the Sāṅkhya tradition accounts for the multifariousness visible in this gross and subtle world on the basis of a differently proportioned commixture of the guṇas pertaining to the same single originating Prakṛti and the capacity-for-transformation inherent in this Prakṛti, similarly the Jaina tradition accounts for the totality of gross and subtle world on the basis of the capacity-for-transformation inherent in a huge infinity of atoms and the various conjunctions and disjunctions experienced by these atoms. A large variety of different views as to the nature of atoms are current in the Vaiśeṣika and Jaina traditions. However, we will complete our account of this latter line of thinking after taking note of just one noteworthy point of difference obtaining between the two. This point of difference pertains to the size or dimension of an atom. Thus while the Vaiśeṣika tradition stops by treating as ultimate atom the one-sixth part of the dust-particle visible in the sun's rays entering the interior of a room the Jaina tradition considers even such an atom to be an aggregate made up of a huge infinity of atoms and further submits that within the same spatial unit as is occupied by one single atom there can reside not only a huge infinity of such atoms but also a huge infinity of such atomic aggregates. Thus viewed

11 See Tattvārtha chapter 5, aphorisms 4, 10, 11, 23-8. For a special consideration of pudgala (=matter) see Sthānāṅga-Samavāyāṅga (Gujarati translation published by Gujarat Vidyapitha) p. 531 and Lokaprakāśa Volume 1, chapter 11.

the atoms posited by the Jaina tradition, even while hugely infinite in number, look like ones possessed of such subtlety as is exhibited by Prakṛti posited by Sāṅkhya ! Even then, the two are certainly mutually different insofar as Prakṛti, even if subtle, is a single one and ubiquitous in size while the atoms in question even if subtle, are hugely infinite in number and are smallest of all in size,

The Various Buddhist Views Regarding the Nature and the Cause of the world

The Buddhist tradition considers the world to be of the form of rūpa. However, according to it the word 'rūpa' does not stand for just 'whatever is visible through eyes' but for 'whatever matter or material element is amenable to sense-perception.' Just like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Jaina traditions the Buddhist tradition too gives prominence to the gross physical effects like colour, taste etc. and bestows consideration on the cause thereof. In connection with the principle of causal relationship it too has given recognition to the principle of similarity—that is, to the principle that an effect is of the same form as its cause. Thus if a physical effect is amenable to sense-perception in the form of colour, taste etc. then its subtle, subtler and even the subtlest or supra-sensuous — i.e. ultimate—cause too ought to be but of the same form—that is, possessed of colour, taste etc. Pursuing this line of thinking this tradition has designated as 'rūpa' the entire world whether gross or subtle.¹² However, there obtains great difference between the nature of rūpa—that is matter and things material — posited by the Buddhists on the one hand and that of matter and things material posited by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Jaina on the other. For just as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Jaina traditions posit atoms and ultimate-atoms similarly the Buddhist tradition posits atoms and ultimate-atoms; however, this latter tradition is on the one hand different from Sāṅkhya with its doctrine of one single element Prakṛti and on the other from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Jaina traditions with their doctrine of eternal atomic elements hugely infinite in number.

The Buddhist tradition posits a multiplicity of physical elements but it attributes permanence or immutability to no element whatsoever. On its view the very constitution of an element is such that it ever undergoes change. Not admitting that under the influence of an independent element called 'time' a thing undergoes change it submits that 'time' is the name for that order of momentary changes which a thing undergoes by its very nature. Hence unlike Sāṅkhya and Jainism it does not posit such an element as always runs along incorporated within the current of those ever-new modifications which a thing undergoes each moment; nevertheless, it does

12 Visuddhimagga 14. 33-80

posit an ever-flowing current of momentary changes. On the Sāṅkhya view there exists within the multiplicity of successive modifications an element called 'Prakṛti' which is ever-present and ubiquitous—even if this element itself too experiences state after state in correspondence with these modifications. On the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view when ever-new effects like substances etc. come into existence then the originating atoms acting as their basis experience no change of any sort whatsoever and remain something eternal-undergoing-no-change. On the Jaina view too the basis of ever-new physical effects are but atoms—even if unlike on the Vaiśeṣika view they are not absolutely different from and independent of those atoms. However one thing is common to the Sāṅkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and Jaina views—viz. that the individuality of the originating substance conceived as a bearer-of-properties remains ever unimpaired. Just as on the Sāṅkhya view the individuality of the one element called 'Prakṛti' remains unimpaired in the form of something conceived as the basis or bearer-of-properties in respect of everything whatsoever¹³, similarly on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika¹⁴ and Jaina¹⁵ views the individuality of the huge infinity of atoms ever remains intact. Thus all these three traditions posit in their respective manners an eternal bearer-of-properties whereas the Buddhist tradition turns out to be different from them all. For according to the latter, when there appear two different effects in the form of an earlier and a later momentary entity they share no common persisting element in the form of a bearer-of-properties. Hence it is that on the Buddhist view the subtle and gross physical-creations do not take place on the basis of a constantly impartite individual element but the physical world goes on experiencing change in the form of something dependently originated so that depending on the first creation there comes into existence the second, depending on the second the third, and so on and so forth. The Buddhist tradition posits no such element of the form of a material cause as gets converted in the form of an effect or gives rise to effects within its own body. Its only submission is that in the earlier appearing momentary entity there obtains some state on account of which a new state makes its appearance in the later appearing momentary entity. Thus even while not positing a single originating element or a number of them in the form of a bearer-of-properties this tradition does posit a multiplicity of elements. In fact, the Buddhist doctrine of a multiplicity of physical elements is a doctrine of a multiplicity of series. And here too the special point to be noted is that in one and the same series the properties like colour, taste, smell, touch etc. being experienced by the various sense-org-

13 Sāṅkhyakārikā 10

14 Āśritatvaṃ cānyatra nityadravyebhyaḥ. . . . Anāśritatvanityatve cānyatra avayavi-dravyebhyaḥ.—Praśastapādaśāstra, Dravyasādharmyaprakaraṇa.

15 Nityāvasthītāny arūpāṇi. Rūpīṇaḥ pudgalāḥ.—Tattvārthasūtra 5. 3-4

ans at one single moment are different from one another even if mutually indivisible. Hence on the Buddhist view the word 'atom' turns out to stand for the properties like colour, taste etc. which exist there for but one single moment and thus behave like an ultimate physical atom of the form of colour, taste etc. Thus denying the existence of something of the form of a bearer-of-properties the Buddhist tradition posited mere properties existing there for but single moment. And an infinite number of series of the properties thus conceived is what constitutes the physical world. Since it was not admitted that series such as these ever came into existence for the first time or will go out of existence altogether they are supposed to be something beginningless and endless. Thus as a result of logically criticizing the doctrine of an eternal-element-undergoing-no-change as also the doctrine of an eternal-element-undergoing-change there came into existence in the Buddhist tradition the doctrine of eternal series.¹⁶

In a general manner one might say that the basic positions as to fundamental principles that were first adopted in the Sāṅkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Jaina traditions underwent no change upto this day whereas the case is different with the Buddhist and Upaniṣadic tradition. Just as in the midst of Vedāntins investigating into fundamental principles on the basis of Upaniṣads there came into existence positions appearing to be absolutely different from one another (e. g. Bodhāyana upholding the doctrine of transformation, Saṅkara that of illusion, and so on), similarly something happened in the case of the Buddhist tradition. Thus what is upheld by the Sarvāstivāda tradition basing itself on Buddha's preaching—something different from that is established by the Sautrāntika tradition basing itself on that very preaching. Not only that, the Vijñānavādin and Śūnyavādin upheld positions altogether different from those upheld by the above two traditions while there obtains a difference of opinion among the former two themselves.

Both the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika branches, while denying the existence of a bearer-of-properties whether of the form of something eternal-undergoing-change or of the form of something eternal-undergoing-no-change, do posit a multiplicity of properties. However, the property posited by Sarvāstivāda, since it retains existence in all the three phases of time, in a way assumes the character of a bearer-of-properties. What till now existed as characterized by a future state now exists as characterized by a present state, and the same giving up the character of being present assumes the character of being past. Since all properties are conceived as existing

16 The Tattvasaṅgraha sections—Sthirabhāvaparīkṣā, Karmaphala-sambandhaparīkṣā, Dravyaparīkṣā, Syādvādaparīkṣā and Traikālyaparīkṣā.

in this manner each property becomes something akin to a bearer-of-properties while the form of its sign or state different at a different time becomes something akin to a property of this bearer-of-properties.

To other Buddhists this position appeared opposed to the preaching of Buddha. So they maintained that the existence of each property is confined to the present alone. Thus they said that whatever possesses existence must be but present. How can existence belong to something that is past or something that is future? Certainly, the meaning of existence is to perform a function while such a function can be performed in the present period alone. Thus in the Buddhist tradition the existence of a property was posited through denying the existence of a bearer-of-properties while existence in the present period alone was attributed to a property through denying to it existence in all the three phases of time.

When the advocates of Sarvāstivāda attributed to a property existence in all the three phases of time they appear to have worked under the influence of the Sāṅkhya or other advocates of the doctrine of an eternal-element-undergoing-change.¹⁷ But how does the Sautrāntika, according to whom a property is confined to the present alone, account for the continuation of a cause-effect-series?—this too is an important question. Thus he says that the indivisible aggregate of colour, taste, smell, touch etc. that existed at an earlier moment perishes as soon as it comes into existence; and in between the moment of its production and the moment of its destruction there intervenes no moment of its persistence. Hence the earlier existing momentary entity is automatically perishable without requiring a cause for its destruction, and its destruction means the production of another momentary entity. This constitutes the rule of uninterrupted succession. For there obtains no temporal gap in between the two momentary entities in question. And so the two can be treated as mutually uninterrupted. The thus flowing current of momentary entities is called 'series of momentary entities (in brief, moment-series).' The properties like colour, taste etc. which are amenable to sense-perception constitute the then running visible series, but there also exist invisible series of the same sort.

How would the Buddhists, who thus considered the world to be divided into multifarious parts in respect of time as well as space, account for the

17 For this see the views of the four masters Dharmatrāta etc. described in *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (p. 504).

cf. *Vibhūtipāda* aphorisms 13-14 in *Yogasūtra* along with *bhāṣya*.

See *History of Philosophy - Eastern and Western*, Volume I, Buddhist philosophy (IX) B, Historical Introduction to the Indian Schools of Buddhism by Vidhushekhar Bhattacarya, p. 173.

phenomenon of recognition?—that too is a question. The Buddhists submit that unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Jaina who while considering atoms quâ substance to be absolutely separate from one another attribute stability to a new composite substance or aggregate and regard it as an object of unitary cognition they themselves posit no such long-standing composite substance or aggregate that might become an object of recognition. However, whatever portion of a series produces in a viewer a sense of similarity in respect of that much portion he out of illusion develops a unitary cognition. On the other hand, personages like Tathāgata etc. in whom there has arisen an inner-wisdom view each and every property as verily separate from one another. But such an ultimate separation is no object of cognition on the part of a physical eye – so that ordinary people conduct all practical usage on the basis of similarity or an illusory unitary-cognition.¹⁸

In the end, two other thought-currents as to the nature of the world also deserve mention. Of these, one has arisen in connection with the Buddhist tradition, the other in connection with the Upaniṣadic tradition. The two thought-currents basically differ as to fundamental principles and they also differ as to the method of explanation, and yet even while employing different words the two propound almost one and the same doctrine. The visible multiplicity exhibiting difference of colour etc. is accounted for by the Mahāyānist thought-current as a superimposition wrought by ignorance or a concealed-truth. This account commonly fits the advocates of Vijñānavāda as well as Śūnyavāda whereas Śāṅkara—the advocate of Kevalādvaita (absolute nondualism)—accounts for the world by calling it a product of illusion (= māyā). When the Mahāyānist thought-current calls the world ignorance-born concealed truth its purport is that this visible gross and subtle external world where difference predominates is not something real but merely appears to be so owing to the mental impressions left behind by ignorance or nescience. On the view of Śāṅkara too the visible world made up of names and forms is not something real but merely appears to be seated in its substratum in the form of a product of illusion.

We have earlier seen that the Sāṅkhya teachers, basing themselves on the ever-present experience of pleasure, pain and delusion, posited in the form of its ultimate cause the sole element Pradhāna which is ubiquitous and made up of three guṇas and thus accounted for the multifariousness visible there in the world; on the other hand, the Jaina, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sthāviravādi-Buddhist, treating as real the properties like colour, taste, smell, touch etc. amenable to sense-perception, gave on the basis thereof thought to the causal-series pertaining to these properties and in the end some posited

18 The Tattvasaṅgraha, section Sthirabhāva-parikṣā, kārīkās 350–475 and Hetubinduṭṭika, pp. 141ff.

in the form of an ultimate cause the huge infinity of impartite atomic substances that are an eternal-element-undergoing-change, some posited an infinity of impartite atomic substances that are an eternal-element-undergoing-no-change, while some posited not any unchanging atomic substance but merely properties that undergo change and are momentary; and the visible multiplicity of the gross and subtle effects was realistically accounted for by them all on the basis of the originating elements respectively posited by them and in their respective manners. That is to say on their view this multiplicity might well be subject to change in the form in which it is cognized by an internal-organ or by the sense-organs it is nevertheless real because it has in fact originated out of its originating cause. Thus even in the eyes of the person who is altogether rid of ignorance this visible multiplicity of the world retains the very same form as it does in the eyes of others. That is say, irrespective of whether the viewer is ignorant or otherwise the form of the world suffers no change whatsoever on account thereof. This has been an account of the realistic thought-current.

The Mahāyāna and the Kevalādvaita Views Regarding the Nature of the World Compared

However the Mahāyānist and the Śāṅkarite thought-currents proceeded and were vindicated on the basis of an altogether different criterion—this appears to be the case. Thus they have been of the view that the nature of the world and its originating cause cannot be correctly ascertained with the help of sense-organs. The sense-organs are indeed a very much imperfect and defective instrument of cognition. They do not at all proceed beyond what is something present and is in contact with them. Not only that, the properties like colour, taste etc. belonging to one and the same object are grasped in absolutely different forms by the sense-organs belonging to the different species of living beings. Even confining ourselves to the human species we find that the capacity of a sense-organ is not of the same form in the case of each individual and these different capacities too do not function in one and the same form. Hence in the task of ascertaining the nature and the originating cause of the world the sense-born cognition cannot be an effective instrument of performance. As compared to the external sense-organs an internal-organ might well be a more competent instrument, but even on the basis of the experience of pleasure, pain and delusion had through it one cannot correctly ascertain the nature and the originating cause of the world. One and the same thing is experienced differently on the same occasion by different internal-organs and even the same internal-organ does not experience a thing in the same manner on different occasions. Besides, when an internal organ is in a controlled or discriminating state it experiences no state of pleasure, pain or delusion even if objects of sensuous enjoyment and the instruments of sensuous enjoyment

retain the same form as before.¹⁹ If the objects of sensuous enjoyment, the instruments of sensuous enjoyment, and the internal-organ that experiences sensuous enjoyment – all these three are by nature of the form of pleasure, pain and delusion then in no case can an internal-organ be free from such an experience. Hence for the sake of determining the nature and the cause of the world some other such criterion has to be adopted as is not based on the experience had by the sense-organs or an internal-organs. It was while searching for some such criterion that the thought-current patronized by Mahāyāna and Kevalādvaita gained currency—that seems likely.

And yogic cognition turned out to be such a criterion. Thus cognition which makes its appearance in a mind absolutely free from the impression left by a past experience, from affliction, from ignorance is yogic cognition. Such a cognition can have a correct direct-acquaintance with all things whatsoever. Hence the nature of the world can be conclusively determined on the basis of this very cognition. Guided by such a consideration the Mahāyāna tradition arrived at one conclusion as to the nature of the world while the Kevalādvaita tradition arrived at one that was somewhat different. Thus the Mahāyāna tradition submitted that the things cognized by a sense-organ or by an internal-organ which appear to be something external have their externality caused by sheer ignorance. Really, if ignorance be not there then there would not at all be in existence the visible world either of the form of colour etc. or of the form of pleasure, pain etc. Hence such a world is a falsity or a concealed-truth. Likewise, the Kevalādvaita tradition argued that since the visible multiplicity-of-things of the form of names and forms is a product of illusion or ignorance it does not at all exist as something real but is something sheer illusory. Both establish their respective conclusions with the help of the same type of illustrations. Thus for example, somebody sees in dream an elephant and that too entering inside the apartment through a small opening in the window.²⁰ On account of that

19 See Tattvasaṅgraha kārikās 36ff. Besides, see Nyāyavatāravārtikavṛtti notes (hito 'pi) pp. 135 and 155 and the aphorism 1.1.3 in Aṇubhāṣya along with Puruṣottama-dāsajī's commentary Prakāśa thereon.

20 "This would mean that when I see in a dream an elephant entering my room through a chink in a window, that the elephant really entered the room; and when I in a dream see my own self quitting the room in which I sleep it will mean that my person has been doubled"—Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, p. 525

Instead of an elephant seen in dream Vasubandhu quotes the illustration of one produced through illusion; this as follows :

Māyākṛtaṁ mantravaśāt khyāti hastyātmanā yathā /
 Ākāramātram tatrāsti hasti nāsti tu sarvathā /
 Svabhāvaḥ kalpito hasti paratantras tadākṛtiḥ /
 Yas tatra hastyabhāvo 'sau pariniṣpanna iṣyate /

the person concerned gets afraid and comes out of the apartment. Just as the thing seen in this dream is something imagined-without-being-real or imaginary similarly the whole external world experienced in the waking state is something imagined-without-being-real or imaginary. The illustrations quoted by the advocates of Kevalādvaita are akin to this one quoted by the advocates of Mahāyāna. The former too submit that just like the spectacles shown by a mirage this world is a product of illusion. Thus the two traditions, even while employing mutually different terminologies, treat the world as unreal and establish their respective positions as regards what constitutes the ultimate truth.

The Mahāyāna tradition, denying the existence of that real world made up of momentary external and internal properties which was posited by the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas, treated this world as something of the form of a concealed-truth or imaginary and traced the origin of its position in the words of Buddha; similarly, the illusionist Kevalādvaita tradition traced the origin of its position in Upaniṣads. Both treat as something rooted in yogic cognition the respective words or scriptures considered to be authoritative by them and then offer their respective trains of logical argumentation in support thereof. The Mahāyānist, even while treating the external world as something imagined-without-being-real or imaginary, accounts for the entire life-practice-presupposing-diversity that goes on therein with the help of the concepts like dhātu, skandha, āyatana, dharma etc. posited by the Vaibhāṣikas²¹; on the other hand, the illusionist Kevalādvaitist

Asatkalpas tathā khyāti mūlacittād dvayātmanā /
Dvayam atyantato nāsti tatrāsty ākr̥timātrakam /
Mantravan mūlavijñānam kṣāṭhavad tathatā matā /
Hastyākāravat eṣṭavyo vikalpo hastivad dvayam /

—Trisvabhāvanirdeśa, Kārikās 27-30

For comparison also see p. 42.

- 21 Tad evaṃ hetupratyayāpekṣaṃ bhāvānām utpādaṃ paridīpayatā bhagavatā ahetvaka hetuviśamahetusambhūtatvaṃ svaparobhayakṛtatvaṃ ca bhāvānām niṣiddhaṃ bhavati. Tanniṣedhāc ca sāmṃvṛtānām padārthānām yathāvasthitam sāmṃvṛtam svarūpam udbhāvitam bhavati.—Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 10

Dve satye samupāśritya buddhānām dharmadeśanā /

Lokasāmṃvṛtisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ //—Madhyamakakārikā 24.8.

Yadi tarhī paramārtho niṣprapañcasvabhāvaḥ sa evāstu. Tat kim anayā' parayā skandhadhātvaśāntānāryasatyapratītyasamutpādādideśanayā prajñānam aparamārthayā. Atattvaṃ hi parityājyam. Yac ca parityājyam kim tenopadiṣṭena ? Ucyate : Satyam etad eva. Kintu laukikam vyavahāram anabhyupagamyābbhidheyajñeyādilakṣaṇam āśakyā eva paramārthato deśayitum.—Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 494

In Vīgrahavyāvartanī Nāgārjuna, after denying the supposed nature of the dharmas like those passion-ridden, those passion-free, etc., simply submits that they originate depending on something else. See Vīgrahavyāvartanī 7,53 etc.

even while treating as unreal the multiplicity obtaining there in the world, accounts for the entire life-practice that the living beings pursue therein with the help of the doctrine of Prakṛti espoused by Sāṅkhya and almost in the very terminology employed by it.²² Thus in the case of a practical account of the world the Vaibhāṣika philosophy acts as basis for one, the Sāṅkhya philosophy for the other.

The Conclusion

The different views as to the nature of the non-conscious world that are briefly narrated above might be summarized as follows : Those of them which posit a multiplicity of originating causes, attributing individuality to the concerned originating causes, explain in their respective manners as to how created multiplicity of effects originates out of these causes and they consider this created multiplicity of effects to be as much real as these causes themselves. Of course, among these advocates of a multiplicity of originating causes there obtains a great difference of opinion as to the nature of what constitutes an originating cause and as to the process of causal relationship that operates in the course of this cause giving rise to a new creation. On the other hand, those positing one single originating cause account for the multiplicity of a real creation emerging out of the one same single cause by positing a capacity for an ordered succession of transformations. Thus on their view the total multiplicity of effects stands permeated by the originating cause while in this originating cause the manifest multiplicity of effects exists in a seed form. Hence these latter too are realist so far as it concerns the nature of the world. On the contrary, those who, while positing one originating element or a number of them, treat the world not as possessed of the same nature as the originating element but something produced owing to ignorance or illusion are to be counted as non-realist (=illusionist).

Vyavahāram anāśriya paramārtho na deśyate/

Paramārtham anāgamyā nirvāṇam nādhigacchati//—Madhyamakakārika 24.10

For a special information regarding concealed-truth and ultimate-truth see Abhidharmadīpa kārika 304 (p. 262) along with notes. Here on the basis of numerous texts there is jointly presented an account of concealed-truth and ultimate-truth that has been accepted by the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika.

22 For example, pañcīkaraṇa (Pañcadaśī) and trivṛtkaraṇaprakriyā; also Chāndogyopaniṣad 6.3.2-4.

LECTURE FOUR

Soul : The Conscious Element

we have already briefly seen as to how regarding the non-conscious world philosophers have considered the matter and established their respective positions. Now regarding soul or the conscious world we have to see as to what order has been adopted by the concerned philosophical speculation proceeding forward, as to how many halts have been resorted to in the course of thus making successive progress, and as to how all this is found mentioned in texts.

In connection with soul or consciousness the first place is occupied by the doctrine that consciousness pertains to physical elements. After that comes the doctrine that soul is an independently existing entity. And lastly comes the doctrine that soul is an entity independent yet somehow dependent on something else. In the case of each stage traversed by the position in question there have been established various views opposed to each other. Here an attempt will be made to briefly review them all.

The Cārvākas Holding that Consciousness Pertains to Physical Elements

So far as discussion regarding soul or consciousness is concerned the oldest stratum of thought is constituted by the doctrine that consciousness pertains to physical elements. In Upaniṣads, Jaina Āgamas and Buddhist Piṭakas the doctrine has found mention in the form of a prima facie view. In Śvetāśvatara at the time of enquiring about the originating cause of the world physical elements are mentioned in the form of a possible such cause.¹ Even older than this might be considered the reference occurring in Bṛhadāraṇyaka. There too consciousness of the form of a mass-of-cognition is mentioned as having arisen from physical elements and having been dissolved back in the same; besides, here there also occurs the statement 'na pretya samjñā asti'.² Not only in the Jaina texts is this statement treated as one upholding the doctrine that consciousness pertains to physical elements,³ but a staunch Naiyāyika like Jayanta too refers to it as a Cārvāka tenet.⁴ In Jaina Āgama there is found mentioned a view to the effect that soul takes its rise from the five physical elements.⁵ Similarly, in Buddhist Piṭa-

1 Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 1.2

2 Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 2.4.12

3 Viśeṣāśākyakabhaṣya, gāthā 1553

4 Nyāyamañjarī (Vāzianagaram Series), p. 472

5 Sūtrakṛtāṅga 1.1.17-18

kas there is described the view of Ajita Kesakambalī who maintained that the soul(=puruṣa) originates from four physical elements.⁶ From all these references one thing emerges out conclusively—viz. that there was a time when great influence was exercised by people who, maintaining that consciousness or soul is a transformation or effect of mere physical elements, conducted their life—practice on the basis of such a position. May be at that time a deep impression was made on the population by a position like that. Hence it was that in later times this position was in a way condemned by being nicknamed 'lokāyata (=widespread among ordinary people)'.

Just as there is found mentioned the view that consciousness pertains to physical elements—a doctrine according to which consciousness emerges out of an aggregate of four or five physical elements—similarly there also prevailed in those olden days a view akin to it but somewhat different from it and called 'the doctrine that soul is the same thing as body (=tājīvat-accharīravāda)', a view reference to which too is preserved. A literal reference to this view is not found in Upaniṣads but it is actually found in Jaina Āgamas⁷ and Buddhist Piṭakas.⁸ This reference is verily different from that to the view according to which consciousness pertains to physical elements. The meaning of the phrase 'four elements' or 'five elements' is very much well known, and in the later philosophical texts whenever there occurs a refutation of the Cārvāka position there is invariably found quoted some old aphorism or other supporting this position.⁹

Now arises the question "What is signified by the 'doctrine that soul is the same thing as body' mentioned apart from the 'doctrine that consciousness pertains to physical elements'?" Had the former doctrine been in no sense different from the latter why in so olden days were the two mentioned apart from one another? Viewing generally, the doctrine that soul is the same thing as body amounts to saying that soul and body are non-different from one another. Buddha, while enumerating his inexplicable questions, has mentioned the doctrine that soul is the same thing as body and has submitted that just as there is one extreme view that soul is different

6 Sāmaññaphalasutta in Dīghanikāya

7 In the chapter Poṇḍariya-adhyayana occurring in the second śrutaskandha of Sūtrakṛtāṅga the ninth para says 'Iti paḍhame purisajāe tājīvat-accharīrac tti āhie' while the tenth para ends with the statement 'Docce purisajāe pañcāmahabbhūie tti āhie'. Besides, see Sūtrakṛtāṅganiryuktigāthā 30 and in Gaṇadharavāda (published by Gujarat Vidyāsabhā) the doubt expressed by the third gaṇadhara Vāyubhūti, p 50.

8 See Buddha's inexplicable question in the Cūlamālunkyasutta of Dīghanikāya.

9 Pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur iti tattvāni'. 'Tatsamudāye śarirendriyaviśayasamjñā'. Tattvopaplavasimha p. 1

Tebhyaś caitanyam iti. Tatra kecid vṛttikārā vyācakṣate—utpadyate tebhyaś caitanyam. Anye' bhivyajyata ity āhuḥ.—Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā p. 205

from body there is another one that soul is non-different from body—this being the reason why the question concerned is inexplicable. From this it appears that to say that soul and body are non-different from one another is the very same thing as to say that soul is identical with body-of-the-form-of-a-Physical-aggregate—which means that the former statement is a description of the doctrine that consciousness pertains to physical elements.

In the chapter *Puṇḍarīka-adhyayana* of *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* the doctrine that soul is the same thing as body is elucidated by saying that just as one can show a sword separately taking it out of the sword-case, or can show an *āmalaka*-fruit separately placing it on one's palm, or can show butter separately churning it out of curd and oil pressing it out of *sesamum*-seeds similarly those who treat soul and body as absolutely different from one another cannot show a soul separately taking it out of body. Hence whatever things is body is also soul.

It seems that both the above views related to the doctrine that consciousness pertains to physical elements have remained preserved in later philosophical texts. Hence it is that after mentioning four physical elements in the aphorism '*pṛthivyāpastejovāyuriti tattvāni*' the doctrine that consciousness originates out of the four physical elements is found described through the aphorism '*tebhyaścāitanyam*.' Similarly, in *Tattvasaṅgraha* the aphorism '*kāyādeva cāitanyam*' is quoted in the form of a position maintained by *Kambalāśvatara*. It is possible that this very position maintained by *Kambalāśvatara* is identical with the doctrine that soul is the same thing as body. In *Dighanikāya* there is mentioned a materialist named *Ajita Kesakambali* while in *Tattvasaṅgraha* there occurs the name of *Kambalāśvatara*. The noteworthy thing is that the word '*kambala* (=blanket)' occurs in both these names. May be the sect upholding the position in question had something to do with some type of a piece of blanket. Even today so many sects advocating the carrying of a piece of blanket are considerably current in this country. Be that as it may, the position in question must belong to a period earlier than that which witnessed the emergence of the doctrine that consciousness is an independent entity.

Move Towards the Doctrine that Consciousness is an Independent Entity

However, as against this position the doctrine which posited rebirth, other-world and soul of the form of an independent entity was gaining great strength. It is of course unknown as to who, when and where gave rise to this doctrine, but it is certain that those upholding this doctrine were divided into so many circles and bestowed consideration on it in their respective manners.

An act once performed does not go waste and the very same person who performs an act reaps its fruit – from out of this deliberation there came

into existence the doctrine of rebirth and other-world. Slowly and slowly but with ease was the doctrine that consciousness pertains to physical elements assailed by this particular doctrine. As a result, the former doctrine began to diminish in prestige. Even so, those upholding the doctrine of other-world were bound to give consideration to the question as to what is the nature of that independent soul which assumes a new birth or reaches another world. Through what precise process might it take leave of one body and proceed to get hold of another one ? Consideration of these and similar questions must have proceeded on. Side by side with this, consideration must have been given to the question as to how and through what means one can attain an other-worldly life happier than the present one. On account of considerations such as these, on the one hand people's attitude towards life underwent a change while on the other hand a number of mutually divergent views came into existence one after another.

Whatever type of actions and whatever type of social organization were deemed proper by a particular tradition, in connection with those very actions and that very social organization it introduced a life-attitude positing other-world and the prestige attained by religions positing other-world gradually became particularly firm. Those people who gave consideration to the question as to how another birth is attained in consequence of the present one undertook speculation in their respective manners and thus established the procedure following which one goes to assume another birth. Thus as regards the nature of an independently existing soul a number of thought-processes came into existence and were firmly established.

The different results arrived at as a result of this type of thought-process have remained preserved in different traditions and have also acted as a centre around which discussions and counter-discussions have taken place in the latter-day philosophical literature. But each and every religious preacher or thinker did admit this much that there exists an element which is of the form of an independently existing conscious entity and which perishes never. It is this element which reaps the fruit of an act performed by itself and can rise to spiritual heights in conformity to a resolve made.

The Jaina View Regarding the Nature of Soul

Among the doctrines positing an independent soul the first place is occupied by the Jaina tradition, and this from two angles. For on the one hand the position as regards soul maintained by this tradition is primitive in comparison with the other more developed such positions and is one that appeals to ordinary commonsense. On the other hand, this position as to the nature of soul had become firmly established in the form of the basis of spiritual endeavour aimed at emancipation made by Lord Pārva-

nātha who had flourished in the eighth century B.C. In the Jaina tradition the position as to the nature of soul that was maintained in the beginning has not upto this day undergone any particular fundamental modification—this unlike what has taken place in the Buddhist and Vedicist traditions. Whatever views as to the nature of soul have been preserved in this tradition ever since the beginning upto this day are of an identical form. Their chief items run as follows :

1. There does exist a soul and by nature it is possessed of consciousness. It is an independent entity and hence is beginningless and endless.¹⁰

2. Souls are many and infinite in number and differ body to body.

3. Of the so many capacities belonging to a soul the chief ones and those obvious to everyone are the following : capacity for cognition, capacity for perseverance or making endeavour, capacity for faith or making resolve. These capacities constitute its nature non-different from itself.¹¹

4. Corresponding to the type of thoughts or acts undertaken by a soul appropriate impressions are left behind there in. And along with them is there created a subtle-body bearing the mark of these impressions and one which accompanies this soul at the time of assuming new body.¹²

5. Even if a soul is of the form of an independent conscious and incorporeal entity it, on account of its association with the corporeal body accumulated by itself, becomes something corporeal so long as this body remains in existence.¹³

6. Corresponding to its body the size of a soul increases or diminishes. However, this increment or diminution of size does not affect its basic character as a substance. Thus its basic substantiality or massiveness retains the same form as always. What alone happens is that depending on the different available occasioning causes its size increases or diminishes. This is a type of doctrine of transformation and that too positing something eternal-undergoing-change. Its another type is constituted by the position that the qualities or capacities possessed by a soul undergo increment and diminution. Thus even if the basic capacities or inherent qualities retain their original form their purity or impurity increases or diminishes in correspondence with the endeavour undertaken by the soul concerned. This

10 Nityāvasthitāny arūpāṇi.—Tattvārthasūtra 5.3

11 Nāṇaṃ ca dāṇsaṇaṃ ceva carittāṃ ca tava tāhā /

Viriyaṃ uvaṇṇa ya eyaṃ jīvaṇṇa lakkhaṇaṃ /—Uttarādhyaṇasūtra, 28.11

12 See the Tattvārtha aphorisms 'Vigrahagataṃ karmayogaḥ' (2.26) etc.

13 See 'Gaṇadhara-vāda (Gujarati)' gāthā 1638.

constitutes eternality-in-the-midst-of-change in respect of a capacity.¹⁴

7. Even if all the souls are possessed of an identical capacity the development undergone by them all is not identical. For that depends on the strength or weakness of the concerned soul's endeavour and that of other occasioning causes.

8. In the whole world there is no place whatsoever where there do not exist souls—either these possessed of a subtle body or those possessed of a gross one.

The Jaina View on Soul Compared with the Corresponding Sāṅkhya-Yoga View

A comparison between the above-stated view adopted by the Jaina tradition as to the element soul (called jīva) and the view adopted by the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition as to the conscious element (called puruṣa or jīva) particularly attracts attention.

(1) According to the Jaina tradition, all soul (=jīva) whatsoever is of the form of an entity which is by nature conscious, beginningless and endless. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition views the element soul (=puruṣa) in an identical fashion.¹⁵

(2) The Jaina tradition attributes a different soul to a different body and maintains that the number of souls is infinite. The same view is upheld by the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition.¹⁶

(3) The Jaina tradition, while supposing the element soul to be of the same size as body, considers it to be something capable of expanding and contracting and so quā substance something eternal-undergoing-change. On the contrary, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition considers the Puruṣa element to be something eternal-undergoing-no-change and ubiquitous; that is to say, not attributing expansion and contraction to the Puruṣa element it does not consider it to be something undergoing transformation quā substance.

14 See Tattvārtha 5.15-16 and the various commentaries thereon.

A similar expansion-cum-contraction of a citta (=internal organ) and its body-sizedness is posited in the Sāṅkhya tradition. E. g. Ghaṭaprasādapradīpakalpaṃ saṅkocavikāśi cittam śarīraparimāṇākāramātram ity apare—Yogabhāṣya 4.1

Aupaśamikakṣāyikau bhāvau mīśraś ca jīvasya svatattvam audayikapāriṇāmikau ca. Tattvārthasūtra 2.1

Mohakṣayāj jñānadarśanāvaranāntarāyākṣayāc ca kevalam. Bandhahetvabhāvanirjarābhyām. Kṛtsnakarmakṣayo mokṣaḥ. Tattvārthasūtra 10.1-3

15 Sāṅkhyakārikā 10-1, 17

16 ibid. 18

(4) The Jaina tradition maintains that actorship and enjoyership belonging to the element soul are real and so it posits in it an increment and diminution of qualities in the form of purity and impurity—that is, some kind of transformation; on the other hand, nothing of the sort is maintained by the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition. Thus the latter, on account of not positing in the conscious element actorship and enjoyership and the relation of guṇa and guṇa-owner or that of property and property-owner, attributes to it no kind of transformation of a guṇa or a property.¹⁷

(5) The Jaina tradition, positing an element soul which bears the impressions left behind as a result of its pure and impure thought or endeavour, also posits a physical subtle body constructed in its vicinity. This very body acts as the carrier or medium for the element soul being taken forward from one birth to another. In the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition, on the other hand, even if the conscious element is regarded as something not undergoing transformation, untouched by anything else, devoid of actorship and enjoyership, ubiquitous, yet each and every soul is supposed to be possessed of its own subtle body—this with a view to accounting for the phenomenon of rebirth. This subtle body itself is like a soul posited by the Jaina tradition, an actor and enjoyer, a substratum of the qualities like knowledge and ignorance, religiosity and irreligiosity, etc. and one possessed of transformation of the form of an increment or diminution of the qualities in question. Not only that, just like the element soul posited by the Jaina tradition, it is also body-sized and one undergoing expansion and contraction. In brief one can say that with the exception of the inherent capacity of consciousness whatever properties, qualities or transformations are attributed to the element soul posited by the Jainas are also attributed to the element buddhi or subtle-body posited by the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition.¹⁸

(6) According to the Jaina tradition, the element soul even if inherently incorporeal, becomes akin to something corporeal on account of the relation of identity obtaining between it and the corporeal karmic body. On the other hand, the conscious element posited by the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition is supposed to be so absolutely incorporeal that it carries no real imprint whatsoever of the corporeality pertaining to the nonconscious or corporeal body always residing in its vicinity while that imprint which on account of their mutual vicinity is supposed to be impressed by the pure element buddhi on soul and by soul on buddhi is merely something imputed, unreal and hence merely something just practically real—this like sky really not

17 *ibid.* 19,20

18 *ibid.* 40; also Introduction to 'Gaṇadharavāda, p. 122

carrying the imprint of a painting and yet such an imprint appearing to be present there.¹⁹

(7) Just as from among the various qualities or capacities those like cognition, endeavour, faith are treated by the Jaina tradition as inherently belonging to a soul and something empirically observable, similarly the same qualities are posited by the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition not in the conscious element but in the element buddhi of the form of subtle body.²⁰

(8) According to the Jaina tradition each and every soul is possessed of an identical inherent capacity and yet it experiences gradual progress in accordance with the strength or weakness of endeavour and that of an occasioning cause available to it; similarly is all this said by the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition about the subtle element or the element buddhi. That is to say, even if all the elements of the form of buddhi are inherently possessed of a similar capacity their gradual progress depends on the strength or weakness of their endeavour and that of the occasioning causes available to them.

The Jaina and Sāṅkhya-Yoga View on Soul Compared with the Corresponding Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika View

Even if the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition posits soul in the form of an independent entity its view of the nature of a soul is in so many respects different from those of the Jaina and Sāṅkhya-Yoga traditions. Hence the former's comparison with the latter two is as much necessary as it is interesting. Thus the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition agrees with the Jaina and Sāṅkhya-Yoga traditions in positing an infinite number of beginningless and endless substances of the form of soul — each different for a different body²¹ — but it does not agree with the Jaina view that a soul is medium in size while agreeing with the Sāṅkhya-Yoga view that it is ubiquitous in size.²² Since it does not attribute to a soul medium size or a capacity to undergo expansion and contraction it agrees with the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition in viewing a soul qua substance as something eternal-undergoing-no-change²³; even so, on the question of the relation of quality and quality-owner or property and property-owner it, disagreeing with the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition, in some way agrees with the Jaina tradition. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition views the conscious element as something impartite and devoid of all relation with a

19. Sāṅkhyakārikā 62

20. *ibid.* 40

21. Vyavasthāto nāna—Vaiśeṣikadarśana 3.2.20
Śāstrasāmarthyāc ca—*ibid.* 3.2.21

22. Vibhavan mahānākāśas tathā cātmā,—*ibid.* 7. 1. 22

23. Anāśritatvanityatve cānyatrāvayāvidravyebhyah.—Prasastapādabhāṣya, Dravyasādharmya-prakaraṇa.

quality or property but the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, agreeing with the Jaina tradition, views the element soul as a substratum of numerous qualities and properties.²⁴ Nevertheless, it after all disagrees also with the view upheld by the Jaina tradition. Thus the Jaina tradition attributes to the element soul a number of inherent and ever-present capacities like consciousness, bliss, endeavour etc., capacities which are non-different from this element, and then posits in them such transformations or modifications as are different from moment to moment; on the other hand, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition attributes to the element soul no such inherent capacities like consciousness etc. and yet posits in it qualities like cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, spiritual merit, spiritual demerit, etc. qualities which remain in a soul only so long as it is associated with a body while they also continue to come into existence and go out of existence. These nine qualities cognition, pleasure etc. posited by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition are in a way akin to the modifications-undergone-by-an-inherent capacity posited by the Jaina tradition. Even so, the two traditions differ inasmuch as according to the Jaina tradition at the time of disembodied emancipation when there obtains no association with a body the element soul experiences an uninterrupted cycle of the pure transformations or modifications undergone by the inherent capacities like consciousness, bliss, endeavour etc. while according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition at the time of disembodied emancipation there cannot possibly exist in the element soul any such quality like cognition etc.—whether pure or impure, whether momentary or perdurable²⁵; for the latter does not basically posit in the element soul inherent capacities like consciousness etc. In this connection the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition agrees with the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition in one respect and disagrees with it in another. Thus according to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition, the conscious element is of the form of consciousness that is impartite, something eternal-undergoing-no-change and self-revelatory; hence on its view, in the state of emancipation this element is as much free from all association with the qualities cognition etc. as it is in the state of transmigration. On the other hand, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, the element soul is not something inherently conscious and yet in the state of transmigration it is possessed of the qualities like cognition etc. while in the state of emancipation, being devoid of all such qualities, this substance soul in a way becomes akin to the conscious element posited by the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition, an element which too is devoid of all qualities. That is to say, in the state of emancipation it, being absolutely devoid of qualities that come into existence and go out of existence, becomes a substance

24 Vaiśeṣikadarśana 3.2.4; 5.3.5; 9.2.6 as also discussion on soul occurring in Praśastapādabhāṣya,

25 Nyāyabhāṣya 1.1.22 and Introduction to 'Gaṇadharavāda' p. 105

devoid of all qualities as it does according to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition. Thus on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view an emancipated soul becomes something akin to ether. In this connection the only difference is that ether is considered to be physical though incorporeal while the substance soul is incorporeal as well as non-physical. So far as the absence of inherent consciousness and that of the qualities or modifications like cognition etc. is concerned there is not the slightest difference between the element ether and the element soul. However, ether is one single substance while the emancipated souls are infinite in number; this difference as to number does draw attention,

In many other respects as well does the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition bear a peculiar similarity with and dissimilarity from the Jaina and Sāṅkhya-Yoga traditions. Thus the Jaina tradition attributes inherent actorship and enjoyership to the element soul²⁶; the same is done by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. However, actorship and enjoyership posited by the Jaina tradition in a soul remain there even in a pure and emancipated soul—which is not the case with the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika tradition. So long as body remains there and the origination and destruction of the qualities like cognition, desire etc. go on there actorship and enjoyership continue to belong to a soul²⁷; but no such actorship or enjoyership remains there in the state of emancipation. Thus in the state of emancipation it becomes akin to soul as conceived by the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition.

Actorship-cum-enjoyership posited in the element soul by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition is also of a different order. Since this tradition treats a soul as something eternal-undergoing-no-change it cannot directly attribute to it any kind of actorship-cum-enjoyership. Hence it attributes actorship-cum-enjoyership to it on the basis of the origination and destruction of the qualities belonging to it. Thus it submits that so long as the qualities cognition, desire, effort etc. belong to a soul it behaves as an actor and an enjoyer, but when an utter absence of these qualities takes place in the state of emancipation actorship-cum-enjoyership no longer remains present in it in a direct sense—even if one might attribute the same to it in the sense that it was present in it in the past. Thus even if agreeing with the Jaina tradition the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition attributes to a soul actorship-cum-enjoyership it can also go on to add that the element soul is something eternal-undergoing-no-change; for according to it, the qualities are utterly different from the element soul acting as their substratum. Thus even if it grants that the qualities originate and vanish it manages to defend its cherished doctrine that a soul is something eternal-

26 *Sanmatitarka* 3.55

27 *Nyāyavārtika* 3.1.6 and Introduction to 'Gaṇadharavāda' p. 96.

undergoing-no-change; and this on the basis of its view that a quality and the quality-owner concerned are different from one another. With a view to defending its position that the conscious element is something eternal-undergoing-no-change the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition contended that qualities do not at all exist in this element, and when there arose the contingency that this element undergoes a change or modification as a result of its association with an alien substance it declared the situation concerned to be something merely figurative or imaginary. On the other hand, its position that the conscious element is something eternal-undergoing-no-change was defended by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition in an altogether different manner. Thus the latter did posit qualities in a substance but even while granting that qualities are liable to originate and vanish it refused to further grant that the substance concerned undergoes a change or modification on the ground thereof. Its argument is that the qualities are altogether different from the substance acting as their substratum—so that their origination-cum-destruction means neither the origination-cum-destruction nor a modification of the substance soul acting as their substratum. Thus both the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika traditions explain in their respective manners as to how an entity acts as something eternal-undergoing-no-change, but the original current subscribing to the view that the substance soul is something eternal-undergoing-no-change has been preserved in the two traditions in an identical fashion.

Like the Jaina tradition the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does maintain that as a result of its noble and ignoble or pure and impure performances certain impressions are left behind in the substance soul, but unlike the former the latter does not posit a physical subtle body carrying the imprint of these impressions; and yet since the latter too subscribes to the doctrine of rebirth it too has to entertain in this connection some hypothesis or other. Accordingly, it submits that being ubiquitous a soul can undertake no going and coming but that each soul is equipped with an internal-organ of atomic size which at the time when one body perishes transfers to the place where a new body is to be assumed. This transference to another place on the part of an internal-organ is what constitutes a soul's rebirth. According to the Jaina tradition a soul itself along with its subtle physical body transfers to another place while according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition rebirth means transference to another place not on the part of a soul but on the part of an internal-organ belonging to this soul.

In this connection the method of accounting for rebirth on the part of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition is worth comparison. According to this tradition, buddhi or the subtle body (called *līṅga-śarīra*), which is possessed of the properties like merit, demerit etc. and which in spite of being medium-

sized is mobile, leaves the gross body at the time of death and transfers to another place²⁸; on the other hand, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition accounts for rebirth without positing such a prakṛti-born subtle body but merely by assuming that the eternal and atomic-sized internal-organ itself is mobile. According to the Jaina tradition a soul itself along with the associated subtle body undertakes going and coming in a real fashion while according to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika traditions there is no scope at all for such going and coming. According to the latter two, rebirth means the going and coming of an adjunct attached to a soul.

- 28 The physical karmic body posited by the Jaina tradition is dravya-karman (=karman of the form of a physical substance.), but according to it Bhāvakarman (=karman of the form of a mental state) is constituted by mental impressions. In place of a karmic body the Nyāya philosophers posit an internal-organ which is of the form of a substance, but in place of bhāva-karman he too posits an element called 'avyakta' in the form of what he calls karma-prakṛti; this as follows :

Dve śarīrasya prakṛti vyaktā ca avyaktā ca. Tatra avyaktāyāḥ karīṇasamākhyā-tāyāḥ prakṛter upabhogāt prakṣyaḥ. Prakṣiṇe ca karmaṇi vidyamānāni bhūtāni na śarīram utpādayanti ity upapanno'pavargaḥ. Nyāyavārtika 3.2.68

Besides, for a special study see Introduction to Gaṇadharavāda, p. 121.

In the commentary Yuktidīpikā on Sāṅkhyakārikā (kārikā 39) there are enumerated various views as to liṅga-śarīra. There Pañcādhikaraṇa, Patañjali and Vindhyavāsīn are said to uphold three different views. The speciality of Patañjali is that he posits a new subtle body for each new birth while Vindhyavāsīn does not at all posit such an intermediate body. A view similar to the latter is mentioned in Mahābhārata (3. 193.77). Furthermore, in Śaṅkara's Prapañcasāraṇtra too there are mentioned other views as to the subtle body that transfers from birth to birth. The commentator Padmapāda has attributed these different views to different authorities like—Pañcādhikaraṇa, Vārṣaganya, Āvaṭya, Vindhyavāsīn, Patañjali, Dharmantari. In this connection Śaṅkarācārya also quotes a view according to which the father's soul transfers to the son. This view occurs in Aitareya Upaniṣad (2.1.3). All these views quoted in Yuktidīpikā and Prapañcasāra have been described at great length and with great clarity by Shri Pulinbīhari in his 'Origin and Development of the Sāṅkhya System of Thought' (pp. 288-98). While doing so he also makes use of the medical texts like Caraka, Suśruta, Kāśyapa-saṁhitā, Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya. In the end the view as to subtle body adopted by Īśvarakṛṣṇa himself is elucidated in conformity to the kārikā 40.

Besides, we come across accounts as to how at the very moment of death a subtle body proceeds forward to assume a new body. Thus somebody says that just as leech leaves the earlier leaf only after it has firmly caught hold of the new one similarly a subtle body catches hold of a new body just as it takes leave of the old one—there occurring no interval between the two acts. Another one says that just as a new lamp is lighted with the help of an old one a new body appears in succession to the old one. With all this does deserve comparison the motion attributed to a karmic body by the Jaina tradition. Thus this tradition posits two types of such motion—viz. ṛjugati (=straight motion) and vighraḥgati (=curved motion), and there appears no interval of time in the case of the former type of motion.

In connection with rebirth and the allied topics Shri Aurobindo's work 'Rebirth' too is particularly worthy of perusal.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, agreeing with the Jaina tradition, attributes to a soul a real progress and degeneration depending on the purity and impurity of the cognition, faith and endeavour—that is effort or perseverance—belonging to this soul; thus it disagrees with the Śāṅkhya-Yoga tradition which treats them as something imputed or imaginary and ones produced as a result of associatedness with an adjunct of the form of a subtle body or *liṅga-sārīra*.

The Various Buddhist Views Regarding Soul

Among the lines of thinking positing soul in the form of an independent element the Buddhist one comes last of all. Generally speaking, each non-Buddhist-tradition dubs the Buddhist one as an upholder of the doctrine of no-soul. So when we here include it among those positing soul in the form of an independent entity the first question that deserves consideration is as to what is meant by its rivals when they call it an upholder of the doctrine of no-soul and as to what is meant when it is to be treated as one positing soul in the form of an independent entity.

Before and during the time of Buddha—the Enlightened One, there were current among the philosophers of the country chiefly two thought-currents as to the nature of soul or the conscious element. Of these, one submitted that time-factor in no way affects the element soul or its capacity—that is, even while occupying in every sense a place on the standing-board of time it remains untouched by an influence thereof; on the other hand, the second thought-current maintained that the element soul and its capacities, even while retaining an identical form in every sense, ~~crossing~~ remain entirely untouched by the influence of time-factor. Thus according to the first thought-current, being or existence means remaining unchanged or unchanging in all the three phases of time while according to the second, existence means that even while the thing existing does undergo change its individuality is one and remains ever impartite. Both these thought-currents uphold the doctrine of eternality. Being eternal means being uninterrupted—so that an entity is eternal in case it, while undergoing change or even undergoing a change, remains ever-standing. Both these thought-currents considered in their respective manners did they consider the conscious element or substance. In confrontation with this consideration the view upheld by Buddha. Thus he came out with the view that there exists no such element or entity as remains unchanged in the course of time. Every element or entity is subject to the law of temporal uninterruptedness or order. There can be no two moments during which a real re-

itself manifest exhibiting the nature of *nāma* and *rūpa*.³³ Buddha on the other hand does not posit an independent basic element which manifests itself in the form of *nāma* but views *nāma* itself in the form of an independent element which is as much real as *rūpa* (=physical element) and on account of bearing the character of an aggregate in the manner described and running its course in the form of a series is beginningless and endless. In this position maintained by Pitakas we can see that there flows in an uninterrupted manner the current of an aggregate whose constituent-elements are *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāra* and *viññāna*; of this current there is neither a beginning nor an end. Since in this current centred around *viññāna* there is no place for the permanent individuality of a conscious element or substance-of-the-form-of-soul the position in question is known as the doctrine that soul does not exist in the form of a real entity,

However, round about the Buddhist order there were in existence a number of circles upholding the doctrine of an eternal soul. So when objections against the doctrine of no-soul were raised from the side of these circles and when certain people working under the influence of their past adherence to some doctrine positing an eternal element entered the Buddhist order the doctrine of soul was once more advocated by these people in their own specific manner. In *Kathavatthu* and *Tattvasaṅgraha* this doctrine of soul is referred to as a *prima facie* view maintained by a section of Buddhists.³⁴ These advocates of the doctrine of soul mentioned under the title *Sammitiya* or *Vātsīputriya* submitted that the substance soul does exist in a real sense of the term, but when they were asked whether soul exists in the same fashion as does *rūpa* (=physical element) they answered in the negative. Thus the doctrine that there does exist a soul did gain entry in the Buddhist order, but it could not be made compatible with Buddha's basic viewpoint and ultimately retained a mere nominal existence.

The doctrine that soul does not exist in the form of a real entity was evolving itself in a number of ways. However, it was mainly concerned with the question as to how to retain a footing in confrontation with the advocates of the doctrine of an eternal soul as also with the question as to how besides answering other objections to offer an intelligible account of the phenomena like rebirth and bondage-cum-emancipation. Out of this concern

33 *Taddhedam tarhy avyākṛtamāsīt/Tannāmarūpābhyām eva vyākriyata.*—*Bṛhadāraṇyakaopaniṣad* 1.4.7

34. *Kaḥ punar atra saṃyujyate?* (p. 254). *Paudgalikasyāpi avyākṛtavastuvādinah pudgalopi dravyato'stiti* (p. 258). *Nagnātapakṣe prakṣeptavyāh* (p. 259)—Quoted from *Abhidharmadīpa* and the notes thereon (p.254). In this text the procedure of vindicating the doctrine of no-soul favoured by the Buddhist has been elucidated on the basis of a number of texts. Besides, see *Tattvasaṅgraha*, *kārikās* 336ff.

came into existence the doctrine called sarvāstivāda. It gave to the element *nāma* also the designation 'citta', and offered an account of this citta or aggregate-of-vedanā-samjñā-samskāra-vijñāna by dividing it into a number of parts or properties – inherent as well as adventitious, general as well as specific. It is this position that constitutes the doctrine called sarvāstivāda. This doctrine offered a minute—a very minute—account of citta and its various states called 'caitasika', but even while sticking to its basic tenet of momentarism it posited a past as also a future course and attributed in its own manner to a momentary citta or caitasika existence in all the three phases of time.³⁵ But it too had to face opposition on the ground that since Buddha regards everything as merely momentary or one existing in the present time alone his position cannot be compatible with an existence of the three phases of time. Indeed, to accept the three phases of time is to allow entry from the backdoor to the doctrine of eternalism. Out of a consideration like this there came into existence the doctrine called sautrāntikavāda. It kept in tact the already evolved framework of properties (=dharma) or citta-cum-caitasika but altogether freed these entities from the shackles of existence in the three phases of time and treated them as existing in the present time alone.

In this way intensive discussion and assemblies-for-disputation went on being organized by the parties and counter-parties. Thus one party would defend the doctrine positing something real while another party the just opposite doctrine positing something unreal; similarly, a third party would defend the doctrine positing something real-as-well-as-unreal while a fourth party the doctrine positing something-neither-real-nor-unreal. Similarly, there were current a number of sets of four alternatives like the set comprising permanent, impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, neither permanent nor impermanent, the set comprising one, many, both one and many, neither one nor many, and so on and so forth. To people like Nāgārjuna it appeared that to stick to the rival alternatives such as these is incompatible with Buddha's Middle Path. This idea impelled them in the direction of positing an element free from the four rival alternatives³⁶ and on that basis they established the doctrine called śūnyavāda. Śūnya (=void) stands for the

35 See the *Tattvasaṅgraha* section *Traikālyaparikṣā* kārīkās 1786ff. (p. 503). In *Abhidharma-dīpa* (along with notes, kārīkā 299, p. 250), while describing the four position-holders flourishing within the Buddhist order, there is given an account of *Sarvāstivāda* whose explanation of all phenomena presupposes the acceptance of three phases of time.

36 *Mādhyamikavṛtti* pp. 16, 26 and 108 and the kārīkās 5, 7 occurring on p. 275; also *Syādvādamāñjarī*, kārīkā 17.

Tasmān na bhāvo nābhāvo na lakṣyaṃ nāpi lakṣaṇam /
Ākāśaṃ ākāśasamā dhātavaḥ pañca ye pare //

Astitvaṃ ye tu paśyanti nāstitvaṃ cālpabuddhayaḥ /
Bhāvānāṃ te na paśyanti draṣṭavyopāśamaṃ śivam // —*Madhyamakakārīkā* 5.7-8

fact that properties (=dharma) do not exist in the form of a real entity or that things are devoid of their own nature. To attach oneself to a property-owner or a property, to this party or that is not the Middle path. As for what constitutes the ultimate real, it is free from all the possible sets of rival alternatives and is amenable to cognition on the part of *prajñā* (=supra-ordinary wisdom) alone. Thus in spite of propounding the doctrine of *śūnyavāda* they did defend Buddha's Middle Path Wisdom—as also the doctrine of rebirth and spiritual progress.

Thereafter and last of all comes the doctrine called *Yogācāra*. To the advocates of this doctrine it might have appeared that the doctrine called *śūnyavāda* does not describe any element whatsoever positively or in the form of a really existing entity—so that even the element *nāma* centred around cognition (=vijñāna) and posited by Buddha becomes something akin to a mere void (=nonentity). Possibly, some such consideration impelled the advocates of *Yogācāra* in the direction of propounding the doctrine called *vijñānavāda*. Thus they established that the element alternatively called *nāma*, *citta*, consciousness or soul is of the form of mere cognition. This doctrine differs from the earlier enumerated ones inasmuch as all the earlier Buddhist disputants conducted their investigation on the presupposition that the extra-cognitive element *rūpa* (=physical element and the things made up of them — all amenable to sense-perception) is something that exists really whereas all the advocates of *vijñānavāda*—whether old or new — denied the separate existence of any such external *rūpa* and submitted that that corporeal element which the Buddhist and other disputants call 'rūpa', is merely a form of cognition (=vijñāna) but appears to be something different from cognition owing to nescience, past-impression or concealment. Thus the Buddhist tradition, after passing through several stages-of-thought as regards the nature of soul, ultimately got established in the doctrine that there exists cognition alone,—a doctrine advocated by *Yogācāra*; and competent efforts were made by scholars like Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla to make this doctrine intelligible.³⁷

Yathoktam āryaratnāvalyām—

Nāstiko durgatim yāti sugatim yāty anāstikaḥ /

Yathābhūtaparijñānān mokṣam advayanirhṛitaḥ //

Āryasamādhirāje coktam bhagavatā—

Asīti nāstīti ubhe'pi antā śuddhī aśuddhīti ime'pi antā /

Tasmād ubhe anta vivarjayitvā madhye'pi sthānam na karoti paṇḍitaḥ //

Asīti nāstīti vivāda eṣaḥ śuddhī aśuddhīti ayam vivādaḥ /

Vivādaprapṛtyā na duḥkham praśmyate avivādaprapṛtyā ca duḥkham nirudhyate //

—Mādhyamikavṛtti pp. 135-6

37 Pramāṇavārtika 2.327 etc. and the Tattvasaṅgraha section Bahirarthaparīkṣā pp. 550-82

Whatever be the branch of the Buddhist tradition it attributes to a different body a really different citta-series or soul as conceived by it. Even vijñānavādins (=those advocating that there exists cognition alone) who posit nothing real apart from cognition, when they maintain that the different cognition-series really differ from one another, in fact follow the view attributing a different soul to a different body;³⁸ a view which constitutes a common trait of the Śramaṇa-tradition.

As regards the size of a citta, cognition-series or soul the Buddhist tradition puts forth no particular view—on the basis whereof one might definitely assert that this size is atomic or one equal to that of the body concerned. Even then, it is occasionally said in the Buddhist texts that the seat of citta or vijñāna is 'hadayavatthu.'³⁹ On the basis of it one might generally say that even if the Buddhists bestowed no particular consideration on the question as to the size of the element citta or soul they must have been of the view that effects of the form of an experience of pleasure, pain etc. produced by cognition seated in hadayavatthu are spread throughout the body concerned.

Just as with a view to accounting for rebirth in their respective manners the Jainas, Sāṅkhya, Yoga etc. posited a subtle body that transfers from one place to another similarly was it posited by Buddhists too since the very beginning—that seems likely. In Dīghanikāya there occurs the word 'gandharva' and it is explained by saying that in case one is to assume another birth after dying then for seven days does the gandharva concerned lie waiting for a suitable occasion. On the basis of this hypothesis of gandharva the texts like Kathāvatthu spoke of a body called 'antarābhava.' Subsequently, the Vaibhāṣikas like Vasubandhu and others too posited an 'antarābhava' body and argued in support of the position.⁴⁰ In this connection the only exception is the Theravādin Buddhaghosa. For he, basing himself on certain illustrations, accounts for rebirth without positing anything like an 'antarābhava' body.⁴¹

The Upaniṣadic Thought—Current Regarding the Nature of Soul

Now is the occasion to say something about how the Upaniṣadic thought-current views the nature of soul. Thus in different old Upaniṣads and at times in the different parts of the same Upaniṣad there is visible difference as to suppositions and difference as to thoughts as regards the

38. With a view to vindicating this very tenet was composed by Dharmakīrti the text entitled 'Santānāntarasiddhi'.

39. Visuddhimagga 14.60 and 17.163 etc.

40. See Abhidharmadīpa, p. 142 along with notes and 'The Tibetan Book of the Dead'.

41. Visuddhimagga, 17.163

nature of soul. On the basis of it one can say that not all the Upaniṣads speak with the same voice. Hence it is that among the thinkers basing themselves upon Upaniṣads there have been prevalent since the very beginning various trends of thought as to the nature of soul. With a view to establishing from among those trends the position acceptable to himself Bādarāyaṇa composed his Brahmasūtra and in it he also referred to a number of positions earlier current. Like Upaniṣads themselves Brahmasūtra too came to earn immense prestige. Hence so many commentaries were composed on the latter and the trends of thought that had earlier come into existence again received development in the form of these commentaries on Brahmasūtra; however, these old commentaries are no more available today in their original form.

Ācārya Śaṅkara wrote commentaries on the texts like Brahmasūtra etc. and established the doctrine called māyāvāda; and as soon as he did so a reaction followed immediately. Thus advocates of the trends of thought which found māyāvāda to be unacceptable wrote anti-māyāvāda commentaries on Brahmasūtra following the line laid down by some old master or other. Famous among these commentators are the masters like Bhāskara, Rāmaṇuja, Nimbārka etc. These masters differ more or less as to the line of consideration adopted—also as to the employment of technical terminologies and illustrations; yet they are all unanimous as to one thing—viz. in stressing that the existence of a soul is not illusory as is upheld by Śaṅkarācārya and that the really existing souls too are different in different bodies and are eternal. All the masters like Śaṅkara etc. chiefly depend on Upaniṣads in the course of corroborating their respective views and in so many cases they put different interpretations on one and the same Upaniṣadic text. Thus there are current a number of Upaniṣadic trends of thought, but if they are to be classified then one can say that Śaṅkara constitutes one class, Madhva another while the rest of the masters the third.

Śaṅkara treats as an ultimate real no other element besides Brahman and accounts for the practically experienced difference of souls by positing a capacity for illusion (=māyā) or ignorance (=avidyā). Even this capacity is not something independent of Brahman. Hence according to Śaṅkara neither a soul nor the mutual difference obtaining among souls is something real.⁴² Directly opposed to it is the position maintained by Madhva. Thus he says that a soul is not something imaginary but something real and that the mutual difference obtaining among souls too is something real; besides, a soul is different from Brahman as well. Thus Madhva's position is to be classed among those according to which souls are something real,

⁴² Jivo brahmaiva nāparaḥ. —Brahmasiddhi p. 9. See Dr. C. D. Sharma's 'Bauddha Darśana aur Vedānta' p. 224.

infinite in number and eternal.⁴³

On their part, all the remaining masters like Bhāskara etc. do treat a soul as something real but only in the form of a transformation, effect or portion of Brahman. These entities of the form of a transformation, effect or portion might well be produced on account of a capacity inherent in Brahman, but in no form are they something illusory. This is how these trends of thought proceed on and on.

In Mahābhārata there are found mentioned three different views in the form of a Śāṅkhyan position. Of these, one posits twenty-four elements while another, according to which there exist an infinite number of independent souls, posits twenty-five elements. The third view, according to which there exists an element Brahman besides souls, posits twenty-six elements. It seems likely that in the beginning these three views constituted three different trends of thought. On the basis thereof different masters developed their respective positions and in this connection sought support from Upaniṣads as well. Subsequently, when people like Śāṅkara denied to the element prakṛti or pradhāna an independent individuality and actorship while attributing to it the status of a capacity-inherent-in-Brahman, ignorance or illusion then there remained no scope also for the independently existing infinite number of souls conceived in the form of a twenty-fifth element, and everything whatsoever was derived from Brahman. On the other hand, those who did not altogether deny to prakṛti and to the souls a distinct individuality but preserved this individuality in the form of a transformation, effect or portion of Brahman delineated the nature of soul on the supposition that a transformation, effect or portion of Brahman is something real. All these masters are in a way an advocate of the doctrine of a really existing soul but since they also maintain that Brahman undergoes a transformation they are to be classed among those according to whom a soul exists depending on something else. This is no place to discuss the question in details, but a consideration related to soul remains incomplete without reviewing the various Vedāntic positions concerned. So this review too should be undertaken now.

The Vedāntic thought-current related to soul has flown in the form of the predominantly non-dualist traditions like Kevalādvaita, Satyopādhīadvaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaitādvaita, Avibhāgādvaita, Śuddhādvaita and Acintya-bhedābheda, and it has also gained support in the form of a dualist doctrine.

⁴³ Tathā ca paramā śrutih—

Jiveśvarabhīdā caiva jaḍeśvarabhīdā tathā /

Jivābhedo mithaś caiva jaḍajivābhīdā tathā //

Mithaś ca jaḍābhēdo yāḥ prapāñco bhēdapāncakāḥ /

Kevalādvaita is the doctrine upheld by Śaṅkara. On his view, Brahman alone is an ultimate real and the difference pertaining to souls—like that pertaining to the world—he accounts for by positing a capacity for illusion. Hence according to this doctrine, a soul is not an independent and permanent element but a mere reflection of the ultimately real Brahman appearing there owing to its association with illusion, ignorance or an internal-organ; and when one comes to realize the identity of a soul with Brahman this reflection too ceases to be there. Since the doctrine of Kevalādvaita intends to posit the existence of a pure and impartite conscious element alone it has to account for the mutual difference obtaining among souls just as it has to account for the relation obtaining between the element souls and the pure Brahman. Besides, with a view to explaining as to how rebirth takes place they have to explain as to how a soul transfers from one body to another. Now if just one ultimate real is posited at the root and account has to be offered for so many types of differences then the only way out is to take recourse to the concept of illusion or ignorance. Hence it is that by taking recourse to the concept of illusion or ignorance has the doctrine of Kevalādvaita accounted for the entire secular and scriptural practice which presupposes so much of diversity. However, this accounting has been done not following some one single procedure. For what Śaṅkara had finally to say on the question is not available in his own words. Hence in this connection his disciples and commentators have resorted to do so many sorts of hypotheses which at times even seem to be just opposed to one another. In the following we quote several instances of the mutually divergent hypotheses adopted by the commentators of Śaṅkara — on the basis of which one can well say that so much difference of opinion as to the nature etc. of a soul is found there within the fold of the doctrine of Kevalādvaita is to be met within the case of no other Vedāntic thought-current. Here it too is necessary to keep in mind that with a view to vindicating his view or hypothesis each commentator has chiefly relied on scriptural texts.

A scholar named Gaṅgādhara Sarasvatī has written a verse-text entitled *Vedāntasiddhāntasūktimañjarī*. On it is found a commentary *Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha* composed by Appaya Dīkṣita. In this original text and its commentary there are compiled and elaborated all the different views as to soul adopted by the advocates of the doctrine of Kevalādvaita. From among them the chief ones are being taken up by us here.

(1) *The Doctrine of Reflection* : The masters like the author of *Prakāśārtha*, the author of *Samkṣepasārīraka* and the author of *Vivaraṇa* describe in their respective manners a soul as a reflection of Brahman. One would submit that this reflection takes place in ignorance, another one that it takes place in an internal-organ, a third one that it takes place in

nescience. Thus the doctrine of reflection has been defended in so many different ways. [Vedāntasūktimanjari, chapter I, vv. 28-40]

(2) *The Doctrine of Delimitation*; Certain other masters employ the concept of delimitation in place of that of reflection and submit that not Brahman reflected in antahkarana (=internal-organ) etc. but the same delimited by antahkarana etc. is what constitutes a soul. [ibid. v.41]

(3) *The Doctrine that Brahman Itself is a Soul*: On this view a soul is neither a reflection of Brahman nor a delimitation thereof, but the unchanged Brahman itself acts as a soul on account of ignorance and as Brahman on account of knowledge. [ibid. v. 42.]

Thus as to the nature of a soul there are chiefly current three alternative views—viz. that which treats it as of the form of a reflection, that which treats it as being of the form of a delimitation, that which treats it as being non-different from Brahman.

The question whether there exists just one soul or a number of souls has also been discussed among the advocate of Kevalādvaita. Thus one submitted that some one single body is alone possessed of a soul while the rest are devoid of a soul, another one that even while there exists just one soul all the bodies are possessed of a soul, a third one that there actually exist a number of souls. Thus the discussion has received good deal of ramification. [ibid- vv. 43-44] This wide ramification has been altogether summarized by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his Siddhāntabindu and by Sadānanda in his Vedāntasāra.

Bhāskara is of the view that Brahman on account of its various capacities is transformed in the form of a soul just as it is transformed in the form of the world. The souls are of the form of a transformation of Brahman and are real because they are born of an active and hence real adjunct possessed by Brahman. Even if Brahman is a single entity it is possible for its transformations to be many in number. Thus on Bhāskara's view there is no contradiction between unity and multiplicity. Just as the same ocean appears to be many on account of its waves, similarly the souls constitute so many transformations of the same Brahman, and they really remain in existence only so long as ignorance has its sway. For when ignorance disappears those atomic-sized souls come to realize their own non-difference from Brahman.

Rāmānuja, while propounding the doctrine called Viśiṣṭādvaitayāda (=doctrine of modified nondualism), submits that at root a soul is as much of the form of a non-manifest body of Brahman as is the world while the same non-manifest body in due course assumes the form of a manifest

soul on the one hand and a manifest worldly multiplicity on the other. The non-manifest capacity for consciousness assumes the form of a manifest soul and undertakes activity—all this happens on account of Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Brahman. Within the body of both the gross and subtle conscious as well as non-conscious elements the Supreme Brahman remains ever permeated.

Being a believer in the reality of an inherent difference-cum-nondifference Nimbārka is reported as an advocate of the doctrine called Dvaita-dvaita (=doctrine of dualism-cum-nondualism). Thus on his view even if the Supreme Brahman is possessed of an undifferentiated form it is transformed in the form of an infinite number of souls. Just as the same wind is transformed into different forms depending on a difference of place, similarly Brahman too is transformed in the form of a multiplicity of souls. These souls are not of the form of something imaginary or imputed.

Vijñānabhikṣu is of the view that just like prakṛti the puruṣas or souls too are something beginningless and independent and yet they are incapable of existing apart from Brahman. Thus the souls exist in Brahman in an unseparated (=avibhakta) form and are guided in their activity by a power inherent in it. So this is the doctrine called Avibhāgādvaita (=doctrine of nondualism-in-the-form-of-nonseparateness).

Vallabha is of the view that souls constitute a real transformation of Brahman as does the world. Such transformation takes their rise owing to a playful-activity (=līlā) on the part of Brahman and yet Brahman itself remains unchanged and pure. So this is the doctrine called Śuddhādvaita-vāda (=doctrine of pure nondualism).

Caitanya too is of the view that owing to its capacity in-respect-of-souls Brahman appears in the form of an infinite number of souls. There obtains between these souls and Brahman a relation of difference-cum-nondifference, but this relation is something incomprehensible (=acintya). So this is the doctrine called Acintya-bheda-bhedavāda (=doctrine of an incomprehensible difference-cum-nondifference).

All the doctrines from that advocated by Bhāskara down to that advocated by Caitanya view a soul as atomic-sized and according to them all it attains emancipation when its ignorance vanishes as a result of knowledge, devotion etc. While in the state of emancipation it, in some form or other, experiences proximity with Brahman. Besides, all these masters account for rebirth by positing a subtle body.

Madhva, while remaining a Vedāntist, does not at all take recourse to any form of non-dualism or non-difference. Thus having himself an

Upaniṣads and other scriptural texts he submits that souls are certainly atomic-sized as well as infinite in number, but being something independent and eternal they constitute neither a transformation of Brahman, nor an effect of it, nor a portion of it. Thus even at that time when they are free from ignorance souls experience the lordship exercised over them by Brahman or Viṣṇu.

Among the Śaivas who have undertaken philosophical speculation independently and without basing themselves on Vedas or Vedānta there is current a doctrine called pratyabhijñādarśana. On its showing the Supreme Brahman itself is Śiva and there is nobody superior to it—so that it is also called 'anuttara (-having nothing superior to itself). It is this anuttara Brahman which, of its own will, brings to manifestation an infinite number of souls as also the world. Thus these souls are in essence non-different from Śiva Himself.

LECTURE FIVE

THE ELEMENT GOD

We have already given some consideration to the element soul. In the course of philosophical speculation there are discussed numerous elements like the non-conscious element, the conscious element soul, God and so on; but in a way all such discussion is centred around the conscious element soul. For whatever be some other element, even if it exists in its own form a cognition of it, a consideration of it, a utilization of it, an enjoyment of it—all this is possible only on the part of a soul. Indeed, an evaluation of all element whatsoever is possible only because of the consciousness pertaining to a soul. Consciousness, capacity-for-cognition and life-activity—these three constitute the successive or gradually evolved states of the element soul. Hence it is that the conscious element cannot rest content with a mere consideration, utilization or enjoyment of things non-conscious; but there is well hidden within it such a capacity as attracts it towards an element superior to and more auspicious than itself. Out of this attraction there has come into existence the idea of the element God, an idea developed and even assimilated in their own life by the philosophers, subtle thinkers and spiritual realizers.

Introductory

A desire to know about the course of creation—out of curiosity or out of wonder, a longing for protection against all fear and all danger as also for attaining a permanent bliss, a natural inclination to get attracted towards what might act as a staunch support, an eagerness to whole-heartedly dedicate oneself to something great and incomprehensible and an inclination to realize equality or identity with this something—these and similar other compulsions appear in the conscious element soul one after another or all together. As a result thereof the concept of God takes its rise in multifarious forms. Thus in the midst of the entire human community there is no such group which feels confident without positing, in one form or another, under one name or another, an element superior to itself. However, presently the concept of God is going to be considered chiefly on the basis of the established philosophical traditions. Hence this consideration has got its own limitation

It has already been said that a number of philosophers posit a multiplicity of non-conscious elements while others posit a single non-conscious element. Similarly, a number of philosophers posit a multiplicity of consc-

ous elements while others posit a single conscious element. Among these, those who posit a multiplicity of non-conscious as well as conscious elements have conceived God in the form of a beginningless and endless independent element different from both the conscious and non-conscious elements. In this connection an exception is constituted by Jainism, Buddhism and a particular type of Sāṅkhya. On the other hand, those who posit one single element have given consideration to the element God as to the element soul deriving them both from this one single element. Let this point be subjected to a special elucidation.

It seems that the doctrine positing an independent element God is very old and so is also well-rooted among the common people. And the position whose roots reach deep down among people impels the philosophers and thinkers too to undertake a consideration of the same. Hence it is possible that the philosophers have given consideration to the conception of God since very long.

The Māheśvara View Regarding God

Among the remnants of the Indus Valley Civilization there have been discovered symbols pertaining to some sect like Pāsupata¹, and even today Maheśvara, Śiva and Rudra are much current in the form of the names of God. From the available description of the four types of Māheśvaras and the literature left behind by them this much is certain that the Māheśvaras posited Maheśvara under some name or other and in some form or other. All of them also posit a multiplicity of non-conscious elements and a multiplicity of souls. Among them, many are such as posit God in the form of the cause of the world and yet conceive Him to be independent of the acts preformed by souls and hence an absolutely independent such cause, while others are such as do not conceive Him to be an absolutely independent cause but a creator dependent on the acts performed by souls. Thus there are two main lines-of-thinking prevalent among the Māheśvaras².

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika View Regarding God

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition too posits a multiplicity of conscious and

1 On this question particularly noteworthy are the pages 5 to 10 of the presidential address delivered by Shri T. N. Ramachandran at the Agra session of the Indian History Congress.

2 Nanu mahad etad indrajālaṃ yan nirapekṣaḥ parameśvaraḥ kāraṇam iti. Tathāhve karmavaiphalyaṃ sarvakāryāṇāṃ samasamayasaṃutpādaś ceti doṣadvayam prāduḥkṛyāt. Maivaṃ manyethāḥ. —Nakulīpāpāsupatadarśana in Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha.

Tam imam parameśvaraḥ karmādinirapekṣaḥ kāraṇam iti pakṣam vaiṣamya-nairgrhyadoṣadūṣitatvāt pratikṣipantaḥ kecana māheśvaraḥ śaivāgamasiddhāntatattvaṃ yathāvad iksamānāḥ karmādisāpekṣaḥ parameśvaraḥ kāraṇam iti pakṣam kakṣkurvānāḥ pakṣantaram upakṣipanti. —Śaivadarśana in Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha p. 66.

non-conscious elements. The aphorisms of Kaṇāda are much old but they do not contain a clear discussion about the element God. The bhāṣya (a commentary-form) which Praśastapāda wrote on it is the oldest among its available commentaries. In this bhāṣya there occurs a detailed description of Maheśvara in the form of the creator and destroyer of the world³; at the same time, it is also indicated there that Maheśvara undertakes creation and destruction in conformity to the good and evil acts performed by the mass of living beings. In the Vaiśeṣika system Maheśvara won prestige in the form of world-creator from Praśastapāda onwards – this possibility can well be entertained. An ally of the Vaiśeṣika system is the Nyāya system. The Nyāya aphorist Akṣapāda too has briefly discussed about God⁴, but Vātsyāyana on Nyāya who wrote a bhāṣya on Nyāya aphorisms has undertaken this discussion in a particularly elaborate form. Among those who wrote a commentary on this bhāṣya Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra occupy a highly special position. Both of them argued in favour of God's independent individuality and creatorship in such a staunch fashion as if it were a philosophically and logically refined version of those very arguments and reasonings about world-creatorship that were prevalent and rooted among common people.

Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra not only argue in favour of God being the creator and controller of the world, but they made it clear on the basis of the original aphorisms themselves that God has certainly created the world though depending on the acts performed by souls and not in an independent fashion. In view of this one can say that they had before them the difference of opinion that prevailed among the Māheśvaras on the question of creatorship independent-of-acts-performed-by-souls versus creatorship-depending-on-acts-performed-by-souls and that they lent a very strongly cogent support to the latter.

In this connection another thing too is worthy of comparison. Thus so many thinkers did consider God to be a creator of the world but they defended this position of theirs mainly depending on argumentation or inference; as against them, certain others, while defending this very position, chiefly depended on their cherished scripture and argued that this position cannot be defended in an indisputable fashion with the help of inference because in face of the competent inferences offered by the rival atheistic thinkers the pro-theistic argument cannot prove strong. Thus while defending world-creatorship on the part of God some based themselves on inference and some on scripture and both made use of the other means-of-valid-cognition in the form of a supplementary. The Nakulīṣa, Pāsupata and

3 The account of world-creation and world-destruction in Praśastapādabhāṣya.

4 Īśvaraḥ kāraṇam puruṣakarmāphalyadarśanāt. Na puruṣakarmābhāve phalānīpatteḥ. Tatkāritatvād ahetur.

—Nyāyasūtra 4.19-21

Saiva differ on this very issue. Among them the Nyāya tradition, while defending world-creatorship on God's part, chiefly relies on inference; this becomes very clear in the case of Uddyotakara and Vācaspati-miśra.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition the concept of God in the form of an independent individual—and that too supposed to be a creator and controller of the world—was demonstrated in so strong a fashion and texts full of reasoning and argumentation dealing with it were composed in so large a number that it appears as if it was under their influence that other philosophers came to compose a huge mass of literature of their own rich with ideas either favourable to this concept or opposed to it. The foremost person produced by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition was Udayana. This Udayana wrote his Nyāyakusumāñjali only with a view to establishing the concept of God; and in it he, after answering in his own manner all the anti-theistic rivals, in the end establishes the concept of Maheśvara in the form of a creator and controller of the world. For this reason and for many others it seems likely that there has obtained a particularly intimate relationship between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition on the one hand and the tradition like Maheśvara, Pāsupata etc. on the other.

The Sāṅkhya-Yoga Tradition Regarding God

After having taken up the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition let us consider the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Madhva traditions one after another. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition posits not only twenty-four or twenty-five elements but also even twenty-six. In this third position, just as there is room for the concept of a multiplicity of ordinary souls similarly there is also that for the concept of a particular independent soul of the form of God. Even before the now available aphoristic text of Patañjali there were composed texts belonging to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition while there was current a Yoga-path associated with the name of Hiranyagarbha⁵ or Svayambhū;⁶ and in this Yoga-path too there was of course room for the concept of God in the form of an independent element. However, today it is not easy to decide whether all these conceived God of the nature of an independent soul merely in the form of a passive witness and an object of worship or plous muttering or, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, demonstrated Him to be a creator and destroyer of the world. From the available aphorisms of Patañjali only this much can be directly concluded that in the Yoga tradition God has found room in the form of a passive witness or an object of worship.⁷ However, when we peruse the bhāṣya available on these apho-

⁵ Origin and Development of the Sāṅkhya System of Thought, pp. 49ff.

⁶ Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, pp. 17 and 20.

⁷ Yogasūtra 1.23-19.

risms then it becomes clear that the author also conceives God in the form of one who renders people help in getting out of difficult contingencies. Thus he says that one purpose held by God before Himself is to bestow favour on people. Through preaching wisdom and religion He resolves to get the entire mass of people out of difficult contingencies. And such a resolve He makes because of a predomiance of the sattva type of guṇa.⁸ Though in his statement Vyāsa does not make it clear that this God of the nature of a particular soul is also a creator and destroyer of the world, even then he does clearly say that He helps people get out of difficult contingencies. Thus as soon as there was introduced in the Bhāṣya the idea that God acts as a helper to people faced with difficult contingencies his commentators, particularly Vācaspati Miśra and Viṣṇanabhikṣu, got a favourable opportunity to give expression to their own respective views. Hence while commenting on the bhāṣya they both, in their respective manners but competently, demonstrated that God posited by the Yoga system is also a creator of the world. This demonstration on their part is chiefly based on the testimony of scriptural texts.

The Madhvaite View Regarding God

Though the Madhvaite tradition is famous as a Vedāntic tradition and it also establishes its views on the basis of the Upaniṣad-based texts like Vedāntasūtra etc., yet in a way it is almost a category apart from all the remaining Vedāntic traditions. On having a look at its doctrine of first principles one finds that it is chiefly influenced by the corresponding Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine. But it appears that keeping in mind the so much grown and ever-growing prestige of Upaniṣads it utilized them in its own manner—that is, by positing, in the manner of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, besides a real multiplicity of non-conscious atoms and conscious souls an absolutely independent God in the form of an individual. Though it has referred to God by names like Brahman or Viṣṇu, yet from the point of view of His nature God posited by it seems akin to the creator God posited by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition. Thus the Madhvaite tradition describes God as a creator and destroyer of the world and it also submits that He creates the world in conformity to the good and bad acts performed by the mass of living beings. Thus viewed the Madhvaite tradition, just like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, views God as One who undertakes world-creation in conformity to the acts performed by the mass of living beings. Of course, one difference of opinion is certainly there inasmuch as Madhva, giving to God the designation Brahman, also derives an account of Him from

8 Prakṛtasattvopādānād īśvarasya śāśvatika utkarṣaḥ.

Tasya ātmānugrahābhāve'pi bhūtānugrahaḥ prayojanam,

—Yogabhāṣya 1.24

—ibid, 1.25

Brahmasūtra while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition in its demonstration of God bases itself on no Brahmasūtra or Upaniṣad. Hence it too can be said that the Madhville tradition's doctrine of world-creatorship on the part of God, since it is chiefly based on Upaniṣads, is a scripture-dependent doctrine.

Since we are now considering the view as to God upheld by traditions that posit a multiplicity of souls it seems proper here to bestow consideration on such similar traditions as do not posit God. Thus the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, Sāṅkhya, Jaina and Buddhist traditions too posit a multiplicity of independent souls, but they do not attribute world-creatorship to an element God existing by the side of souls. All these four traditions, even if they posit rebirth and another world, attribute to God no role whatsoever so far as the destiny of a soul is concerned. An understanding of the secret of this state of affairs will be conducive to a proper appreciation of the difference of opinion that obtains between these traditions on the one hand and those positing a world-creator God on the other.

The Pūrva-mīmāṃsā View Regarding God

First of all we take up the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā tradition. It does not at all give thought to the topic of emancipation and confines itself to a consideration of just two topics--viz. this world and another world like heaven etc. And in the form of a means for attaining whatever is to be attained in both these worlds it is rituals like yajña etc. that this tradition depends upon. In a Vedic ritual the chief place is occupied by a Vedic hymn, the proper following of a procedure due, the priests like hotṛ etc. Thus he who performs an act like yajña etc. following the prescribed procedure attains the desired result. So in this position there is room only for the actorship of persons desirous of attaining a fruit, and such an actorship does belong to souls. Hence in this tradition there arises no question of God bestowing kindness or favour on anyone. Hence also here there is no occasion for considering world-creatorship on the part of God. Whatever chief-actorship is considered there in this tradition ultimately pertains to a Vedic injunction. That is to say, an action performed in conformity to a Vedic injunction is possessed of such a capacity that it automatically yields the fruit desired by the person concerned. Hence in this tradition a Vedic hymn, a god, a properly performed act, the capacity inherent in the causal aggregate pertaining to an act - these things take the place of creatorship on the part of God.⁹

9 Śābarabhāṣya 2.1.5 etc. Besides, for other references from Kumārila see Nyāyāvataṛavārtikavṛtti p. 179 (Singhi Jaina Series) and footnotes on it.

The Sāṅkhya, Jaina and Buddhist Views Regarding God

But totally different from all this is the case with the Sāṅkhya tradition on positing twenty-five elements, the Jaina tradition and the Buddhist tradition. All these three posit along with heaven etc. emancipation as well and treat the latter itself as the chief aim of human endeavour. Even then, they attribute no role whatsoever to God either in the task of attaining emancipation or in that of attaining any other desired fruit. All these three traditions are a believer in the efficacy of human endeavour. They do posit element like faith, fate and unforeseen destiny, but according to them all these become useful only when functioning under the supervision of human endeavour. These traditions are of the view that a soul is itself possessed of such a capacity that it can create for itself whatever type of future it likes. Just as it works under the influence of an impress of ignorance or affliction similarly by dint of its own endeavour it attains the highest limit of knowledge and undeclinedness. As soon as the endeavour on its part assumes an upward (progressive) direction the elements like faith, fate and unforeseen destiny inherent in it become helpful in its progress in that very direction. Hence in these traditions souls are considered to be so much independent that they stand in no need of favour bestowed on them by an element standing besides them in the form of a world-creator.

Among these three traditions themselves there obtains an important difference of opinion which too is worthy of note. Thus the Sāṅkhya tradition of course advocates the efficacy of endeavour but there is in it no scope whatsoever for endeavour on the part of a soul or conscious element; for according to it, all endeavour pertains to prakṛti or the non-conscious element. Thus it is prakṛti which acts in relation to the world as a material-cause on the one hand and an efficient-cause as also a controller on the other. It undertakes its entire operation for the sake of a twofold enjoyment on the part of the conscious element which is something eternal-undergoing-no-change. Thus prakṛti brings about for the sake of soul two types of enjoyment—viz. that of the form of a sense-born cognition and that of the form of a discriminatory knowledge. Really, these enjoyments too pertain to prakṛti itself; for so far as a soul is concerned they are only imputed to it. Thus in the Sāṅkhya tradition actorship as also world-creatorship and world-destroyership are attributed to the element prakṛti in so absolute a fashion that on account thereof just as there is no actorship or enjoyership belonging to the conscious element even if its existence in the form of something eternal-undergoing-no-change is of course posited similarly there is here no scope even for positing the existence of the element God—to say nothing of positing world-creatorship on its part. However, there have been thinkers who are of the view that the Sāṅkhya tradition does not altogether deny the existence of the element God—its only contention being that in

the task of attaining discriminatory knowledge which acts as a means for attaining emancipation there arises for the element God no need at all.¹⁰ But the fact of the matter is that in the Sāṅkhya tradition positing twenty-five elements there can possibly be attributed to the element God no role whatsoever.

Let us now consider the Jaina and Buddhist traditions. Unlike Sāṅkhya, neither of these traditions posits a conscious element of the form of something eternal-undergoing-no-change. Both envisage the possibility of an inherent virtuous quality of a soul or conscious element undergoing development. The non-conscious element (=rūpa) can well act as an aid to the development of the virtuous qualities inheret in a soul but the basic seed of such a development lies latent in the conscious-element soul (=citta) itself. The spiritual aspirants who, as a result of fully developing this seed attain emancipation themselves become God because of having become a perfect being. Apart from them there exists no God who might act as a world-creator and world-destroyer or even as a passive witness. As for the spiritual aspirants they, while seeking to fulfil their aspiration – that is, while in an imperfect state – do stand in need of a support of some sort or other. According to both these traditions, such a support can be only such a personage who has become an emancipated one or an enlightened one through his own endeavour; moreover, those who have attained perfection taking recourse to such a support can, in turn, themselves act as a support to other spiritual aspirants. Thus according to the Jaina and Buddhist traditions, an emancipated or enlightened soul or citta itself is what constitutes God or Supreme Soul.

The Mīmāṃsaka, Sāṅkhya, Jaina and Buddhist—all these four traditions do admit that the world undergoes a change, but they are not of the view that there was a time when this world was first created and hence they also provide no occasion for God's actorship in the task of creating this world. The net essence of the above discussion is that just as the Mīmāṃsaka is in his own manner an advocate of the doctrine of activity so verily are the Sāṅkhya, Jaina and Buddhist. The capacity to perform an act and to reap the fruit thereof lies in oneself. Hence unlike those advocating the doctrine of world-creatorship on God's part, these traditions attribute no role to God's impulsion in the task of one performing

10 This is what Vijñānabhikṣu says in his Introduction to Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya—
.....brahmanimāṃsāyāṃ īśvara eva mukhyo viśaya upakramādibhir avadhṛtaḥ.
Tatrāṃśe tasya bādhe śāstrasyaivāprāmāṇyaṃ syāt, yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārtha iti
nyāyāt. Sāṅkhyaśāstrasya tu puruṣārthatatsādhanaaprakṛtipuruṣavivekāḥ eva mukhyo
viśaya itiśvarapratishedhāṃśabādhe'pi nāprāmāṇyam, yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārtha iti
nyāyāt. Ataḥ sāvakanāstayaṃ sāṅkhyāṃ eveśvarapratishedhāṃśe durbalam iti.

an act or reaping the fruit thereof. Thus the latter are of the view that when an act performed reaches maturity it yields its own fruit itself and on account of a capacity inherent in itself—so that the entire world-diversity is due to the acts performed by the mass of living beings.¹¹ The same role which full-fledged actorship on the part of prakṛti plays in the Sāṅkhya tradition is played in the Jaina and Buddhist traditions by actorship on the part of a soul or citta.

*The Main Points at Issue in the so far
Mentioned Views Regarding God*

Before we consider the position as to God adopted by the Upaniṣadic systems advocating the doctrine of Brahman it is necessary to clinch the main points that have arisen in the course of the above discussion pertaining to the different other systems—so that it might be easy to understand as to how far and in what form the same points make their appearance in connection with the position adopted by the Upaniṣadic systems. Thus when the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Pāśupata-Māheśvara, Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Mādhyā treat God as a creator of the world their position first of all presupposes that he is only an occasioning or presiding cause of the world and not also its material-cause. And such a creatorship or occasional-causality too is according to some something dependent on the acts performed by the living beings, according to others something independent of such acts. And while demonstrating such a creatorship some chiefly take recourse to inference and then seek support from scripture, others chiefly basing themselves on scripture treat reasoning as a mere buttressing-factor. As for the Sāṅkhya-Yoga positing twenty-six elements, even when it calls God a particular type of soul He is supposed to assume the role of one who gets people out of difficult contingencies only insofar as He receives support from the supreme type of sattva-guṇa while in the absence of such a support He is incapable of doing anything on his own.

As for the Sāṅkhya positing twenty-four or twenty-five elements, he attributes actorship and controllership to the Original Prakṛti alone. Acting independently it is prakṛti which acts with a view to serving the purposes of a soul; hence it is as much an efficient-cause of the world as it is its material-cause. Whatever good or evil act is performed by a buddhi yields its fruit automatically as soon as the time is ripe for that.¹² This does not

11. Karmajaṃ lokavaicitryam. —Abhidharmakośa 4.1

12. The account of a karmāśaya (=accumulated mass of karmans) and its fruition which we come across in the aphorisms 12-14 of the second chapter of Yogasūtra makes one incline to think that what is described here is a karman's capacity-to-yield-fruit as posited by the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition. That is why in connection with

require the services of an impelling cause. The Jaina, Buddhist and Mīmāṃsaka too—each in his own manner—attributes to a karman itself a capacity to yield fruit without depending on God. This constitutes the level of thinking common to all the systems barring those advocating the doctrine of Brahman.

The Views Regarding God Maintained by the Systems Advocating the Doctrine of Brahman.

Let us now consider systems advocating the doctrine of Brahman. Barring Madhva, they are in general all an advocate of the doctrine of one single basic element. However, this single element is not prakṛti or pradhāna posited by Sāṅkhya but the element Brahman which is something different from the same. Thus while the element pradhāna is considered to be something basically non-conscious the element Brahman is considered to be something basically of the form of consciousness. It seems that ever since the time of Vedas there did go on an investigation into some one element supposed to be acting as the basis for the visible multiplicity. Passing through various stages this investigation culminates in Upaniṣads and here there comes to be established a basic element of the form of existence, consciousness and bliss. But in the midst of these successive stages there seems to have once come into existence such a stage when in the form of a basic element there was also considered and established an element like pradhāna. Both these traditions are of course basically an advocate of some one single element but they have also necessarily to account for that non-conscious and conscious multiplicity which is empirically established and is obvious to all ordinary people. Thus Sāṅkhya, an advocate of the doctrine of pradhāna, did give to pradhāna the status of an independent agent but it accounted for the real multiplicity through positing a multiplicity of souls; on the other hand, those who advocated the doctrine of one single basic element of the form of Brahman posited another element under the different titles like 'an associate of Brahman', 'an adjunct of Brahman', 'a qualification of Brahman' etc. etc. Thus both these traditions, even while being an advocate of the doctrine of one single element, went on accounting for the multiplicity and difference in their respective manners. Just as Sāṅkhya demonstrated through argumentation the independent actorship belonging to prakṛti, similarly many an advocate of the doctrine of prakṛti did the same also through

this fruition here there is no reference to God or to any such independently standing power. Even so, the fact remains that in the first chapter of the text in question God has actually been referred to. From this one might surmise that this reference pertains to God as an object of meditation on the part of a spiritual aspirant.

See the section 'Karmavicāra' in Introduction to 'Gaṇadharavāda'.

making a use of Upaniṣads.¹³ On their view a real actorship belongs to prakṛti alone while a soul is merely a bystander devoid of actorship and enjoyership. Strongly pitted against this view were the advocates of the doctrine of Brahman who, pointing out that conceived in whatever manner the element prakṛti is after all something non-conscious, would ask as to how a non-conscious element can create or control the world possessed of such a multifarious and incomprehensible constitution. For such a creation and control there is required some conscious element possessed of an incomprehensible capacity. As this idea gathered strength it also assumed various forms. And it is this idea that is responsible for the composition of Brahmasūtra. In it there is refuted with the help of scripture as well as reasoning the doctrine attributing independent actorship to prakṛti and there is demonstrated that chief actorship pertains only to the element Brahman. All the available bhāṣyas of Brahmasūtra are unanimous in maintaining that the element Brahman is alone the chief and independent cause of the world, but the commentation undertaken by these bhāṣyas does not end merely with a consideration of the question of causalship. For they have also to elucidate the nature of the so conceived basic cause in a language employing the concept of God. Hence all those who composed such a bhāṣya, however much they might differ among themselves, would, while attributing to the element Brahman the properties appropriate to God, borrow in the course of amplifying these properties of God as conceived by them certain positions and arguments given currency by their rival non-Vedic advocates of the doctrine of God.

All the available bhāṣyas of Brahmasūtra can be divided into two chief classes. Of these, one class includes only the bhāṣya composed by Śaṅkara while the other class all those composed by the authors beginning with Bhāskara and coming down to Caitanya. Śaṅkara is an advocate of the doctrine called Kevalādvaita (=absolute nondualism). So he is not in favour of attributing ultimate realship to any element other than Brahman; and yet the difficult question before him is that if there exists nothing save Brahman of the form of something eternal-undergoing-no-change then what ought to be the source of a multiplicity and how this multiplicity

13 Sāṅkhyādayaḥ svapakṣasthāpanāya vedāntavākyaṇy apy udāhṛtya svapakṣānugūnyena-
aiva yojayanto vyācakṣate. Teṣāṃ yad vyākhyānam tad vyākhyānābhāṣam, na sam-
yagvyākhyānam ity etāvat pūrvakṛtam. —Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya 2.2.1

For a discussion of the relation obtaining between Sāṅkhya philosophy and Upaniṣad see 'History of Indian Philosophy' by Belvākar and Ranade, Vol. 2, pp. 412-30

Sāṅkhyādayas tv āstikā nātra pratīvādināḥ. Tair bauddhagatābhyupagamavādata
eva svasvapratijñātānām vedāntārthaikadeśānām pratipādanād iti mantavyam.

—The passage introducing Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra 2.1.1

ought to become an object of experience. Certainly, Brahman as thus conceived in the form of something eternal-undergoing-no-change cannot itself undergo a transformation. Besides, there was to be accounted for bondage-cum-emancipation on the one hand and the difference obtaining between one soul and another on the other. All such difficulties Śaṅkara sought to obviate by adopting the doctrine of māyā(=illusion). However, if māyā be conceived as an independent element then too absolute non-dualism does not remain in tact. Hence describing it as 'not-describable-either-as-something-real-or-as-something-unreal' and the like he treats it as neither something different from the element Brahman nor as something absolutely identical with it, and yet by positing the existence of māyā he justified the doctrine of absolute non-dualism and demonstrated that the visible multiplicity of practical life is something māyā-born. Really, the same difficulty about deriving a multiplicity out of one single element which was faced by the Sāṅkhya who advocated the doctrine of an independent prakṛti was faced by Śaṅkara as well. However, the way out of the difficulty was easy for the Sāṅkhya on account of his positing something eternal-undergoing-change but not so easy for Śaṅkara. Yet the latter facilitated his path with great skill. With the help of the concept of māyā Śaṅkara established both the position that the element Brahman is something eternal-undergoing-no-change as also his doctrine of absolute non-dualism, but he came out with no all-round elucidation of the problems that were present before him and were to present themselves in later times. Such an elucidation was offered by his highly learned disciples who were either his contemporaries or who came after him. Hence it is that this elucidation is met with in so many varieties. Thus Sarvajñātmamuni offers one variety of elucidation, Vācaspatiśiṣra another variety, a third master a third variety. But in all these elucidations the tenet favoured by Śaṅkara has been preserved in its entirety. And this tenet is the doctrine of absolute non-dualism.¹⁴

If Brahman itself is to be called God then it too will have to be elucidated as to how it is possible for the same Brahman to act as God on the one hand and as a soul on the other. Hence it is that with a view to answering this very question that the scholars have posited a duality of māyā(=illusion) and avidyā(=ignorance). Thus Brahman having māyā for its adjunct is God, the same having avidyā for its adjunct is a soul. Māyā is but avidyā pertaining to the totality of souls while an individual avidyā is the adjunct of a particular soul. Thus even after describing and establishing Brahman in the form of God so many questions do arise. Of

¹⁴ See Dasagupta's 'History of Indian Philosophy' Vol. III, pp. 197-8, footnote number two.

these, the chief ones run as follows : What is the nature of that *māyā* with the help of which God creates the world ? Does this world-creation depend on the acts performed by the mass of living beings or does it not ? Moreover, is the existence of God to be established chiefly on the basis of reasoning or on the basis of scripture ? And so on and so forth. These questions too have been answered by the Śāṅkarite scholars. And generally speaking, the common tone of their answer is to the effect that world-creation is a beginningless process, that in ever new kalpas (=world-acons) God creates the world in conformity to the acts performed by the mass of living beings, and that all this stands proved on the basis of scriptures—chiefly Upaniṣads. As for reasoning, it is at the most useful for providing support to scripture. Thus in the *bhāṣya* composed by Śāṅkara—which is oldest among the available *bhāṣyas*—Brahman comprising existence, consciousness and bliss is supposed to be of the form of the element God and the same has been demonstrated to be the material-cause as well as the efficient-cause of this mobile-cum-immobile world while refutation has been directed against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc, who posit God in the form of an independent element supposed to be the efficient cause of this world; at the same time, refutation was directed against the Sāṅkhya doctrine which attributes actorship to *prakṛti* supposed to be an independent element. Similarly, the view upheld by the anti-theistic philosophers was rejected on the ground that it was non-Vedic. Thus it was that among those advocating the doctrine of Brahman Brahman was established in the form of one possessed of absolute actorship and Godship.

However, even before Śāṅkara there had been several commentators of *Brahmasūtra*. All these commentators offered the same kind of commentary—this too cannot be said; even so, these commentators seem to have been unanimous about one thing. This point of unanimity was that none of them was, like Śāṅkara, an advocate of the doctrine of Kevalādvaita (=absolute nondualism) or *māyāvāda* (=illusionism); and even if there was such a one there is available no clear evidence in respect of that. They all, in the main, treated the element Brahman as something different from *prakṛti* and yet something eternal-undergoing-change. If the Sāṅkhya treats *prakṛti* as something eternal-undergoing-change and the advocate of the doctrine of Brahman too treats Brahman as something eternal-undergoing-change, then what is there to differentiate the two from one another?—this question too must have presented itself to them. This precisely is why almost all of those commentators, while treating Brahman as something eternal-undergoing-change, have derived the conscious-cum-non-conscious creation from the same, and yet have offered arguments and reasonings in support of the position that the essential nature of Brahman remains preserved in an

unchanged form even in the midst of the transformations undergone by it – seeking to support this position with the help of numerous empirical illustrations.

True, the texts composed by the pre-Śaṅkara commentators are no more available in full, but the thought-currents represented by them are found preserved, nourished and developed in the different traditions inaugurated by the later masters. Among these masters, Bhāskara comes first of all. He, treating the element Brahman as something eternal-undergoing-change, attributes to it a multiplicity of capacities and submits that one of these capacities gives rise to the creation-of-the-form-of-things-enjoyed and another one to the creation-of-the-form-of-souls-of-beings-experiencing-enjoyment; again, attributing to Brahman the role of a world-creator, world-sustainer and world-destroyer God and treating it as the material-cause as well as the efficient-cause of the world he refutes rival views as did Śaṅkara. While demonstrating the existence of God Bhāskara too chiefly depends on Upaniṣads and treats world-creation as that dependent on the acts performed by the mass of living beings. He is of the view that the conscious-cum-non-conscious world is different-cum-nondifferent from the element Brahman acting as its material-cause. On his showing each and everything is one from one viewpoint, many from another viewpoint. Thus in one and the same thing both unity and multiplicity are natural as well as real. Just as an ocean, even if one, is also many in the form of its transformations comprising the world on the one hand and souls on the other. These transformations might well be transitory in duration, but that does not turn them into something unreal. Thus while attributing Godship to Brahman Bhāskara, unlike Śaṅkara, was not compelled to take recourse to the concept of māyā; for he has attributed a multiplicity of inherent capacities to Brahman itself.

In this connection it too is noteworthy that just as the Sāṅkhya derives from the original prakṛti tanmātras etc. in this form of a creation-to-be-enjoyed and buddhi, ahankāra etc. in the form of a creation-to-act-as-enjoyer, similarly does Bhāskara derive the same from the original Brahman itself.¹⁵

Though in the times of Upaniṣads too the prestige of the nondualist idea was growing and getting rooted yet on the other hand the dualist thinkers flourishing both within and outside the circle of those following Upaniṣads – were of course clearly coming out in support of the dualist idea.

¹⁵ See Dasagupta's 'History of Indian Philosophy' Vol. III, p. 6; also Bhāskarabhāṣya (Brahmasūtra) 2.1.14, p. 97.

And out of this conflict of ideas a sort of dualism-cum-nondualism too was likewise coming into existence in various forms. At that very time when there was a predominance of the nondualist ideas like *sadadvaita* (=nondualism in respect of existence), *dravyādvaita* (=nondualism in respect of substance); *guṇādvaita* (=nondualism in respect of quality), *Brahmādvaita* (=nondualism in respect of Brahman), *Vijñānādvaita* (=nondualism in respect of consciousness), *śabdādvaita* (=nondualism in respect of word) etc. there, in there midst gained entry in a powerful fashion Śaṅkara's doctrine of *Kevalādvaita* (=absolute nondualism). This also produced reaction on the dualist and dualist-cum-nondualist thinkers. As a consequence, they began to oppose in their respective manners the doctrine of absolute non-dualism based on the concept of *māyā*. Thus in the very manner of Bhāskara, a host of other powerful and very powerful masters become determined to prove that the doctrine of absolute nondualism is irrational and unauthoritative. They also included such masters as followed Upaniṣads. As for those like the Sāṅkhya and Madhva they based their opposition on pure dualism; but those like Rāmaṇuja etc., even while basing themselves on nondualism, established an altogether different type of nondualism and began to oppose Śaṅkara's absolute nondualism in a powerful fashion. Among such non-dualists there have been masters following the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva traditions. Thus masters like Rāmaṇuja, Nimbārka, Vallabha and Caitanya, even if they established *Brahmādvaita* (=nondualism in respect of Brahman), through basing themselves on the Vaiṣṇava tradition in their respective manners, in fact while doing so only lent support to the doctrine of difference-cum-nondifference and dualism-cum-nondualism. For the same type of real unity-cum-multiplicity or difference-cum-nondifference which Bhāskara has established in respect of the element Brahman or God was discussed and established by these Vaiṣṇava, Śaiva and other masters in slightly different forms and in great details. On the other hand, masters like Vijñānabhikṣu too established *Brahmādvaita* but while doing so they simply couched the Sāṅkhya-Yoga idea in the terminology of nondualism; similarly, masters like Śrīkanṭha, basing themselves on the Śaiva tradition, interpreted the element Brahman in the form of Śiva and also established nondualism in their own manner. Thus even while basing themselves on Upaniṣads and Brahmasūtra so many masters belonging to so many traditions opposed to Śaṅkara's absolute nondualism wrote commentaries on Brahmasūtra. Each of these masters establishes the element Brahman spoken of under the different names like God, Supreme God, Nārāyaṇa, Viṣṇu, Kṛṣṇa, Śiva etc. in the form of something eternal-undergoing-no-change, and yet conceives a real origination of the conscious-cum-nonconscious world out of this very element God.

Masters like Rāmaṇuja are of the view that the supreme Brahman or Nārāyaṇa, besides being one present everywhere and one controlling all the

living beings from within, is a real repository of auspicious qualities. In its original form it is verily something eternal-undergoing-no-change but with the help of its inherent capacities it turns its body existing in the state of a cause a body non manifest, subtle and of the form of elements non-conscious and conscious into a manifest body or body existing in the form of an effect. The elements prakṛti and souls which were there with Nārāyaṇa in the form of His body are guided by a capacity inherant in Him. This non-conscious and conscious creation—that is, the conscious-cum-nonconscious world—is something real and not māyā-born. While seeking to establish the Supreme Brahman in the form of God and Vāsudeva Rāmānuja has chiefly adopted the support of scripture and has contended that the means-of-valid-cognition called inference is not at all competent to undertake such a performance. Besides, he has maintained that God undertakes world-creation depending on the acts performed by the mass of living beings, and yet he has also kept in tact the independence exercised by God. Thus even while having a difference-of-opinion with his own early-preceptor Yāmunaācārya on the question of the superiority or otherwise of the means-of-valid-cognition called inference Rāmānuja, while establishing the Supreme Brahman in the form of Vāsudeva or Nārāyaṇa with the help of the means of valid cognition called scripture, profusely makes use of Upaniṣads; in this connection whatever texts are interpreted by Śāṅkara in the sense of absolute nondualism are interpreted by him in the sense of modified nondualism, thus contending that Upaniṣads and Brahmasūtra verily mean to understand the Supreme Brahman as Nārāyaṇa; besides, he makes clear that it is the Supreme Brahman Nārāyaṇa who is the material cause as well as efficient cause of the conscious-cum-nonconscious world.¹⁶

Nimbārka too has established the element Brahman in the form of God and has given to the same the designation 'Viṣṇu'. He too is an advocate of a real difference-cum-nondifference or dualism-cum-nondualism. Again, on his view too it is verily the Supreme Brahman or Viṣṇu who is the material cause as well as efficient cause of the mobile-cum-immobile world. Similarly, he too establishes his position chiefly on the basis of the means of valid cognition called scripture and considers world-creation to be something dependent on the acts performed by the mass of living beings.¹⁷

16 See Dasgupta's 'History of Indian Philosophy' Vol. III, p. 156; also the following statement in Śrībhāṣya 1.1.1—'Sūkṣmacidacidvastuśarīrasyaiva brahmaṇaḥ sthūlacidacidvastuśarīratvena kāryatvāt.'

17 See Dasgupta ibid. pp. 405-6; also the following statement in Nimbārkaśrībhāṣya (Brahmasūtra) 1.1.4—'Tasmāt sarvajñaḥ sarvācintyaśaktiviśvajanmādihetur vedaikapramāṇagāmyaḥ sarvābhinnābhinnno bhagavān vāsudevo viśvātmaiva jñānāsāviśayas tatraiva sarvaṁ tātṛam samanvetity aupaniṣadānām siddhāntaḥ.'

Vijñānabhikṣu too has written commentaries on Sāṅkhya, Yoga as well as Vedānta texts. While commenting on Brahmasūtra he too in his bhāṣya establishes the element Brahman in the form of God, but while doing so he has adopted a path altogether different from that of Bhāskara, Rāmānuja etc. Thus while establishing the element Brahman in the form of God he has made use of an argument employed by the Yoga tradition while establishing the concept of God and has submitted that with the help of pure prakṛti of the form of satva-guṇa Brahman creates and develops the elements prakṛti and souls ever present within itself. Both prakṛti and souls are real and also something different from Brahman, and yet they do not at all reside anywhere else except in their substratum of the form of Brahman. Consequently, even if something different from Brahman they are also something unseparated (=avibhakta) from it. Besides, rejecting the current interpretation of God either as a material cause or as an efficient cause of the world he interpreted it as something of the form of a substratum and contended that a cause of the form a substratum is a fourth type of cause apart from the three well known type of it—viz. samavāyi-kāraṇa, asamavāyi-kāraṇa and nimitta kāraṇa. And a cause of the form of a substratum is that in which the effect concerned resides in an unseparated form and receiving enforcement from which it becomes capable of undertaking activity. Such a world-cause of the form of a substratum is Brahman and prakṛti as well as souls reside in it in an unseparated form. This is why Vijñānabhikṣu is called an advocate of the doctrine called Avibhāgādvaita (=nondualism-of-the-form-of-nonseparation). He opposes in an extremely violent fashion Śāṅkara's doctrine of māyā, and on the basis of Upaniṣads and so many Purāṇas and Smṛtis establishing Brahman in the form of something nondual devoid of all separation calls it itself God. When calling Brahman itself God Vijñānabhikṣu comments on Brahmasūtra then it becomes clear that the same argument which he in the course of writing his vārtika on Yogabhāṣya employs as regards the nature of God is employed by him at the time of propounding the nature of Brahman. That is why one can say that unlike Śāṅkara, Vijñānabhikṣu does not regard the Yoga and Sāṅkhya-Yoga traditions as un-Vedic. Nay, the latter goes to the extent of saying that prakṛti posited by Sāṅkhya is something in line with the teaching of Vedas. He also refers to the texts corroborating this statement and insists that prakṛti is but a portion of Brahman. When Brahman has to function as God then that sattvaguna pure-since-a-beginningless-time which he has to depend on is not something non-existent or ultimately unreal as is māyā. And while commenting on Brahmasūtra when there arises an occasion for refuting the Sāṅkhya view he in a general manner simply says that the basic cause of the form of prakṛti cannot be demonstrated with

the help of inference alone. Lastly, on his view world-creation is something dependent on the acts performed by the mass of living beings.¹⁸

Vallabhācārya too in his bhāṣya makes an effort to establish Brahman in the form of God. On an outward view this effort looks somewhat different from that made by other masters, but in fact his procedure is not basically different from that followed by Rāmānuja etc. Being an advocate of the doctrine called Śuddhādvaita (=pure nondualism) Vallabhācārya considers Brahman to be of the form of the world and the world to be of the form of Brahman; at the same time, he demonstrates the world to be something ultimately real. While saying that God of the form of Brahman is a cause of the world he employs a terminology different from that employed by the other earlier masters. Thus he says that God is not the material cause of the world but its samavāyi-cause. And his definition of a samavāyi-cause is different from that offered by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. He too establishes the concept of Brahman chiefly with the help of the means of valid cognition called scripture and considers world-creation to be something dependent on the acts performed by the mass of living beings; and yet he also preserves the full independence of God's desire or playful activity.

Vallabhācārya has raised the difficulty that if the element God is of the form of existence, consciousness and bliss then in this world too which is His effect or transformation there ought to be experienced these three qualities belonging to God who is of the form of a samavāyi-cause of this world but that in both the non-conscious and conscious world-sectors there is commonly experienced only the quality existence while in the world-sector comprising souls there is additionally experienced consciousness and that too in different degrees. If there obtains non-difference between God or Brahman on the one hand and the world on the other or if the world be an effect with God acting as its samavāyi-cause, then this effect must equally exhibit all the qualities characteristic of its samavāyi-cause. But as a matter of fact the two are not experienced as commonly exhibiting these qualities. Why is all this? This question has been answered by him in his bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra 1.1.3—in brief but in an intelligible fashion; and this brief answer has been elaborated by Puruṣottamaji who commented on the bhāṣya. Thus he says that if the qualities existence etc. belonging to Brahman which is of the form of the samavāyi-cause of the world are found to be becoming manifest in different degrees in the world which is of the form of the effect then the reason for that lies in the difference of degrees exhibited by the concerned remo-

18 See Dasagupta *ibid.* pp. 445-95; also *Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya* 1.1.2; 1.1.4; 2.1.32

val of concealment. In the non-conscious world consciousness does not become manifest because here there obtains total concealment in respect of this quality, but in the conscious world consciousness is experienced because here there takes place a loosening of the concealment in question while even in this world consciousness exhibits degrees. The reason for this too lies in the fact that the removal of concealment takes place in different degrees. So far as the quality pure bliss is concerned, it becomes manifest in God alone.

To Vallabhācārya there also occurred the question that if prakṛti made up of three guṇas is considered to be the originating cause of the world while the Sāṅkhya teachers have been accounting for the world-multiplicity on the basis of that alone then what is the point behind replacing that basic element by a new element Brahman of the form of God. This question too has been answered by him. Thus he says that the quality sattva pertaining to prakṛti cannot account for the experience of pleasure inasmuch as the pradhāna-born creation does exhibit the quality existence at every place whatsoever. If the experience of pleasure and knowledge be possible on account of that quality then they ought to be equally experienced throughout the world. But we find that some one single thing causes to different souls at one and the same time pleasure, pain and delusion while it causes to the same soul at different times pleasure, pain etc. Hence the experience of pleasure, pain, knowledge etc. had by one should be treated not as originating from the qualities sattva etc. but as being due to the degree-wise manifestation of the capacities consciousness and bliss pertaining to God. Thus in place of the originating cause prakṛti Vallabhācārya established Brahman and gave to the same the designation 'Supreme God'.¹⁹

In the procedure adopted by Lord Śrī Caitanya there is no new point so far as philosophical speculation is concerned.

Lastly, let us take up the Śaiva teacher Śrīkaṇṭha and see as to what standpoint he adopts in his commentary on Brahmasūtra while establishing Brahman in the form of God. Thus like the earlier teachers Śrīkaṇṭha says that Brahman is of the form of existence, consciousness and bliss but that it is of the form of Śiva while the same is God.

However, this God is not a mere efficient-cause of the world as is held by certain Māheśvaras or Śaivas but a material-cause and an efficient-cause.

19 See Anubhāṣya 1.1.3—Tad brahmaiva samavāyikāraṇam. Kutaḥ ? Samavāyāt sam-yag anuvṛttatvāt. Astibhātipriyatvena saccidānandarūpeṇāvayāt. Nāmarūpayoḥ kāryarūpatvāt. Prakṛter api svamate tadamśatvāt. Ajñānāt paricchedāpriyatve, Jñānena badhadarśanāt. Nānātvam tv aicchikam eva.* Also see Puruṣottamaji's Bhāṣyaprakāśikā on the same.

For this Śrīkaṇṭha employs the technical term 'samavāyi-cause'. Śrīkaṇṭhācārya says that the texts called Āgamas which did away with the so many contradictions that were vitiating Upaniṣads and which thus revealed their true essential-meaning were composed by the Śaiva teacher named Śveta. And there arose twenty-seven Śaiva teachers even after Śveta. Śrīkaṇṭha's claim is that his bhāṣya is composed in conformity to the Āgamas in question; and lastly on the basis of so many Upaniṣadic texts on the one hand and Purāṇas and Smṛtis on the other. He establishes that Maheśvara himself is the Supreme Brahman. And the same Brahman is designated by so many names like Śiva, Śarva, Bhava, Maheśvara, Īśāna etc. etc.

Śrīkaṇṭhācārya has attributed to Brahman the status of God in the form of Śiva, and that too by treating Him as a material-cause as well as an efficient cause of the world. Thus he has given expression to his difference of opinion in relation to Nakulīśa, Pāśupata, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc. who would treat Maheśvara as a mere efficient-cause of the world. Though he has written bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra, yet it appears that he bases himself on so many Śaiva Āgamas. There is no clarity on the question as to whether these Śaiva Āgamas were originally composed on the basis of Upaniṣads or on the basis of texts written in some Dravidian language, but it appears that he did have before him several Śaiva Āgamas that reflected the ideas contained in Upaniṣads.

Śrīkaṇṭha too has had to answer one question. Thus in the second sub-section of the second section of Brahmasūtra there occurs a topic beginning with 'patyur asāmañjasyat', a topic in the course of commenting on which Śaṅkarācārya refutes the view upheld by four types of Maheśvaras on the ground that they treat Maheśvara as a mere efficient-cause of the world and not also its material-cause — so that the view is not a doctrine of Brahman. Now there arose occasion for these aphorisms to be commented on by Śrīkaṇṭha himself who, being a Śaiva master, was out to write a bhāṣya where Brahman was identical with Śiva; and it was in the context of these aphorisms that the Śaiva view was refuted by so many masters like Śaṅkarācārya etc. So what ought to be done in a context like this? — this was the question which presented itself before Śrīkaṇṭha. Being himself a Śaiva he could not follow Śaṅkarācārya etc. in interpreting the set of aphorisms in question as one intended to refute the Maheśvara view. So he adopted a different path of his own. Thus Śrīkaṇṭha submitted that the Maheśvara view sought to be refuted in the set of aphorisms in question represents the view upheld by a sub-section of Śaivas. That is to say, on Śrīkaṇṭha's view there were also such-Śaivas as would treat Maheśvara as a mere efficient cause of the world. Hence Śrīkaṇṭha too, following in the footsteps of the masters like Śaṅkarācārya etc., refutes in the context of the present aphorisms the view upheld by a sub-section of Sai-

vas while on the basis of the pro-Upaniṣad and unanimously upheld Śaiva Āgamas established the view that Śiva is a material-cause as well as an efficient-cause of the world.²⁰

We have earlier seen that in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition God is conceived to be a world-creator and He is specially known by names like Paśupati, Maheśvara etc. There God's world-creatorship is confined to His being a mere efficient-cause of the world while there is not even a hint of His being a material-cause of the world. As for the systems like Nakulīśa, Pāśupata and Śaiva mentioned in Sarvadrśanaśaṅgraha, we note that they too regard Paśupati or Śiva as a mere efficient-cause of the world. From this we can conclude that just as Madhva, even while himself being a Vedāntist, differs from the rest of the Vedāntist masters and describes Brahman as a mere efficient-cause of the world, similarly some anomalous development has taken place in the Śaiva tradition. Thus there could have been even such Śaiva masters as would seek to reconcile their tradition with Upaniṣads. Naturally, these masters would attribute the designation 'Śiva' to Brahman described in Upaniṣads and regard it as a material-cause as well as an efficient-cause of the world; on the other hand, the other Śaiva masters would differ from this position and regard God as a mere efficient-cause of the world. Śrīkaṇṭha, following the Vedānta tradition, seeks support from Upaniṣads in a large measure while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Nakulīśa, Pāśupata, Śaiva etc. either chiefly seek support from reasoning or treat as authoritative the other independent Śaiva Āgamas of their own.²¹

Here the noteworthy thing is that when Śrīkaṇṭha establishes Śiva in the form of Brahman he submits that Brahman possessed of a subtle capacity for being non-conscious and conscious is Brahman-of-the-form-of-a-cause while the gross or visible world possessed of things non-conscious and conscious is Brahman-of-the-form-of-an-effect. This submission of Śrīkaṇṭha is a mere reflection of the corresponding position upheld by Śrī Rāmānujācārya. The subtle elements non-conscious and conscious have been described by Rāmānuja as a body and called Brahmana-in-the-state-of-a-cause while the manifest or gross world-multiplicity has been called by him Brahman-in-the-state-of-an-effect. These two masters—the former a Śaiva, the latter a Vaiṣṇava—adhere to the doctrine of transformation and yet pleading that the basis of transformation is a capacity inherent in Brahman continue to treat Brahman itself as something eternal-undergoing-no-change or something that undergoes no transformation whatsoever. As for Śrīkaṇṭha, he clearly says that to undergo a transformation is to undergo a

²⁰ See Dasagupta *ibid.* Vol. V, p. 79; also Śrīkaṇṭhabhāṣya 1.1.2

²¹ See Dasagupta *ibid.* Vol. V, p. 65; also Śrīkaṇṭhabhāṣya 1.1.2

change. That is to say, what undergoes a transformation necessarily undergoes a change. Hence with a view to keeping the changelessness of Brahman in tact he dubs transformations as a doing of the capacities inherent in Brahman. Such capacities inherent in Brahman are supposed to be many in number. The view of Śrī Vallabhācārya is called the doctrine of 'transformation-undergoing-no-change (=avikṛtapariṇāmavāda)'; the secret of this expression verily lies revealed in the present statement of Śrīkaṇṭha. If Śrīkaṇṭha identifies transformation with change then his net conclusion would be that Brahman-undergoing-transformation is Brahman-undergoing-change. Since Vallabhācārya advocates the doctrine that Brahman is something undergoing transformation one could easily charge him with advocating the doctrine that Brahman is something undergoing change. Possibly, it was with a view to saving himself from a charge like this that he calls his doctrine one which posits transformation-undergoing-no-change.²²

The Net Essence of the Various Positions Regarding God

The somewhat detailed discussion as to the element God that has been undertaken above has for its net essence the following points:

1. Among the atomists there are two chief groups of traditions. Thus the Jaina and Buddhist traditions, even while advocating atomism attribute no role whatsoever to God in the form of an independent individual. On the other hand, the traditions like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc. do attribute to God an independent role but they establish him as a mere efficient-cause of the world.

2. Within the Sāṅkhya tradition positing one original element those who posit twenty-four or twenty-five elements do not at all attribute any role to God, but the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition positing twenty six elements in all does posit God in the form of an independent element, and yet conceives him as a mere efficient-cause of the world.

3. All the Vedāntist traditions advocating the doctrine of Brahman, while positing one original element are different from the tradition positing Pradhāna, treat Brahman as a material-cause as well as an efficient-cause of the world and establish the same in the form of God. Some Vedāntists describe such Brahman only under ordinary designations like 'God', 'Supreme God' etc. but others describe it also under sectarian designations like 'Nārāyaṇa', 'Viṣṇu', 'Śiva' etc. But they all in one form or another, raise their doctrinal superstructure on the basis of the element Brahman alone.

22kāraṇavikṛtirūpatvāt pariṇāmasya,—Śrīkaṇṭhabhāṣya 1.1.5

4. Among all the authors of a bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra—from Śaṅkara onwards—one tendency seems to be commonly visible and it is that while establishing Brahman in the form of an original element and treating the same as a material-cause as well as an efficient cause of the world they are unable to propound their position in a systematic fashion without taking recourse to the Sāṅkhya concept of prakṛti and prakṛti-born effects. In other words, one can say that the basic non-dualist position adopted by these advocates of the doctrine of Brahman can be offered an apparently rational support only with the help of the element prakṛti posited by the Sāṅkhya. If from within the supporting argumentation advanced by an advocate of the doctrine of Brahman the Sāṅkhya procedure is taken away then no doctrine of Brahman is left with legs to stand on. From all this one can conclude that the very same qualities like being an efficient-cause not different from the material-cause which were attributed to pradhāna by the Sāṅkhya thinkers positing pradhāna as the sole original element were denied to prakṛti and attributed to Brahman by the advocates of the doctrine of Brahman, who while positing, in one form or other and under one designation or other, prakṛti as conceived by the Sāṅkhya, denied independent actorship to it on the testimony of Upaniṣads as well as reasoning.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Philosophy and Life

What is the relationship of philosophy to life and how does this relationship evolve

—this question has been touched upon in the following hymn of Katha Upaniṣad :

Parāñci khāni vyatṛṇat svayambhū-
tasmāt param paśyati nāntarātman /
Kaścid dhīraḥ pratyagātmānam aikṣad-
āvṛttacakṣur amṛtatvam icchan //

This hymn says that the sense-organs eye etc. belonging to an individual soul—whose existence is self-established—have the nature of undertaking activity directed in an outward direction. Hence it is that this individual soul first of all comes to know through the instrumentality of sense-organs only the external objects like colour etc. but is not in a position to know the internal soul—that is, its own nature. Even so, there often arises such a patience—possessing person as seeks to know and attain immortality—that is, his own internal and ultimately—real nature. With this end in view he places a closure before the sense-organs that are of form of doors directed outwards—that is, he directs those doors inward and incline them towards having a vision of his own nature. On having done so this person experiences a seeing or vision of his own nature.

The originating source of the philosophical discipline is certainly man, but he has a vision of his own nature not all of a sudden but in a gradual fashion. Just as a baby enhances its knowledge and experience only gradually—that is, with the growth of its age, so is the case with the human race. The inherent constitution of a sense-organ is itself such that it first implies man too—as it implies every other species of living beings—to have a vision of the external world. But however much pleasure or enjoyment one might derive from the journey of having a direct vision of the external world man's intellect does not find satisfaction in that. Since this happens the same man makes an effort to free his sense-organs from their operation directed outwards and directs them inwards. And when these sense-organs, having been directed inwards, develop their inherent capacity then there appears before them an internal world—that is, the nature of a soul. And the vision of an internal world culminates in the vision of something immortal—that is, the Supreme Soul. Thus the philosophical discipline too is first preoccupied with an accounting of the external world;

then gradually penetrating deeper it is directed toward an internal world—that is, towards an accounting of the Supreme Soul. The scholar Edward Caird enumerates the three stages of religious development as follows: “We look out before we look in; and we look in before we look up”.

This statement verily echoes the above hymn of *Kaṭha-Upaniṣad*. The same order of progress is described in the *Upaniṣads* also under the titles ‘*adhibhūta*’, ‘*adhideva*’, ‘*adhyātma*’. And whenever in *Upaniṣads* as also elsewhere there occurs a reference to the learnings called lower and higher or worldly and supra-worldly then too there is indicated the very same idea. The man first of all practises the so many worldly learnings commonly called ‘lower learning’ or ‘worldly learning’, but he does not rest content with those learnings alone; so proceeding still further he moves in the direction of what is called ‘higher learning’. It is this higher learning which is learning-pertaining-to-soul or learning-pertaining-to-Supreme-Soul.

Through anecdotes like those of *Nārada* and *Śaunaka* it is indicated that even after having acquired so many varieties of lower learning the former did not relish them and went to a competent preceptor with a view to acquiring the varieties of higher learning. In the context of these anecdotes the higher variety of learning is just one and that is learning-pertaining-to-soul. One desirous of acquiring learning-pertaining-to-soul seeks to know besides one’s nature also the nature of the Supreme Soul, which exists in all or is common to all. Following the wording of the *Upaniṣads* concerned *Śaṅkarācārya* offers the following interpretation: I am conversant with hymns—that is, conversant with the acts to be performed, this meaning that I am conversant with lower branches of learning like *Vedās*—along-with—their-meaning. But I am not conversant with soul—that is, I am ignorant of higher learning”. *Rāmānuja*, while not interpreting the phrase ‘lower learning’ in a literal sense and indicating that it stands for learning of the form of an indirect knowledge, interprets the phrase ‘higher learning’ as direct knowledge. But however might one interpret the phrases in question the net ultimate-conclusion is that there first originated and developed lower branches of learning which have for their chief aim a knowledge of soul not at all or least of all and that it was only later on that the class of knowledge-seekers turned towards higher learning — that is, was more and more inclined towards understanding and experiencing the nature of oneself and the Supreme Soul as also the relationship obtaining between the two.

Man’s desire for knowledge and the journey-of-knowledge of the form of an effort to satisfy this desire resulted in his undertaking an investigation into three topics. These very three topics — viz. the world, soul

and God — have become three chief subject-matters for the philosophical discipline.

A consideration of these three topics has been undertaken by so many different people in different geographical regions and in different periods of time. Not all of them were equipped with the same sort of capacity, starting-point, viewpoint or means. The result was that even if they all were bent upon investigating into truth the net outcome of their investigations was not identical in each case. This explains why we find that as regards the nature of the external worlds, the internal-soul and the Supreme Soul so many trends of thought have been current. When viewed superficially — and sometimes even from the standpoint of essentials — these trends appear to be mutually divergent; and yet within them all the chief voice to be heard is that each of these trends is seeking after nothing save truth. This is verily an achievement on the part of the philosophical trends of thought. Certainly, if each trend of thought insists on but truth then through the instrumentality of it man will sooner or later be able to untie his knot of ignorance.

Whatever branches of learning man has cultivated are all certainly meant to achieve his some ultimate-aim or other. Thus he has given birth to the branches of learning that are meant to achieve wealth and sensuous enjoyment, also those that are meant to achieve a religious end, and finally he has also given consideration to the pathways that lead to an achievement of emancipation. Not only that, in so many cases he, through actually traversing those pathways, has also tested them on the criterion of practice. Thus upto this day man has undertaken a very long journey of learning as also that of experience. The conclusions arrived at as a result of this journey and found described in Indian literature in a most satisfactory manner — in the form of a modest illustration of a prolonged perusal and the resultant enjoyment of those conclusions I have attempted to serve their cream in the course of these lectures.

My aim has been to make it possible for every student of the philosophical discipline to briefly understand and also to comparatively study as to what different speculations and in what different forms have been undertaken by the Indian systems of philosophy as to the world, soul and God. If the basic question is properly understood then there can arise in one a desire to know the details thereof and with a view to satisfying that desire one can also feel inclined to undertake a study of the original texts. With this end in view I have offered in the footnotes references to many such texts as might be useful in an understanding of these and those topics and that of the differences of opinion arising in connection with them.

I have not only mentioned the differences of opinion obtaining between the philosophical trends as to three topics — viz. the world, soul and God — but have also made a little attempt to show as to what way of looking at things has given birth to these differences, how they have undergone development, what goes to unite them and what to differentiate them — all this with a view to facilitating an understanding of the original intention of the founder of this or that trend.

In the ultimate count, the philosophical discipline inspires man to undertake a consideration of the relation that obtains between man on the one hand and the world and the remaining mass of living beings on the other. This consideration on its part transforms man. His life, ceasing to concentrate merely on things gross, turns towards concentrating on things subtle and on all things whatsoever — as a result of which he develops in relation to all things, even if they appear to be mutually different quâ individuals, a vision of self-similarity and even one of self-identity. This very vision is the aim of humanity and this verily is the foundation of character-building. As soon as the philosophical discipline brings about the touch of a true philosophical vision or 'higher learning' the process of rising high is inevitable in life. An attempt to bring about this process of rising high is what is called *adhyātma-yoga* or *yogic discipline*.

The Indian philosophical discipline did not rest content with a mere delineation of the fundamental elements; for this delineation has in the main paved the ground for the building up of the pathway to *yogic discipline* or *adhyātma-yoga*. If the experience that has found mention in the course of a consideration of *yogic path* as also in the texts dealing with the same and has gained currency in different traditions is left aside then there remains no vital element whatsoever in the Indian philosophical discipline. From this point of view it was certainly proper for me to undertake in these lectures a discussion of *yoga* or *adhyātmavidyā*. However, since these lectures have a limitation of their own I have done nothing of the sort. Even so, the matter as I view it has been discussed by me elsewhere — that is, in my book '*Adhyātmavicāraṇā*'.¹

The ultimate task present before the philosophical discipline is after all a consideration of the element Supreme Soul. This consideration has been undertaken by so many people and for so long a time, but not all of them have adopted an identical procedure of thought. In the manner described above man first of all looks at the external world — that is, he undertakes acts saying about his body "this is I myself in the ultimate count". Proceeding beyond this when he goes deeper then he realizes that

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even beyond the body, sense-organs, breath and internal-organs there is an element which is an object of self-experience and is really 'I'. This 'I' is not something amenable to cognition on the part of a mere sense-organ or internal-organ, but lying still deeper it is an object of cognition on its own part. When this much becomes clear to him then the differentiating coverage or imposition of the form of body, breath etc. is removed from before him and he realizes that just as his own 'I', even while residing inside body etc., is of the form of a conscious soul lying beyond these body etc. so is also the case with the 'I' belonging to each and every living being. When this occurs then either of the two ideas gets a steady hold over him. Thus either he begins to regard his own conscious soul as akin to 'I' belonging to each and every living being — that is, looks at the entire mass of living beings as something similar to himself (to put it in Sanskrit, *ātmavat sarvabhūteṣu*) — or he begins to regard his own conscious soul as essentially non-different from 'I' belonging to the mass of living beings. This latter view of looking at things constitutes the idea of non-difference or idea-pertaining-to-Brahma (to put it in Sanskrit, *sarvam khalv idam brahma*).

'Whatever is inside body the same is inside the world' — in conformity to this dictum just as a conscious soul lying deeper than body, sense-organ, breath etc. resides in the aggregate of body etc. similarly there ought to exist an all-pervading conscious soul which lies deeper than the gross elements like earth, water etc. constituting the gross world and deeper than the even subtler elements like air, ether and conscious souls. If there exists a conscious soul inside each and every body then why should there not exist inside the entire universe a conscious-soul which is even more noble and all-pervading ? In the absence of a conscious-soul of the latter type how should it be possible at all for the world to make a move in an intelligent fashion ? On account of this consideration the idea of the existence of a Great Element lying at the root of the world as a whole too occupied a strong position within the fold of philosophical discipline. This idea constitutes the foundation of the position that one soul is non-different from another soul. Thus the idea that all souls are similar arising out of a consideration of body and the idea that all souls are one arising out of a consideration of the world — these two chief thought-currents alone have provided inspiration to the philosophical discipline.

The view that all souls are similar gave currency in life to the feeling of equality, the view that all souls are one gave currency to the feeling of world-unity or the feeling of being one with Brahman. Both these feelings in common ultimately lend support to non-violence. Unless non-violence is given a corporate form in human life both these feelings remain but

verbal. However, the human race has actually given birth to such heroes as have given to non-violence a corporate form in life. In Upaniṣads when an existing thing or a soul is described as Brahman then there is echoed there the feeling that the world is one, and when a soul is described as something lying deeper than body etc. then there is indicated there a direction to the idea that all souls are similar. Ultimately, in the context of non-violence and the allied basic vows-of-conduct the two words 'Brahman' and 'sama (=equal)' verily become synonymous.

In each and every field of individual and social life — that is, in the economic, educational, political, social and other fields — it is today that there arises the maximum need for a true practice of non-violence based either on the idea that all souls are similar or on the idea that they are all one.

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